Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-072
Friday
14 April 1995

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FBIS-SOV-95-072 *14 April 1995*

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ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 14 Apr

LD1404061795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0601 GMT 14 Apr 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA runs a leading article on the situation in Tajikistan.

According to the newspaper, Andrey Nikolayev, director of Russia's Federal Border Service (FBS), has expressed concern about the fact that a "critical mass of civil war" is accumulating in Tajikistan at a time when the border "from Tajikistan to Moscow" is open and 12.5 million ethnic Russians have not yet had time to leave Central Asia.

Ever since combat actions began on the border, the Russian border troops have not received any considerable assistance from units which are part of the CIS collective peacekeeping force, the newspaper notes.

The Russian Defence Ministry ignores appeals from the FBs leadership, which, the newspaper believes, accounts for the big losses sustained by border troops. The newspaper explains the Defence Ministry's stand by personal dislike that Pavel Grachev feels towards Andrey Nikolayev.

IZVESTIYA, in an article headlined "Russia Arms America", writes that the major aim of the recent trip to Yekaterinburg by Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador in Russia, was to examine the question of the sale of the supermodern missile system S-300 to the Americans. According to the newspaper, the Americans "promised to pay serious money for the missile system, dissimilar to the amount which Belarus received upon selling the outdated S-300 model".

The promised amount is more than 60 million U.S. dollars. The existence of a contract for the sale of the missile system to the U.S. has been confirmed at various levels, from the Antaeus design bureau, where it was developed, to the Russian committee on the defence industry. Experts believe that such a deal would not be to the detriment of Russia's defence might, since it is impossible to reproduce the missile sytem without know-how.

IZVESTIYA writes that underworld leaders are longing for the corridors of power. Conditions for the existence of domestic businesses are such that the availability of a reliable "cover", i.e. the patronage of an influential criminal group is the necessary prerequisite for the activities of this or that firm, the article says.

Naturally, the leaders of organised crime groups, seeking to consolidate the captured positions in the economy, in every way strive to resolve for themselves the problem of reliability of commercial structures being established by them, through a direct penetration of governing bodies in particular. The newspaper mentions instances when criminal "authorities" financed political actions.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on election prospects for social democracy in Russia.

The newspaper believes that two forces in Russia contend for this role: the social democrats of various trends, on the one hand, and the communists, primarily the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, on the other.

The newspaper explains the communists' complaints by the fact that the latest political events, including those connected with Chechnya, have deeply ploughed up the political field of Russia. This ploughing is not to the benefit of overt nationalistic, great- power - chauvinist forces. The newspaper is of the opinion that the communists came to feel a serious to their plans following the emergence of a Russian Party of Social Democracy headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, TRUD and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA still highlight the April 12 All-Russia Trade Unions' protest action.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA describes the trade unions' protest actions by mentioning two figures: about 450,000 people involved in the action, according to Interior Minister Viktor Yerin and about 1.5 million participants, according to trade unions' information.

Anatoliy Chubays, reacting to the trade unions' protest actions, said "with unfailing optimism" that the economic situation in 1995 is changing for the better and that the state debts in repayment of wage arrears will be settled according to a time-table.

Many newspapers devote attention to the fire which gutted out two floors in the building of Promstrojbank on Tverskoi Boulevard in Moscow. The fire was rated as being of top, fifth category of seriousness. The fire board of the Moscow Department of Internal Affairs is of the opinion that investigators have no grounds so far to consider "criminal" versions of the causes of the fire.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA nevertheless recalls that the bank's brach in St. Petersburg suffered from a fire not so long ago, which gives food for reflection. The newspaper points out that in general the fire on Tverskoi Boulevard is far from beig the first one affecting banks. All however agree about one thing, namely, that the fire will not not affect the obligations of Promstrojbank, which is among Russia's ten major banks, to the depositors and clients.

Transcaucasian Collective Security Force Reportedly Planned

LD1304215595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1100 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 13 Apr—Regional coalition forces of collective security, which are being set up in Transcaucasia, will, if necessary, act as peacemaking forces. ITAR-TASS learned from well-informed military

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and diplomatic sources in Tbilisi that these forces will initially include military contingents of three member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States deployed in Transcaucasia—Russia, Georgia, and Armenia. This will make it possible to speed up their use in the event of possible conflicts in the region.

Joint exercises of Russian servicemen, together with their Armenian and Georgian counterparts, have already been held in the framework of setting up the regional coalition forces of collective security.

Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz Presidents To Meet in Chimkent

LD1404083595 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program in Russian 1100 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As is known, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan is on a working visit around the republic. Our correspondent reports from Kzyl-Orda. [passage omitted: correspondent on Nazarbayev's visits to local enterprises]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The visit has ended. You have basically managed to see a lot, but there are many things left over. What is your overall personal impression?

[Nazarbayev] This is the Aral region which we are talking about. Due to the catastrophic drying up of the Aral Sea, the whole region is certainly suffering from grave difficulties. It was therefore interesting for me to see this place, where people are forced to bear the heavy burden of this catastrophe; all the more so because I have not been here for the last two years.

As president of the Save the Aral Fund I am drawing in the whole world community. Now, all the presidents in the world to whom I have written are interested in it. A special committee of the Central Asian states has been set up.

I and the presidents of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will meet and discuss this issue in Chimkent on 14 April. The European banks are allocating a special grant worth $41 million to help the people. A large international conference is to take place under the aegis of the United Nations. [passage omitted on local economic developments]

Kzyl-Orda Region is becoming an oil region. The fact that I visited the Kumkol deposit is of great significance. If it is proved that there are workable reserves of up to 500 million tonnes here, we will try to increase he volume of oil extraction from 6 to 10 million tonnes here. In that case we would be able to free ourselves from depending on Siberian oil. We will supply both Chimkent and Pavlodar oil refineries with our own oil. That is very important. I think geological work must be intensified here.

The mood of young people, and others too—and you know the population here is 100 percent Kazakh—shows that the extent of their comprehension of independence and sovereignty is very high, which is very pleasant for me to see. The people support the policies. The people understand the reforms. The people think that the reform processes have become irrevocable. And that is very important for me, because we are following this very path now. [end recording]

[Announcer] This morning President Nursultan Nazarbayev left Kzyl-Orda for South Kazakhstan Region.

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Summit Will Tackle 'Practical Aspects' of Relations

MM1104095295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Mikhail Pogorelyy: "Both a Tribute to the Victors and the Development of Partnership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Less than one month remains until the festivities in Moscow to mark the 50th anniversary of the great victory and, simultaneously, until the top-level Russian-U.S. meeting. For U.S. President Bill Clinton is coming to the Russian capital not only in order to express the Americans' admiration for the courage and the greatness of the historic exploit of the peoples of the former USSR in World War II. But opinions of just this kind are currently widespread in the Russian mass media: Clinton's visit to Russia is said to be of purely symbolic significance. In order to dispel such prejudices, a high-ranking spokesman for the U.S. Administration who is now working out with his Russian colleagues all the details of the summit scheduled for 10 May met with journalists in the Russian-U.S. Press Center last weekend.

Of course, Washington's emissary said, President Clinton sees his participation in the memorial festivities as a very important part of his visit to Russia. While speaking in Moscow, he will, nevertheless, be addressing all former Soviet citizens who are war veterans. As for the Americans' attitude to the Baltic states leaders' refusal to come to the festivities in Moscow, that is their decision, their choice. Along with the leaders of another 50 states, the U.S. President acts in the way prompted by his awareness of the Soviet people's great feat and the need to express the Americans' feelings toward the events of May 1945.

In addition to the symbolic aspects, on 10 May the Russian and U.S. presidents will also tackle the strictly practical aspects of bilateral relations and of a number of international problems. The U.S. Administration spokesman named some of them. They are problems of global and European stability, Russia's intentions to cooperate in greater depth with the main international political and economic institutions, and a package of military-political questions, including the prospects for enlarging NATO. The presidents will also evidently discuss the Russian-Iranian reactor deal, the U.S. politician assumed. At least, a working group of experts of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of State is tackling this "obstacle." In any case, the high-ranking White House staffer emphasized, it is not a question of the United States' imposing its own policy and its own understanding of various problems of Russia's international security (not just those connected with the reactor for Iran), but of a desire to draw the Russian leaders' attention to them in order together to find mutually acceptable solutions.

Answering a question about the aims of President Clinton's trip to Kiev, which will follow his visit to Moscow, the Washington spokesman declared that this is in no circumstances a counterweight to the "Russian" component of U.S. international policy. But Ukraine is important to America—in view of its potential, the size of its population, and its geographic and geopolitical location. Bill Clinton's visit is designed merely to demonstrate Washington's support for Ukraine's policy of reforms and of building a democratic society founded on a market model of the economy.

Filatov Tries To Persuade Kohl To Attend Victory Parade

LD1104191995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1723 GMT 11 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 11 (Interfax)—Sergey Filatov, the chief of the Russian president's administration "tried to persuade" German chancellor Helmut Kohl to take part in the festivities devoted to the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow's Red Square, but Kohl refused. Filatov explained this in Moscow Tuesday [11 April], discussing the Victory Day decorations of Red Square.

"Kohl had a personal tragedy, connected with the war: his 16- year old brother was killed in the last days of the war in 1945, and Kohl was 15 years old at that time", Filatov said.

Kohl had refused to take part in the military parade on Poklonnaya Hill "in protest against Russia's military actions in Chechnya", as some sources believe.

Canadian Prime Minister To Meet Yeltsin 9 May

LD1404083795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0816 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By Nikolay Setunskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ottawa April 14 TASS—Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien is to meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on May 9, it was officially announced here on Thursday.

A press release, circulated by the prime minister's office, said M. Chretien will watch a Red Square parade in Moscow marking the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism. Then he is take part in ceremonies to lay wreaths at the Unknown Soldier's Tomb near the Kremlin wall and to unveil a memorial on Poklonnaya Hill.

During a meeting with President Yeltsin, M. Chretien intends to discuss matters connected with the course of preparations for a Group of Seven summit meeting, which is to be held in the Canadian city of Halifax on June 15-17 with the participation of the Russian president, exchange views on topical international problems and consider various aspects of bilateral Canadian-Russian relations.

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Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Hallbrooke Remarks on Europe

LD1304184095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1643 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 13 (INTERFAX)—Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin described as incorrect the statement by the Under Secretary of State for Europe and Canada Richard Hallbrooke to the effect that the possibility of Russia's integration into the European security architecture it fell out of in 1917 has just emerged.

"The under secretary's statement is not only incorrect; obviously it distorts the state of affairs on purpose. It would make sense only if NATO could be considered as the only security structure on the continent. But this is not so by far," Karasin said at Thursday's briefing.

"Where will Mr. Hallbrooke apply Russia's participation in the OSCE or, say, in the Agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe?" he asked.

"At a time when Europe is going through a complicated period of search for answers to the new challenges of the post-confrontation era, statements of the kind made by Hallbrooke can hardly be qualified as constructive," Karasin said.

Grachev: START III Talks During Clinton Visit 'Premature'

LD1404124295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1142 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 14 (INTERFAX)—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev says that the Russian leaders and U.S. President Bill Clinton have no intention of discussing prospects for the conclusion of the third treaty on the reduction of the strategic offensive weapons, START-3, during Clinton's upcoming visit to Moscow.

"Now that there is a tendency for the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance into Eastern Europe, talk of a START-3 seems premature," Grachev told INTERFAX Friday. "The START-2 treaty is to be ratified first."

Grachev is touring units of Russia's strategic missile force. At approximately 12:00, Moscow time, on April 14 he will be expected to take a flight from Kostroma, in the upper flow of the Volga river, for Plesetsk, of the Archangel region.

At 14:00, Moscow time, an SS-25 "Topol" intercontinental ballistic missile, with an estimated flying range of 7,000 kilometers, is to be tested at Plesetsk.

Grachev's view of the strategic missile force's potential will depend on whether the launching of the SS-25 missile is a success and whether the missile hits the target.

Friday afternoon Grachev will be expected to return to Moscow.

Grachev has already visited a missile regiment that adopted mobile Topol missiles, near the city of Irkutsk, and the Tatishchevskaya missile division (based in the Saratov region). The division adopted silo-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-19 and a combat railroad complex near Kostroma that is used for the launching of Topol missiles.

Moscow To Sell Air Defense, Anti-Missile Complex to U.S.

LD1404113595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1105 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—Russia has pledged to sell an air-defence and anti-missile complex C-300 to the United States, head of the press centre of the state committee "Rosvooruzheniye" Valeriy Pogrebenkov told ITAR-TASS today. The terms of the deal are still being discussed. The results of the talks are expected to be announced next week, Pogrebenkov said.

According to estimates made by foreign experts the complex C-300 is considered to be a mobile multi-channel missile launching system designed by the "Almaz" scientific-industrial association. The air-defence complex is intended for shooting down modern aircraft, including the so-called "invisible aircraft", cruise missiles and other combat aircraft at altitudes ranging from 25 meters to the top range in which they operate. The C-300 complex can be used under any weather conditions and in different climatic areas.

Generals 'Unhappy' Over Missile Sale

MM1404112395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 95 pp 1-2

[Feature comprising reports by IZVESTIYA correspondent in Yekaterinburg Aleksandr Pashkov and IZVESTIYA military correspondent Viktor Litovkin under the general heading: "Russia Arms America"—first paragraph is unattributed introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit to Moscow an unprecedented decision has been adopted in the Russian capital. Our country is going to sell the U.S. Army the supermodern S-300B antiaircraft, antimissile complex.

[Pashkov report] A few days ago, as in times gone by, determined State Automobile Inspectorate personnel sealed off all Yekaterinburg's streets in order to let U.S. Ambassador Pickering's motorcade pass by unhindered. The ambassador was visiting the Kalinin Machine-Building Plant. The official version has it that problems of conversion were discussed—the development of a dump truck, for instance. According to my information,

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however, more serious topics were broached: In particular, the question of selling the supermodern S-300 missile complex was being decided. The order came from the Americans but was being placed by the Russian Defense Ministry.

It is known from fairly reliable sources that this complex is the very latest of its type in the series and that serious money has been promised for it—by no means the kind of money that Belarus obtained from selling an outdated S-300 model. The editorial office has also received information that the Kalinin Plant, which has long been producing this kind of specialized output, initially felt a sense of panic when it heard about the order. After all, the last few years of sacrifice on the altar of conversion have certainly had an impact—specialists have left, equipment has been mothballed, and some sections have simply been shut down.

Today the Kalinin Plant's personnel are only 6-percent employed on specialized output. Producing a complex system with such sparse resources is obviously not easy. But produce it they have, apparently. I asked plant director Vladimir Kazimirskiy how much the enterprise stands to gain from "selling off the motherland" and whether the order will help extricate it from its disastrous position.

"We have received neither down-payment nor actual payment," Vladimir Vladimirovich said tersely.

I admit that this fact struck me as the most curious in the whole saga. Specialists claim that defense interests will not suffer—that an export version of the complex has been produced and that the Americans will learn no secrets. Other specialists retort that the Americans are certainly not intending to replace their "Patriots" with our missiles—which means that they could want this this purchase for other reasons. There are as many opinions as there are specialists, so to speak. But the fact that the people directly involved in filling the order are still on the rocks does not somehow fit in with any logic. Needless to say, there would not be much joy to be had from enhancing American defense potential even at America's expense, but at least you could see some sense in it: We would earn something, and we could declare how proud we were.

Incidentally, before Kazimirskiy the plant was led by the notorious Aleksandr Tizyakov, one of the participants in the State Committee for the State of Emergency, now leader of the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. [Pashkov ends]

[Litovkin report] The fact that there is a contract for Russia to sell the United States the supermodern S-300B complex has been confirmed to me by various offices ranging from the "Antey" Design Bureau, which developed it, to the Russian Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry. "There is a government decision to supply the United States with the complex, but I will say nothing more on this score," I was told by a high- ranking Defense Ministry staffer. This contract was prepared by "Rosvooruzheniye." Judging by the general's mood, he was not delighted about this deal with what is, albeit no longer a likely enemy, by no means yet a partner.

You can understand the general's sentiments: The furor over the Belarusian sale of a similar complex to the Americans, which we know that the military very strongly opposed (IZVESTIYA Nos. 223, 234, and 247 for 1994) has still not subsided, and now we have a new agreement. Particularly one that was adopted not abroad somewhere, albeit the near abroad, but in our own coiuntry, and at the highest level.

Although our newspaper has written about the S-300B complex (No. 119, 29 June 1993), let us remind the readers what it is. It is a ground forces' mobile antiaircraft missile system designed to protect troop groupings against tactical and operational ballistic missiles, including cruise missiles, and also to combat any aerial targets, including Stealth aircraft. The complex can detect around 200 targets at once and direct up to 48 missiles of two different types (weighing 4.6 tonnes and 2.5 tonnes respectively and developed by the "Novator" Experimental-Design Bureau under the leadership of the Lev Lyulyev) in one shot against targets at altitudes ranging between 25 meters and 30 km and at ranges of 40-100 km. The system was developed by the "Antey" Design Bureau (whose general designer is Academician Veniamin Yefremov).

Yefremov considers his baby "the best in the world." The system does indeed have unique features. For instance, its missiles are able to autonomously counter any jamming en route to the target, home their warhead [boyevoy zaryad] onto the nose section of a head-on or parallel missile, and hit it with a very dense barrage of heavy fragments weighing a total of 150 kg. No other complex, including all models of the U.S. Patriot, possesses these features.

The Americans have frequently tried to buy the S-300B from us. A few months ago Ye. Veygensberg [name as transliterated], president of the Canadian firm ATOS [as transliterated] who became well-known from the Belarusian deal, was negotiating tenaciously for it in parallel with the talks on the S-300 PMU [expansion unknown] complex. The contract was thwarted at the last minute because of the uncompromising approach of our military, who considered the amount agreed between "Antey" and the Canadian firm too small.

According to my information, this time the sum is over $60 million [?U.S. dollars], and that has evidently decided the fate of the contract. Aleksandr Dorofeyev, chief of the State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry Main Directorate for Military- Technical Cooperation, indirectly confirmed during a conversation with me the crucial role play by money in the sale of the S-300B to the Americans. "We will only sell highly modern, science-intensive, high-technology combat equipment abroad in cases where we are absolutely

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convinced that this will not do substantial damage to Russia's security," he said, "and if there is no other realistic possibility of keeping our leading design collectives and defense enterprises afloat."

Specialists believe that it would be impossible to reproduce a counterpart of the S-300 abroad. It would require the "know-how" and established technology. Just as, for example, no matter how many Japanese televisions you buy, you cannot make the same article in your own country without Japanese help. Specialists also think that the assumption that some of the Russian system's design features can be reproduced on a modernized "Patriot" is absurd. "These two complexes will never gel," our designers claim.

The State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry insists that the S-300B contract with the Americans represents a breakthrough in relations between our countries, whose favorable consequences we will be able to utilize in the future. But why then are Russia's generals so unhappy? Probably because they do not have the dollars to buy the supermodern combat equipment which their own army really is short on.

Interior Ministry, U.S. Secret Service To Cooperate

LD1104202995

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1700 GMT on 11 April carries a two-minute recorded report by correspondent Sergey Goryachev as part of the "Vremya" newscast. According to Goryachev, the U.S. Secret Service and Russia's Interior Ministry have announced their intention to cooperate in the fight against organized crime.

Reporting from Washington, Goryachev adds that the main areas of cooperation will be economic crimes and forgery.

After briefly reviewing the history of the U.S. Secret Service, Goryachev concludes: "It was stressed at a news conference in Washington that the Interior Ministry and the U.S. Secret Service had interests in common. It is possible that agents of the U.S. Secret Service will soon appear in Moscow. We have learned that talks are already being held on opening an office. This is in addition to the Moscow bureau of the FBI, which is already operating. Our law enforcement bodies do not yet have any offices in America."

Karasin on UN's Guarantees to Nonnuclear Countries

LD1304174995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1648 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Russian Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said Moscow hoped that the UN Security Council's resolution of April 11 on security guarantees for non-nuclear countries would contribute to ensuring success of the conference on the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and would help the treaty's signatories to opt for unconditionally extending the treaty for an indefinite term.

Karasin said that, contrary to the Security Council's resolution of 1968, the new resolution was more concrete on the measures which the Security Council would take in case of use of nuclear weapons or a threat of such an aggression against a non-nuclear country.

Karasin said the measures would, in particular, include immediate discussion of the issue in the Security Council and actions in response to the request of the victim of an aggression on providing to it technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance.

Russia's Stance on NPT Viewed

BR1304142495 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Apr 95 p 10

[Article by retired Major General Vladimir Belous, member of the Committee of Russian Scientists for Global Security: "Two Opposing Stances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before the conference on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in view of its importance, there have been four sessions of the preparatory committee at which the stances of the various groups of states have been set out. As was to be expected, most of the criticisms were leveled against the nuclear powers, which have not honored their obligations with respect to Article 6 of the treaty, which obliges each signatory to hold talks on effective measures to end the arms race, nuclear disarmament, and a total disarmament treaty with strict and effective international monitoring.

Those justified criticisms are due to the fact that, while the treaty has been in force, those states have not only not reduced their nuclear arsenals but have even increased them. When it was signed in 1968, the United States and the USSR had 4,840 and 1,600 strategic nuclear warheads, respectively, according to figures from the Stockholm Institute for Studies on Peace Problems. At the beginning of the nineties, the United States had 11,700 nuclear warheads in its strategic delivery vehicles, and the USSR 10,740, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons—around 8,000 in the case of the United States and 12,000 in that of the USSR. The United Kingdom, France, and China have also increased their nuclear arsenals, multiplying them several times over.

The nonnuclear countries which signed the treaty are demanding positive and negative guarantees—based on precise obligations laid down juridically—that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. It is foreseeable that these countries will press at the conference for the

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signing of a treaty imposing a universal ban on nuclear tests and the production of fissile materials for military purposes. Although the talks on these matters have been continuing for a long time, the participants have been unable to sign an agreement prior to the conference.

Several Muslim states of the Near East and North Africa, led by Egypt, are making their participation in the NPT as nonnuclear states conditional on Israel's adhering to this document, destroying its nuclear weapons, and placing its secret installations under the supervision of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). According to independent experts, Israel possesses between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads. For its Arab neighbors, such a quantity of nuclear weapons is an unacceptable threat.

On the eve of the conference, analysts point out three possible alternatives for the NPT's future—an indefinite extension, an extension for a definite period, and an extension for a fixed period with an automatic continuation of its validity. Several developing states do not conceal their intention of ensuring that the treaty is extended for a brief period of between five and 10 years, with the idea of using each of the subsequent appraisals of results in order to exert pressure on the nuclear powers. Hence it is to be expected that they will take the initiative conducting opposition to the world's leading countries.

The Western countries and Russia are in favor of an indefinite extension of the NPT, since otherwise, according to the experts on international law, the treaty will lose its validity at the end of the agreed period. This could lead to an unforeseeable situation with the disappearance of the mechanism which prevents the development of totalitarian regimes' nuclear ambitions. The final outcome would be strategic chaos and, finally, nuclear collapse. The position of the opponents of an indefinite extension is strengthened by the practical measures which the United States and Russia (and previously, the USSR) have adopted over the past few years—the destruction of the medium-range and lesser-range nuclear weapons and the signing of the START-1 and START-2 treaties.

Since 1989, the USSR has ceased to produce highly enriched uranium, and has decommissioned 10 out of the 13 nuclear reactors producing plutonium. The other three are operating in order to supply the secret cities with power, and will also be closed down by the year 2000. All the nuclear powers, except China, are observing the moratorium on nuclear tests and holding talks in order to sign a treaty banning them. The measures undertaken by the nuclear powers will help to overcome the opposition of some Third World states to the treaty's being extended indefinitely.

According to analysts, the number of countries openly supporting the proposal to extend the treaty indefinitely is around 70, although at least 86 votes are needed in order to take that decision. This explains the diplomatic activity of the United States and Russia in order to win over other states to their side.

Russia supports the idea of extending the NPT indefinitely, since it believes that the NPT is not responsible for the division of the world's countries into nuclear and nonnuclear countries. The document simply confined itself to freezing the situation which existed when it was drawn up, and constituted a barrier for containing a subsequent proliferation of nuclear weapons on the planet. Russia's stance is to be explained largely by the "nuclear belt" existing on its borders—Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea. There is no other country in the world that is in such a dangerous environment. Aware of the nonnuclear countries' justified concern, the Russian leaders deem it necessary to take real steps to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, such as discontinuing the tests, whose purpose is to perfect nuclear weapons. Some representatives of the Russian arms industry criticize this stance, since they are interested in the state's continuing to finance nuclear tests. They justify their stance by claiming that it is necessary to guarantee Russian nuclear weapons' safety.

Russia resolutely supports the U.S. proposal on discontinuing the production of highly enriched uranium and military plutonium in all countries. According to the experts, in Russia's nuclear warheads there are 100 tonnes of plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium, whose conservation and disposal is a very serious economic, scientific, technical, and ecological problem. Russia is in favor of giving the nonnuclear countries guarantees of security and territorial integrity in accordance with the model followed by Washington and Moscow in the case of Ukraine. Russia is consistently in favor of the reduction of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article 6 of the treaty. However, some analysts believe that the possible steps for signing a START-3 treaty will be discussed during President Clinton's visit to Moscow in May. In the meantime, some political forces—and not just the national patriotic forces—are opposed to a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, criticize the START-2 treaty, and are successfully undertaking initiatives in order to delay its ratification. These actions could strengthen the position of the opponents of an indefinite extension of the NPT. At the same time, the statements by Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Russian parliament's upper house, who has asserted that Russia could refuse to ratify the START-2 treaty in response to the plans to enlarge NATO, are disorienting. The world is at a crossroads, and the decisions taken in New York over the next few days will largely determine its fate. Let us hope that common sense will prevail and that mankind will have a real opportunity to preserve life. To that there is no rational alternative.

Karasin Favors New Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

LD1304193395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1845 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—Russian diplomacy is committed to the soonest possible solution of major poblems related to the implementation and adaptation to new European realities of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin said here on Thursday in connection with a regular session of the joint consultative group on this accord, which is currently being held in Vienna.

One of the most sensitive issues at the moment is that of flank restrictions. According to the Russian diplomat, the immediate elimination of the "flank anomalies" brought to life by "both the dissolution of one of the two military blocs in Europe and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union itself is an essential condition for ensuring the security of Russia and other states". This is also imperative for keeping the overall treaty viable. Russia expects its partners in the treaty to produce a constructive response to specific compromising proposals, which is to help solve the flank issue on a cooperative basis, Karasin noted.

Furthermore, Moscow believes the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in its present form is hardly suitable for being implemented under critical conditions. At least, the latest developments in Europe proved to the need for taking corrective measures in this respect.

"Speaking about the fate of conventional armed forces in Europe on the whole, the new treaty must correspond to new realities, promoting creation of a system of universal non-bloc security and stability in Europe, which is to be built under a unanimous decision taken at the CSCE summit in Budapest", the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman said in conclusion.

Italy Understands Russia Objecting to NATO Expansion

LD1304202195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2002 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksey Bukalov, Aleksey Golyayev, Dmitriy Gorokhov, and Sergey Startsev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome April 13 TASS—"Italy understands Russia's approach which opposes hasty NATO expansion. Talks to this effect worsen the air in Europe and block the Partnership Programme," Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said here on Thursday summing up the results of his working visit to Italy.

"Rome pursues a well-balanced, pragmatic approach to this problem with an emphasis on partnership. This is very important", he said.

Kozyrev believes a "meditation pause" proposed by Italy with regard to NATO expansion "should continue as long as it is needed". "But it should be used to strengthen the partnership", he continued.

"Hastily extending NATO is fraught with new dividing lines in Europe. As for us, we are for unity of actions and not for opposition. It is necessary to jointly draw up a new model of European security with the participation of the U.S.A.

NATO Submarine Shadowing of Naval Exercise Deplored

MM1104144895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Viktor Litovkin: "Northern Fleet Sailors Hunted U.S. Submarines"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Northern Fleet exercises have ended after 10 days. There were given a special piquancy by the constant presence of NATO countries' ships and aircraft in the region where they were being held.

Captain First Rank Vladimir Pyzh, chief of the fleet's press center, told IZVESTIYA that these were the sailors' largest-scale maneuvers for three years.

Over 40 surface ships and submarines participated in the exercises, including nuclear-powered cruisers, strategic submarines with ballistic missiles on board, and the large amphibious warfare ship Mitrofan Moskalenko, as well as 60 aircraft and helicopters, including Il-38's, Tu-142's, Tu-22's, and MiG-31's.

They made missile and artillery strikes against the imaginary enemy's surface ships and targets, shot down cruise missiles, secured a bridgehead ashore for an amphibious landing, organized air defense for ship hunter-killer groups, and carried out electronic jamming of the opposing side.

On the very first day of the exercises Northern Fleet sailors discovered a foreign nuclear-powered submarine on the edge of Russian territorial waters. They established hydroacoustic contact with it and for almost 15 hours, despite desperate opposition—the setting of false targets, antiship maneuvers, the use of electronic warfare instruments—they forced it outside the area of the maneuvers and stopped pursuing it only on the orders of Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev, the fleet commander.

But the foreign submarine's 28 March visit to the Northern Fleet sailors' exercises (the fleet staff knows that it was a U.S. submarine but is staying silent, allowing the Foreign Ministry the opportunity to announce this officially—V.L.) was no accident, nor was it the only one. On a further three occasions (!), when carrying out torpedo and missile firings 3 and 5 April, our sailors detected the presence of foreign submarines nearby. Three times they "drove" them from the region of the exercises. In addition, the Northern Fleet sailors were being monitored constantly by the Norwegoamn Navy intelligence-gathering scientific research ship Sverdrup-2, towing a radar detection antenna, and by a NATO air force's Orion patrol aircraft.

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Adm. Yerofeyev declared that he regards the Norwegian ship's actions as "intelligence-gathering and a violation of Point 3 of Article 246 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention." Although the officers who participated in the exercises and with whom we have spoken by telephone reported that they did not resent the uninvited guests—they helped them to feel that they were at their combat posts in a situation as close as possible to a real one, and they are very grateful to all the "partners" for this. They endeavored not to disgrace themselves in their eyes and to fulfill the exercise tasks successfully.

Admittedly, the chief of the fleet press center does not share this opinion. Vladimir Pyzh told me that three or four foreign nuclear-powered multirole submarines, not counting diesel-powered craft, are permanently on duty at the entrance to the Kola Gulf and off the coast of the peninsula, where the Northern Fleet sailors' main forces are based. This has repeatedly resulted in serious incidents which could cause an ecological disaster. The press center is finding it increasingly hard to explain to journalists and to its own officers how these suspicious activities by NATO vessels fit in with the policy of trust and partnership with Russia proclaimed by their countries' leaders.

But this is not a question for the military.

Official Outlines View on UN Sanctions Against Iraq

LD1304210295 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in English 1910 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Speaking at a news briefing in Moscow on Thursday, 13 April, high-ranking Foreign Ministry official Aleksandr Kalugin laid down the Russian position regarding the international sanctions against Iraq.

Our correspondent Vladislav Chernilko has these details:

[Chernilko] We don't like the idea of building a wall around Iraq. Why not let the Iraqis see the light at the end of the tunnel, Aleksandr Kalugin said. Any continuation of the present stalemate around the lifting of sanctions against Iraq is fraught with a new escalation of tensions in the region, the Russian diplomat said.

He went on to say, if this goes on, the entire peace process in the Gulf could be jeopardized negatively, affecting the overall situation in the region and undermining the efforts of curbing the development of Islamic extremist sentiment there.

Russia is acting on the assumption that Iraq must comply with all the demands made by the international community while the UN Security Council, for its part, should adequately react to all that is positive in the Iraqis' behavior, Aleksandr Kalugin added. By this I mean Iraq's recognition of Kuwait and the ongoing process of destruction of its mass annihilation weapons. The Iraqi Government has been fully cooperative on the establishment of a long-term system of international control over its military programs. Judging by what we know, Kalugin stressed, we can say that the world now has an effective mechanism of controlling the Iraqi defense industry.

Baghdad, however, appears unable to present an account of what happened to the vast amount of biological material Iraq once bought in a suspected attempt to develop a germ warfare capability. This provides some reason to suppose that Iraq has not yet fully complied with the requirements to disarm, imposed by the Security Council Resolution No. 687.

But far from whipping up a germ warfare hysteria, the Russian diplomat went on, Moscow was looking forward to completely sorting out the remaining misunderstandings through Baghdad's cooperation with the special UN commission. Such an approach, he said, would help to implement the Security Council resolution on easing the sanctions and lifting the ban on Iraqi exports. Moscow's dealings with Baghdad, Mr. Kalugin pointed out, did not all boil down to matters purely economic. As a great world power Russia shares responsibility for the stability of the region. The Gulf, lying a stone's throw south of Russia's borders, ensures that developments there do have a significant bearing on Moscow's political and strategic planning.

Moscow Seeks 'Exhaustive Answer' on Iraq Biological Weapons

LD1304150695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1338 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 13 (INTERFAX)—Moscow will seek to induce Baghdad to give "an exhaustive answer" to the Special UN Commission for Disarming Iraq in regard to its program for biological arms production, Vladimir Gudev, who leads the North Africa and Middle East Department in Russia's Foreign Ministry, told Interfax on Thursday.

Recently the head of the Special UN Commission for Disarming Iraq Rolf Ekeus submitted to the UN Security Council a report, expressing doubts as to the peaceful purposes of Baghdad's biological program.

As Gudev said, "this conclusion actually prevents Point 22 of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 687 on lifting the oil embargo imposed against Iraq from coming into force."

According to the high-ranking diplomat, the conclusions of Ekeus' report posed no surprise for Moscow. "The essence of the Ekeus commission's objections is that Iraq cannot account for 17 tonnes of biomaterials it imported," Gudev said.

The objections relate to the past, he stressed. "Now no one doubts that Iraq is not engaged in making biological

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weapons. But Iraq's previous programs are a "blank spot" that must be decoded," Gudev said.

According to him, on Thursday the UN Security Council will consider a draft resolution written by Argentina together with the USA, Britain and Oman to allow Iraq to export its oil "in limited quantities" "to meet humanitarian needs."

Way Around Iraq Sanctions Seen; Paper Objects

MM1304135395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Elmar Guseynov: "Moscow Cannot Afford Friendship With Iraq"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Friday [14 April] the State Duma, on the initiative of the Liberal Democratic Party and Deputy Sergey Glotov of the "Russian Way" faction, will begin discussion of the possibility of Russia's refusing to participate in sanctions against Iraq imposed on that country by decision of the United Nations.

We managed to discover in the Duma Committee for International Affairs that the committee itself, and also individual factions, and even individual deputies, have prepared various draft solutions to this problem. Duma experts with whom we managed to speak expressed confidence that as a result Russia would be able, by relieving itself of its obligations to the United Nations, to "remain on the right side of the law." It would appear that this could refer to removing liability from corporations and individuals for violating the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the United Nations.

The Committee for International Affairs itself intends simply to recommend that the government should be more active in seeking the lifting of sanctions in the UN Security Council. The point is that in any circumstances a unilateral repeal of sanctions is a step so extreme that it would absolutely inevitably entail a whole stack of international complications, and possibly even direct financial losses for Russia. Though those who are insistently trying to push this decision through the upper echelons of power assure Russian of precisely the opposite.

Literally a few days ago Saddam Husayn rejected a UN proposal to effectively repeal the sanctions in part. This proposal would have allowed Iraq to sell oil for $4 billion under the supervision of the Security Council in order to use the proceeds to buy food and medicine. The sufferings caused to ordinary Iraqis by shortages of food and medicine are the main argument of proponents of the lifting of sanctions. But Baghdad rejected this proposal—by no means the first of its kind—yet again demonstrating that the cause of the Iraqi people's hardships is not so much the sanctions themselves, as the ambitions of the country's ruling elite.

At the same time UN experts monitoring the progress of Iraq's destruction of its weapons of mass destruction say that, despite numerous assertions, official Baghdad is continuing to develop biological weapons and is concealing all data on this program from Security Council representatives. Therefore in the eyes of the world community the Iraq of Saddam Husayn, who is not willing to cooperate with the United Nations, continues to violate international law.

Among the arguments of those who support Russian rapprochement with Iraq are the ones that have already been repeated many times about the need to recover Iraq's debts to Russia ($7 billion) as quickly as possible and the possibility of capitalizing on billion- dollar oil contracts promised by Baghdad to Moscow. The irony of the situation, however, is that unilaterally repealing the sanctions would bring nearer neither the return of the debts, nor the start of the implementation of the notorious contracts. After all, without the relevant UN decision, no one will buy oil from Iraq, and that means that Iraq would have no money to settle accounts with Russia under the as-yet mythical contracts. Without a decision from the United Nations U.S. and British warships will not leave the Persian Gulf and will not allow through any vessel carrying freight to Iraq or from Iran. Similarly, the air patrols will not allow any cargo plane into Iraq, and the ground patrols will not allow through any road vehicle. Not the recovery of debts, but new expenditure, new debts, and conflict with those from whom Russia today hopes to obtain resources for its shattered budget—that is what most probably awaits our country if the pro-Iraq lobby carry the day.

Kozyrev Notes 'Promising' Peace Statements

LD1304202895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1805 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome April 13 TASS—"If you have touched upon Mideast, I must say that last statements by (Palestine Liberation Organization leader) Yasir 'Arafat and Rabin, in my view, are in line with our discussions which took place during my recent visit to the region. I consider it necessary to strengthen security and opposition measures against extremists on both sides. The peace process must be continued, and last statements by its participants are promising," Kozyrev added.

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev Arrives in Athens

LD1304204995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2022 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 14 April [dateline as received]—Andrey Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs of Russia, has arrived in Greece. He will take part in the fifth sitting of the Council of Ministers of Black Sea Economic Cooperation participant countries which begins in the morning [14 April].

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Karasin Notes Contact Group's Efforts To Save Bosnia Truce

LD1104165295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1506 GMT 11 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Vladimir Suprun and Andrey Urban]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—The goal of the five-nation Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina settlement is to prevent a final breakup of the truce and back the U.N.'s normalisation efforts in the region, a briefing was told here today by Russian Foreign Ministry's senior spokesman Grigoriy Karasin.

"It is crucial now that the truce between the conflicting parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina is extended beyond the expire of the truce agreement which is in effect until April 30," Karasin said.

"If the parties in the conflict refuse to extend it, violence will be in fact legalised thereby," Karasin continued.

The diplomat said no warring party had chances to win their claims in the war, and the wrecking of the truce might make the war long-term and devastating.

The Contact Group is at present seeking for a new device to help general normalisation in former Yugoslavia.

As for the group's specific plans, Karasin said it was due to meet Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on Tuesday in Belgrade.

The group is to hold talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Wednesday and Thursday in Zagreb.

Presidium Chairman Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to meet the group in Sarajevo.

Dolgolaptev: Peace Talks Only Way To Settle Bosnian Crisis

LD1304162495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1514 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Apr—For Russia, the only way to resolve the Bosnian problem is peace talks on the basis of the adoption by the warring sides of the international Contact Group settlement plan. The press center of the Federation Council reported that Anatoliy Dolgolaptev, deputy chairman of the chamber, said this today after receiving a parliamentary delegation of the Republic of Croatia headed by Parliamentary Speaker Nedeljko Mihanovic.

Anatoliy Dolgolaptev noted that such a position by Russia will allow us to raise the question of lifting the sanctions imposed by the United Nations with regard to the Union Republic of Yugoslavia, which favors support for political efforts in settling the conflict in accordance with the Contact Group plan. Russia does not intend to support one side in the conflict to the detriment of another, but it would like their positions to soften so that a mutually acceptable compromise can be achieved.

The people of Croatia, Nedeljko Mihanovic said, appeal to Russia for help in resolving the crisis. He spoke out in favor of strengthening the mediation role of the Russian Federal Assembly in the process of a peaceful settlement of the situation in the region.

Sacked General: Russia Subjected to 'Psychological War'

LD1304172595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1643 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Republic of Serb Krajina, April 13 TASS—Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Perelyakin, former commander of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] "East" sector in former Yugoslavia, sacked by the U.N. headquarters, said on Thursday that his dismissal had no grounds other than political.

"A real psychological war is waged against Russia here aimed at discrediting the Russian contingent of 'blue helmets' on the territory of former Yugoslavia", the general told ITAR-TASS today.

According to the general, the campaign against him and the Russian peacekeeping battalion, "launched by Croatia leadership and backed by certain circles in the West" had been aimed at making peacekeeping forces in the region homogenous, consisting strictly of representatives from NATO countries.

The general said that peacekeepers should carry out operations "to normalise relations between Croats and Krajina Serbs rather than prepare for combat actions under NATO's cover".

Meanwhile, in the Russian capital, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin told a briefing that Moscow regretted the U.N. Secretariat's decision but was sure "this case will not affect the generally good relations between the Russian peacekeeping contingent and the leadership of U.N. forces in former Yugoslavia."

U.N. inspectors had put forward serious accusations against the general, including favouring the Serb side.

According to Karasin, checks conducted by Russian Defence Ministry inspectors failed to confirm a majority of accusations with the exception of some discipline problems in the Russian battalion.

Removal of General in Croatia 'Politically Motivated'

MM1404093095 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Sergey Sidorov: "Attack on Russian General's Good Name"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] We have known for a long time the capabilities of the sophisticated West when it comes to organizing "information pressure" at the right time. But what is truly amazing is the willingness of some of our journalists, in pursuit of a sensation, to immediately pick up a tune someone is whistling without really examining it. The campaign of attacks on the Russian military during the withdrawal of forces from Germany has been refueled on the point of fizzling out. This time the castigation site has shifted to the former SFRY. Again the papers have been carrying headlines containing the resonant words "corruption," "smuggling," and gifts of "Mercedes."

It goes without saying that the decision by UN headquarters to remove Russian General Aleksandr Perelyakin from the post of commander of a UN sector in former Yugoslavia is a sensation in itself. But there is nothing new in the accusations leveled at the Russian contingent of "trading in official gasoline," "visiting striptease bars," and so on, which allegedly resulted in their ceasing to trust the general who had "committed" these outrages. The real news is different. Aleksandr Perelyakin was the first of the three Russian commanders of the "East" sector in Serb Krajina (Croatia) to succeed in seeing out practically his entire tour on this political volcano.

According to the rules observed by the "blue helmets," the sector commander is changed annually, and another member of the national contingent is appointed each time. The first commander of the sector in which Russian and Belgian battalions are performing the peacemaking mission was a Russian—Colonel Aleksandr Khromchenkov. He was allowed to get on quietly with his job for only the first two months, while he was persuading the Yugoslav Army and the Croat formations to disengage forces and stop the artillery duels which were daily accounting for dozens of lives.

As soon as this incredibly difficult task was completed, not least because of the confidence Khromchenkov was able to instill in the Serbs and the Croats, the Russian officer started to be accused of the most improbable sins—from a "poor knowledge of English" to "playing up to the Krajina Serbs." The most naive of the accusations that went direct to New York from unknown offices in the "East" sector, was "agent of Moscow, conducting at his level a policy in the interests of the Kremlin." As a result the invisible UN bureaucracy had Colonel Khromchenkov "for dinner" and he went home six months before the end of his tour.

It was the same story with another Russian commander—Major General Yuriy Sosedov. At the time the foreign press, above all the U.S. press, printed articles, obviously to order, about "corruption among Russian officers," about the "selling of fuel and other products," about "poor discipline." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA repeatedly addressed the unhealthy atmosphere generated around the Russian "blue helmets." The arguments and the vocabulary of the writing, for example in THE WASHINGTON TIMES, reproduced almost word for word texts that regularly appeared in the Croat paper GLAS SLAVONII, which, in accordance with Balkan wartime laws, had no compunction about purveying blatant disinformation.

With Aleksandr Perelyakin it was more complex in every respect. It was by no means the 50-year-old general's first time abroad. He has an excellent command of English and French, and prior to his appointment to the sector he was military attache in Tanzania. The concepts of an officer's honor and conscience are not empty words as far as he is concerned. And he is capable of standing up not only for them, but for the very specific interests and rights of his state as a participant in the process of a peace settlement in former Yugoslavia. Russian military experts note that General Perelyakin was very active in contributing to the buildup of our officers' presence in UN structures in Zagreb and in Sarajevo, since Russia's rights had been infringed in this entirely legitimate matter as a result of the sluggish and passive approach of its Foreign Ministry structures. It is difficult at the moment to say what enabled the Russian general to serve for two weeks short of a year as commander—the sluggishness of the anti-Russian bureaucracy in the United Nations' Yugoslav mission or Perelyakin's scrupulously correct behavior. But his removal from the UN post is obviously politically motivated, rather than anything else.

Specialists who have been observing the situation in Serb-populated areas of Croatia for a long time, are unanimous. The removal of General Perelyakin was intended to justify the withdrawal of the Russian battalion, which is demanded by the Croatian side and supported by certain forces in the West, and make the peacemaking force in Croatia homogeneous, consisting of NATO countries' contingents. There is nothing further to add.

Moscow 'Regrets' Sacking of General Perelyakin

LD1304175695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1643 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—Moscow regrets the decision of the UN Secretariat to dismiss Major-General Aleksandr Perelyakin, the commander of the eastern section of the UN peacekeeping force in ex-Yugoslavia, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told a Thursday briefing in Moscow. He said the general left for Moscow Thursday.

According to Karasin, the decision can be traced back to the inspection of the Russian peace-keeping battalion by the UN Secretariat last summer.

After the inspection the Russian Defense Ministry together with the command of the international force

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conducted another examination. Most of the complaints, especially the gravest about connivance with the Serbian side and improper observation of duties, were not confirmed which was recognized by the UN Secretariat, Karasin said. Complaints about discipline in the battalion were found grounded. In that context the UN leadership raised the question of replacing Perelyakin.

Karasin was confident that this regrettable case would not affect the generally good relationship between the Russian peace-keeping contingent and the commander of the UN force.

Yeltsin Calls For Technical, Military Aid for Tajikistan

LD1304172195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—President Yeltsin, who is in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on vacation, has heard a report by the chairman of the CIS border guard troops commanders' council, director of the federal border guard service of the Russian Federation Andrey Nikolayev about the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.

The presidential press-service has said that "President Yeltsin believes that it is necessary, based on earlier agreements on coordinated measures, to ensure stability on the southern borders of CIS member-states and to take urgent measures to ease tension on the borders".

President Yeltsin suggested using fully the available resources to protect the border and to use collective CIS peace-keeping forces, if need be.

President Yeltsin called for the necessary technical and military assistance to Tajikistan. He also recommended to urgently consider the state of affairs on the border at a joint conference of CIS foreign ministers with the participation of CIS defence ministers and border guard troop commanders and to draw up additional collective measures under the previously adopted resolutions of the CIS heads of state.

Yeltsin, who is the chairman of the CIS heads of state council, believes it is necessary to step up actions to ensure stability on the Tajik-Afghan border and to enhance the coordination of efforts by CIS countries and international organizations.

"President Yeltsin instructed the Russian government to take the appropriate measures on the Tajik-Afghan border in keeping with the commitments taken by the Russian side", the presidential press- service said.

Afghan Opposition Accuses Russia of Bombing Headquarters

LD1304200395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1810 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TEHRAN, April 13 (Interfax)—Representatives of the Movement for Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan have accused Russia of bombing the movement's headquarters in Taleqan (North Afghanistan).

Deputy Chairman of the Movement for Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan Akbar Turadzhonzoda told Interfax on the phone from Tehran today that the headquarters' building and buildings near it had been partially destroyed and five guards of the headquarters had been killed as a result of the bomb attack.

Turadzhonzoda said about 40 Afghan civilians had been killed.

He said that after the attack the Afghan local authorities had stated their readiness to back the Tajik opposition in its struggle against the Dushanbe regime.

Afghan residents said during their meeting with leader of the Movement for Islamic Rebirth of Tajikistan Said Abdullo Nuri that they were going to take revenge for the murder of their relatives.

Turadzhonzoda said Nuri had asked him to announce that the opposition would provide an adequate response to the air attack.

The Russian Foreign and Defense ministries said they "do not have information on an air attack on Taleqan."

OSCE Delegation to Chechnya Arrives in Moscow

LD1204175295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1345 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 12 (Interfax)—A personal emissary of the chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmati and Gyarmati's compatriot Sandor Meszaros, who will head the OSCE support mission in Chechnya, arrived Wednesday in Moscow, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's European Cooperation Desk Yuriy Ushakov told Interfax.

On Tuesday the OSCE Standing Council decided, in Budapest, to send a support mission to Chechnya.

The six-strong mission will most likely have its headquarters in Groznyy for, "tentatively, two months," Ushakov told Interfax.

In Moscow, Gyarmati and Meszaros on the one hand and President Yeltsin's staff worker Andrey Loginov on the other will discuss cooperation between the OSCE mission and Russian emissaries in Chechnya. The Hungarian diplomats and Russian Foreign Ministry officers may also be expected to discuss the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the Crimean problem and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Ushakov sees the decision to send an OSCE mission to Chechnya as "a constructive move on the part of Russia" and feels that "the European Union cannot but take it into account."

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The European Council saw the installation of an OSCE mission in Chechnya as a condition for "the conclusion of an interim trade agreement with Russia."

"Russia has met this condition," Ushakov stressed.

For the transcript of Interfax's interview with Ushakov see Interfax's Diplomatic Panorama of April 12.

More on Arrival of OSCE Delegation in Moscow

LD1204194095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1534 GMT 12 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 12 (Interfax)—A personal emissary of the chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmati and Gyarmati's compatriot Sandor Meszaros, who will head the OSCE support mission in Chechnya, arrived Wednesday in Moscow, the director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's European Cooperation Desk Yuriy Ushakov told Interfax.

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"Russia has met this condition," Ushakov stressed.

He said representatives of West European Foreign ministries had telephoned him to welcome the Russian constructive approach in sending an OSCE assistance group to Chechnya.

Ushakov described as "absolutely ungrounded" claims of some Western diplomats that Moscow allegedly dragged out the adoption of the corresponding resolution of the OCSE Permanent Council.

"The decision on the group was expected to be taken on April 6. Thus, the delay lasted for only four days. One should take into account that it is an important but delicate issue which cannot be settled within a day or two. What is more, none had set the deadline," stressed the diplomat.

OSCE Envoy Off to Groznyy To Set Up Mission

LD1304105195 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1002 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow, 13 Apr—Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmati, personal envoy of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] chairman, left for Chechnya today to discuss on site the issue of opening the mission of OSCE assistance group in Groznyy. ITAR-TASS learned about this from Yuriy Ushakov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's European cooperation department. [passage omitted]

Before leaving for Chechnya Istvan Gyarmati held "full-scale consultations" at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Yuriy Ushakov said. According to him, the sides discussed the Chechen problem as well as general questions of OSCE work, the situation around Crimea, the Dniester region, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Duma Official on Possible Impact of Tsekov Speech

LD1404110395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1042 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—Deputy Speaker of the Russian State Duma Gennadiy Seleznyev told journalists today that a decision adopted by the Russian lawmakers to give the floor to the Chairman of the Crimean Parliament Serhiy Tsekov "offered a serious argument for Ukrainian lawmakers in favour of dissolving the Crimean Parliament".

Deputy Duma speaker pointed out that by giving the floor to the Crimean parliamentary speaker the lawmakers ignored the opinion of sovereign Ukraine, which had insisted that Serhiy Tsekov's address to the Ukrainian parliament was not included in the agenda of the session of the lower chamber of the Russian parliament. Seleznyev believes that Russian lawmakers should have heeded the opinion of their Ukrainian counterparts, taking into account that there are people in the Ukrainian parliament seeking to spoil relations between Russia and Ukraine and prevent the signing of the Russo-Ukrainian treaty.

Deputy chairman of the State Duma expressed his regret over the fact that the decision adopted by the Russian

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lawmakers today to give the floor to the Crimean parliamentary speaker might "worsen the relations between the two countries."

Moscow To Receive 44 Ukrainian Strategic Bombers in 1995

LD1304200895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1810 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [No place name as received] April 13 (Interfax)—The Russian Military Air Forces command said it was in favor of Ukraine transferring to Russia a group of 44 strategic bombers (25 Tu-95MC planes and 19 Tu-160 planes) this year.

Interfax learned today that an official of the Russian Military Air Forces command had asked Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to back such a proposal.

According to the Russian Military Air Forces command, Moscow and Kiev already agreed on the amount of compensation for the transfer of bombers to Russia which will be $190 million.

Interfax learned that Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov had agreed that the sum would be used for covering a part of the Ukrainian debt for Russian energy supplies.

A military official told Interfax that Ukraine would also transfer to Russia 600 winged missiles capable of carrying the bombers. The same source said Russia had already formed crews for nearly all the bombers.

Russian military experts said the transfer of bombers would allow Russia to resolve the problem on creating strategic aviation for the next 15-20 years.

Interfax learned that Grachev had instructed the Armed Forces General Headquarters to examine in detail the issue of Ukraine transferring the bombers to Russia. Moscow and Kiev are expected to sign a corresponding inter-government agreement on the bombers' transfer.

Crimea's Tsekov Addresses Duma Deputies in Moscow

LD1404100095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0938 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—"The situation in the Crimea must not be regarded by Russia as Ukraine's internal affair, which is disrespect towards the Crimea. Primarily, this is disrespect towards Russia itself,"- said chairman of the Crimean parliament Serhiy Tsekov, who addressed lawmakers of the Russian State Duma in Moscow today.

In the opinion of the Ukrainian parliamentary speaker, an "onslaught on the Crimea by the Ukrainian authorities" began in the second half of 1994, whereas beginning from May 1994, when pro-Russian politicians came to power in Ukraine, the powers of the Crimean authorities are being cut at an increasingly growing pace." In Tsekov's opinion, "Kiev's onslaught on the Crimea's rights was prompted by "an absolutely meek position taken by the Russian Federation and Russia's executive branch of power in order to meet the interests of questionable strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine as it is today." The Crimean speaker believes that "the Crimea, including Sevastopol, has been actually sacrificed."

The Crimean speaker believes that the Crimean people have two ways to choose from: either to hold on to the end, pinning their hopes on the world community, or tolerate the lawlessness reigning in the Crimea. Tsekov pointed out that he is not entitled to give recommendations to the Russian people about realistic ways of helping the Crimea, provided international laws are observed. The Crimean speaker believes that to this end, Russia has all everything at its disposal which the Crimea lacks—the Foreign Ministry, an analytical centre, institutions of international law and etc.

"I wish Russia was really willing to help, being aware of the fact that the Crimea had given no grounds to take such cruel decisions against it,"- Tsekov said. He stressed that there are no illegal armed formations in the republic, that the Crimea did not establish its own police or security services and, finally, that the Crimean leadership had not adopted a decision to secede from Ukraine.

Karasin: Moscow Backs 'Constructive' Ukraine-Crimea Talks

LD1304175595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1643 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniiy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—Russia stands for a constructive dialogue between Kiev and Simferopol to find ways of promoting stability with full respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and due account for the will of the population of the peninsula. This was stated at a Thursday briefing by the official spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin.

He said the idea was expressed by the Russian side at the Moscow meeting of the Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov with a delegation of the Crimean Supreme Soviet led by its chairman Serhiy Tsekov.

According to Karasin, Ivanov said the foreign ministry pays primary attention to the protection of the rights of ethnic Russians abroad in keeping with general norms of international law and fundamental documents of the UN and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe].

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The ministry spokesman said Crimeans spoke of the developments in their republic and their willingness to settle the problems in relations with Kiev by political means in the framework of indivisible Ukraine.

Moscow To Negotiate Jailed Spies Exchange With Israel, U.S.

LD1304175295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1733 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksey Bukalov, Aleksey Golyayev, Dmitriy Gorokhov, and Sergey Startsev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome April 13 TASS—"We are outspokenly against spymania, swelling emotions,and-ideological campaigns in the spirit of the past. We are for an individual approach to every problem and interaction with no exempt topics", Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told TASS on Thursday.

The minister commented upon Israel's suggestion to reach a tripartite agreement with Russia and the U.S.A. on exchanges of individuals convicted of espionage.

Kozyrev, who is on working visit in Italy, said he was not acquainted with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin's statement in detail. However, he stressed that the sides should come into contact regarding this issue. "We are prepared for a concrete cooperation", Kozyrev said.

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Political Issues

Yeltsin, Deputies To Discuss Relations With Ukraine

LD1304193995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—President Yeltsin has agreed to meet with representatives of State Duma factions and groups to discuss relations with Ukraine. Duma CIS Affairs Committee chairman Konstantin Zatulin said on Thursday that the meeting would take place when President Yeltsin was back from vacation.

In the meantime Zatulin is going to ensure the widest reception of the Crimean parliamentary speaker Serhiy Tsekov in Moscow. Tsekov has already met with State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin and first Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. A meeting with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has been requested.

On Friday Tsekov will address the State Duma. Zatulin said that Tsekov's forthcoming address to the Russian parliament has aroused an angry response from Kiev. Zatulin said that in the Ukrainian parliament which Tsekov visited on Wednesday together with deputy speaker of the State Duma Gennadiy Seleznev the Crimean parliamentary speaker was told that if he went ahead with his intention to address the State Duma, the Crimean parliament would be disbanded at once.

"In a situation like that State Duma members must have the full information about the situation in the Crimea", Zatulin said.

Chernomyrdin Tells Ministers To Visit Provinces, Report

LD0704151195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1027 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 7 (INTERFAX)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin decided to tell a number of ministers to pay early visits to the most unstable provinces and take action for the settlement of payments and the payment of delayed salaries and wages.

The decision was made Thursday evening at a working conference with First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays, Fuel and Power Production Minister Yuriy Shafranik, Labor Minister Gennady Malikiyan, chairman of the State Committee for Defense Production Viktor Glukhikh and the chief executives of several federal agencies.

Shafranik, for one, was told to visit Primorye territory, whose (coal) miners have declared industrial action.

The conference pointed out that the provinces were in the habit of redirecting allocations from the federal budget. Federal agencies ought to see to it that addressed payments promptly reach the addressee and are used in strict conformity with earlier agreements. Ministers are to put pressure on those industrial facilities which constantly fail to square payments with producers.

The ministers will be expected to make reports on their trips to the provinces to Chernomyrdin.

Chernomyrdin Names Luzhkov Aide as Deputy Finance Minister

MK1104124695 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Chernomyrdin Has Begun To Lure Away Luzhkov's Deputies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The economic reform department in the Moscow city government has been left without a leader. Under Viktor Chernomyrdin's order, Luzhkov's first deputy Konstantin Buravlev has been appointed to the post of deputy finance minister of the Russian Federation.

People in the City Hall apparat see Buravlev's new post as an obvious promotion. Generally speaking, the young, now former, vice premier has no reason to complain about his career advancement. In the government, the branch he headed included such influential departments and committees as the Financial Department, the Moscow City Property Committee, the Central Bank's Moscow division, the Russian Federation Savings Bank's Moscow division, the tax inspectorate and the tax police, and the Registration and License Chambers. He was considered to be one of the masterminds behind economic reform in Moscow.

The new post was offered him following a decision to increase the number of deputy finance ministers and also because recently such strong finance specialists as Sergey Aleksashenko and Igor Selivanov have resigned as deputy ministers. It is not yet known which line of activity in the Finance Ministry Buravlev will head. This will apparently become known after he has been approved in his new post.

Konstantin Buravlev can be called a "career financier." Even so, for some time his professional activity was related to the construction complex. It is possible that at the Moscow city government session today Buravlev's new appointment will be announced and a replacement for the leader of one of Moscow's largest complexes will be found.

Kozyrev Meets With Chief Arms Exporters

LD1104191695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1642 GMT 11 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 11 (Interfax)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met with the leaders of Russia's chief arms exporters to discuss ways of increasing the effectiveness of Russia's

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military and technological cooperation with other countries in the context of growing international stability.

Russian Foreign Ministry official Grigoriy Karasin has said the meeting took place at President Yeltsin's request.

Karasin avoided disclosing the contents of the meeting. He only said that specific decisions were made.

Kozyrev To Take Part in General Election as Independent

LD1404113995 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 14 Apr 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Presenter Arina Sharapova] Andrey Kozyrev has said he will take part in the forthcoming Russian general election. The RIA-Novosti agency learned that the foreign minister will only take part in the election as an independent, since he cannot see any party he wants to join at the moment. Russia needs a new party now, a new movement of common-sense professionals, Kozyrev believes. In his view, Boris Yeltsin at present, embodies this unifying idea.

Gaydar, 'Women of Russia' Leader Differ on Delaying Election

MK0804093495 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Journal" rubric: "Gaydar, 'Women of Russia' Differ in Views"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yegor Gaydar, leader of Democratic Choice of Russia, has a "negative" view on the idea of delaying presidential and parliamentary elections. "Elections are due to be held at the most unpropitious time," he said in Kiev yesterday, because "we will be able to achieve stabilization only by year's end." But he is still "certain that there is no other way than holding elections," because "a refusal to hold them would bring about destabilization and pose a threat to the future of Russian democracy." Yekaterina Lakhova, leader of the State Duma's "Women of Russia" faction, is more cautious about the elections. She said at yesterday's news conference in Moscow that "voters think that if a new president and a new Duma are elected, the situation will change for the better. But in fact it will remain unchanged, because existing contradictions between the executive and legislative authorities will still be there." In addition, Yekaterina Lakhova said that she favors the retention of the current proportions in forming the Duma—50:50—while "Women of Russia" will run for parliament on their own, without joining any blocs.

Gaydar on Democrats' Election Program

MM1004114295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 5

[Article by Yegor Gaydar: "You Cannot Escape or Hide From Elections. You Have To Win Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

I. Why We Cannot Give Up the Elections

I will be frank: The arguments of those who think that elections are "premature," that it would be a good thing to postpone them, do not provoke a sense of righteous indignation in me. Clearly there is a good deal of utilitarian truth in this. The timing of the elections—both parliamentary and presidential—is not ideal. The economic ebb tide appears to be coming to an end, and the tide should soon start to come in—unless we ourselves, with our clumsy acts, intercept it. Just let us see the start of an economic upswing which will be felt not by a small group of dollar millionaires, but by the whole vast mass of ruble "millionaires," that "middle class" that has been totally unable to take shape in the conditions of inflation—and then we will be assured of political and social stability for real, and for the long term. The harbor—maybe not an ideal one, but a realistic one—is already in sight. This is always the most dangerous moment, especially for our country. Churchill said of the 1917 revolution that the Russian ship had sunk at the very entrance to the harbor. Albeit to a lesser extent, a similar danger exists today.

The serious danger does not come from the rabble who daub swastikas and cover themselves in tattoos of that kind, nor from the more "refined," near-fascist semi-intellectuals who, for the sake of hot publicity, overwhelm the sated public with "trenchant" little journals and songs. This sorry crew has always existed and always will. Some people find them disgusting, others laugh at them, others feel a hysterical interest. But this whole marginal crowd is of no political significance. They twitch convulsively to attract attention. It will be a good thing if the competent bodies notice these efforts and turn their attention to the Nazi scum. But, I repeat, this crew does not make the political weather.

The danger lies elsewhere. Political extremists are well aware that time is working against them. Stability means their steady disappearance from the political scene. The ebb and flow of extremist parties' popularity coincides precisely with the general situation in society. Germany, 1919-1923. Growing inflation—political crisis—increasing chances for the Nazis. Hitler tried to mount the "nag of history" on 8 November 1923. He failed. Then an economic upsurge and a period of social stability began (1923-1928)—the Nazi party collapsed and the Fuehrer's chances sank to zero. A new crisis (1929-1933), many millions unemployed—and again our friends the extremists see their stock rising. This time they managed to ride into power on the crest of the crisis.

In our country the economic upswing "threatens" to begin in 1996-1997. By the law of "pendulums," this means that the chances of our friends the Zhirinovskiys and Zyuganovs and their ilk sink practically to zero. Their last chance is today, their chance is at elections in 1995-1996.

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But all the same, the elections must not be canceled or postponed.

First, such a cancellation will provoke severe ferment in society. It is no use expecting "symmetry" here: The very same people who scorn the elections and do not want to take part in them will be extremely indignant if the elections are canceled and they are deprived of the very opportunity to vote. The extremists will gain a trump card and a strong, universally understood, unifying idea: "Give us elections!"

Second, ferment in society means undermining the legitimacy of democratic power. People want to cancel the elections for the sake of stability, but stability will not be achieved that way (provided, of course, that you do not confuse political stability with your own personal stability, with keeping your own seat in the Duma, the Federation Council, or the presidential staff for a couple more years). On the contrary, the split in society will be aggravated.

Third, the more legitimate support the authorities lose, the more they will seek support in the power structures. An authority that is not elected by lawful means will necessarily support itself with bayonets. Taking into account the specific interests and mentality of the military-police complex, such a "shift" in the center of power would mean nothing less than a degeneration of power, a "drift" toward the political extremists. And they, in turn, sensing the support of the authorities (or at least, the most influential grouping within them), will dramatically increase their own appetites.

No, the democratic authorities cannot, for the sake of any tactical considerations, however reasonable, abandon normal democratic methods—elections. You cannot hide from elections. You have to accept them, you have to win them—that is the task of democratic forces. A difficult task, but a realistic one.

Society must become accustomed to the idea that elections, normally, do not mean a radical change of course, but an adjustment to it within the limits of the existing system.

Zyuganov is celebrating his victory in the parliamentary elections before the event. The Communists, plus the Agrarians, plus "Women of Russia," given benevolent neutrality on the part of the Liberal Democrats (after all, they are the "young wolves," they are the "national socialists"), will control the new Duma, will obtain a solid majority in it, he declares. And the Duma elections are the prologue to the presidential elections. Whoever wins on 12 December gets a powerful boost for the 12 June elections. This is in the form of the voters' mood, the sponsors' money, and the new balance of power in the ruling elite.

I think Zyuganov is in too much of a hurry to order the champagne. Here I can refer self-critically to our own experience. Many democratic politicians and political scientists were too sanguine in predicting overwhelming success for us in the elections of 12 December 1993. Favorites who are announced beforehand rarely finish first....

II. Three Political Forces

In spite of all the variations, such as the geometrically increasing number of parties and blocs, the general political landscape is more or less clear.

The extremists, the "revanche party." I am not talking about the political marginals (although very many people in, say, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] are patently marginal in terms of their mentality). The real "revanche party" consists of elite groups who feel deprived of power and who seek power on a wave of leftist-populist slogans. But their advent would not mean merely a change of nameplates on the office doors. True, there will not be a return to some kind of "socialism," because of the total physical impossibility of such an action today. There will be something different—a string of adventures. In foreign policy: great- power rhetoric and real, small-minded attempts to ingratiate themselves with Western countries. Within the CIS: the same rhetoric, but accompanied by saber-rattling. Lastly, within Russia itself: military adventures (the Chechen war gives us an idea what that means). "State regulation," naturally, with the noble goal of "boosting production" and improving living standards. Both these things will of an inflationary wave. A new spiral in the impoverishment of citizens, a new spiral in the enrichment of other citizens, first and foremost, naturally, the bureaucrats who actually control the flow of money from Moscow via their own pockets to Switzerland, into the quiet backwaters of secret numbered accounts. I am not trying to say that our communist and nationalist political opponents, in terms of their personal qualities, are every one of them thieves, or even that there are more people subject to corruption among them than among the present bureaucrats. It is simply that the system of a half-private, half- state economy with a powerful component of bureaucratic regulation is the ideal breeding ground for the bacteria of corruption. The present leadership is beginning, with great difficulty, to move away from this system. A victory for "left-wing forces" would plunge us at a stroke back into the most unpleasant version of it--one fed by many years of hatred and vengeance, under cover of a thick layer of populist-nationalist demagoguery.

The party of power, the bureaucratic "center." The ruling bureaucracy has undergone a degree of evolution in 1992-1995. Whereas they began with intimidating statements about building "a market, not a bazaar," now they have arrived at a rigorous financial policy and are implementing it fairly consistently. If the present course is maintained, there is a real chance that the economic upswing will indeed begin in 1996-1997.

At the same time the position of the "centrist" bureaucracy is always inconsistent and grossly egotistical. The main motive is to preserve the hypertrophied bureaucratic state and ultrapowerful administrative system,

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combining them with the market and private ownership. This is irresistibly reminiscent of the story about the horse that was harnessed to a steam locomotive. The resultant hybrid is accurately designated by terms like "nomenklatura capitalism" or "the bureaucratic market," which seem to be disputed by nobody and to have won the rights of citizenship. But the internal contradiction contained in these concepts is rarely fully recognized.

Excessive bureaucratic pressure is extremely dangerous for the market. An incompetent bureaucracy becomes the main player in market relations and naturally seeks to hold on to that position. This has been clearly revealed in several sociological polls. According to their data, a very insignificant proportion (some 5 percent) of the rich section of society, the Russian entrepreneurs, fully support radical market reforms. The percentage of supporters of reforms is far higher among the ruined intelligentsia. This paradox is easily explained: A significant proportion of entrepreneurs, particularly at local level, consists of people connected in one way or another with the former and current nomenklatura, who have signed up for nomenklatura capitalism and can conceive of nothing else for themselves. The aggressive nationalist rhetoric of Zhirinovskiy's "young wolves" is also widespread in this milieu. Finally, as already mentioned, the bureaucratic market, the half-private, half-state economy, and the lack of separation of commercial and administrative structures is a breeding ground for corruption, in which the bureaucratic system can easily become a mafia system. It is understandable for the intelligentsia to pin its hopes on a change in the situation, on the transformation of the bureaucratic market into an open market and of nomenklatura capitalism into up-to-date, social capitalism. It is in the context of a civilized, open society, not subject to bureaucratic diktat, that the intelligentsia sees its future, and this is where it pins its hopes. Objectively, the transformation of the nomenklatura-bureaucratic market into an open market and the transformation of a nomenklatura state into an open society is what all Russia needs. That is the categorical imperative of time itself—on the eve of the 21st century—if, of course, we are not prepared to reconcile ourselves to the role of a criminalized country with a backward socioeconomic system that never tires, however, of grumbling threateningly about its great ambitions.

The third major political grouping—the democratic forces, the "reform party"—is indeed trying to implement the program that the country vitally needs. To paraphrase Lenin, you could say of this program: Nomenklatura Russia will become the Russia of developed capitalism.

To apply political will to ensure a peaceful, evolutionary transition from a bureaucratic state to a civil society—that is how I would identify our "general line." I hope it unites the entire democratic camp, despite the differences within it.

In a sense this is not merely a strategic line, but a historical line. These ideas inspired the Russian liberal intelligentsia back in the last century, and after that the dissidents. The biggest success here, the breakthrough, was achieved, of course, in 1990-91- 92. However, the problem remains acute today.

There is a whole series of problems here. In the economy—the open market, guarantees of private ownership, including land ownership. A whole series of concrete programs have been drawn up which it is not appropriate to discuss in detail here—in the sphere of agrarian reform, the protection of private ownership, and encouragement for investments. I would particularly single out the problem of housing construction. It seems to us that this could become the "locomotive" for our economy just as railroad construction was in the 19th century. An important event was the adoption of the Civil Code, which we were directly involved in drafting back in the days of our work in government. However, it is important to make this the real basis of civil life.

Major tasks face us in social policy, in the sphere of military reform, and in the reform of state administration. A single ideology pervades everything: a compact and efficient state that helps a healthy, honest middle class to find its feet and does not pursue the phantoms of imperial-bureaucratic greatness in the spirit of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but prepares the country to enter post-industrial civilization, with an appropriate system of priorities.

Finally, the actual spirit of the state must change, so that the problems of citizens' rights and security, their protection against bureaucratic arrogance and tyranny, their quality of life, and the fight against chauvinism become genuinely the most important. Traditionally, the Russian bureaucracy has regarded even formulating such problems either as "wild dreams" or as dangerous sedition. Firm political will and persistence are needed to overturn this principle.

III. Minimum Program

However, as realist politicians we also set ourselves a minimum program. To block the extremists' path and achieve the preservation of stability. Here an alliance between us and a section of the party of power is objectively possible.

The Russian political system, with its ultrapowerful, ultraweighty bureaucratic core, is structured in such a way that political parties are forced constantly to struggle for influence on the bureaucratic elite—the only force that really makes the decisions. At present, liberal influences are certainly very strong among the economic section of the ruling elite. In fact, it is these influences that explain the generally sensible economic policy of recent months. At the same time, part of the bureaucratic elite always preserves a kind of "genetic" predisposition toward national- communist ideology. A part is played here by the shared nomenklatura origins, the Soviet mentality with its traditional prejudices, and—most important—interests. The bureaucracy always has an

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interest in strengthening state control. And strengthening state control requires an appropriate ideological cover—a national-populist cover, and that, in turn, entails obvious political consequences....

This "tug of war" in the corridors of power between liberalism and national-populism has always gone on. The Duma elections play an important role here, and the presidential elections a decisive one.

The most influential section of the ruling bureaucratic elite has moved away from the national-populist wing not out of a love of liberal values. Instead, a strong-state instinct came into play, or, if you like, a self-preservation instinct. The real strong- state advocates have become convinced in practice, in their day-to- day economic activity, that the "strong-state" advocates from newspapers like PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, or DEN are dragging the state straight into the abyss. The inflationary abyss and the political abyss. Nationalist, strong-state rhetoric may be pleasing, and liberal democratic rhetoric may be repulsive—as we know, there is no accounting for taste. But life itself has shown graphically that by following the pleasing rhetoric the state breaks its own neck, and in order to save itself if is forced to take the rather unpleasant pills of liberalism.

The ruling bureaucratic elite has to a significant extent recognized this fact. If the voters recognize it too, the elections are won.

So the democratic politicians' minimum task is to preserve and strengthen the alliance that has now become established between the bureaucratic center and part of the liberal elite. Not to permit the main bureaucratic mass to shift in the direction of the national-populists. A shift that immediately calls to mind the sinister picture of the handshake between Field Marshal von Hindenburg and the "Bohemian Lance Corporal" Hitler.

Liberals and democrats never want great upheavals. Upheavals are the adventurists' milieu. But if the democrats had convinced themselves to such words in 1989-1990, it would have been disingenuous. An obsolete system had to be replaced. The task was to dismantle it by peaceful means, through evolution, not revolution, but obviously in this context it was impossible in principle to avoid upheavals entirely. Now it is a different matter. Despite all the shortcomings and all the tendencies toward stagnation and disintegration, the new system is viable in principle, it offers the country the possibility of developing. We are indeed opposed to any acute upheavals, we are indeed in favor of smooth evolution, maintaining stability. This is no mere slogan, it is a clear principle.

The apolitical attitude that people often speak of is also a political stance: People do not want any more drastic developments. Everyone is sick and tired of hysterics, people do not go to rallies, they have had enough of hysterics about the "ruin of the country." In principle, the extremists missed their chance in 1992- 1993, and the victory (comparative victory) of 12 December 1993 could in fact be their last.

There are no objective reasons for an extremist victory, just as there are no objective reasons for a new economic and social collapse. That is the main thing we must explain to the voter. We must convey to the voter this most elementary idea: The most difficult time is behind us. Today it is up to us whether our patience and our sacrifices are to be justified by the start of an upswing, or erased by a new collapse. We have passed through the time to cast away stones, and now the time has objectively arrived for Russia to gather stones together, to harvest what was sown with such effort in 1992. Let us not trample what we ourselves sowed!

The resources accumulated in trade, in financial speculations, and in the raw materials sectors, if inflation stops, can begin to flow into production. If we just "start rolling" with this process, a natural, organic upswing will begin.

In the social sphere, after a period of impoverishment, the consolidation and crystallization of a new middle class will begin. These will be the real "new Russians," who have found themselves not in commercial banditry, but in work in market conditions. And only a society on the way up will really be able to help the poor, those who are not able to rise from their knees by themselves.

Only one thing is now needed in national-state development—to avoid adventures and dramatic moves. Russia will come together firmly around the magnet of the market, of economic upswing. Strong-arm methods did nothing to preserve the integrity of Georgia, Tajikistan, or Moldova, although plenty of blood was shed. Now the war has come to us—and did those tens of thousands of dead help Russia much? The country's unity is built not on blood, but on law, respect for the equality and dignity of nations, and—most important—stability and economic interest. If we achieve that, then we will firmly guarantee Russia's unity.

These are the elementary ideas, based on simple common sense (not really "slogans"), that we will put at the center of our election campaign.

This is undoubtedly a patriotic stance, the stance of normal, honest patriotism—concern for your own future in your own country. Of course, this is diametrically opposed to the "patriotism" that the scoundrels use as their last resort.

I pin much hope here on constructive cooperation with all reasonable politicians who are committed to preserving civil peace in Russia, which means democracy and the market.

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Governor Nemtsov Will Not Run for President in 1996

MK0804120295 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed report in the "Provincial Chronicle" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nizhniy Novgorod—Oblast Governor Boris Nemtsov has announced that he does not intend to run in the 1996 presidential elections. According to him, "I am well aware of the responsibilities that will face the person in the presidential chair, and I am not going to fight for it." Nemtsov believes that Boris Yeltsin's chances in the next elections are "negligible."

Volskiy Rejects Leadership Role in New 'Industrialists' Party

MM1004123795 Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 1

["Own Information" report under the rubric "This Is the News": "Party Behind Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An enlarged session of the board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs has taken place at which a proposal was made to form a United Industrial Party.

Apart from representatives from 47 regions, a number of prominent politicians, experts, and businessmen were present at the board meeting; they unequivocally supported the proposal to form a party. Representatives of business and banking structures led by Association of Russian Banks President S. Yegorov will take care of its funding.

A. Shulunov, president of the Defense Enterprises' Assistance League, counted among the party's main allies first the trade unions followed by the Agrarians and G. Zyuganov's Communists.

Asked who would be party leader, Arkadiy Volskiy, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, did not reply, though many at the board meeting actually put him forward as a candidate. Volskiy emphasized that the party is needed not for elections but for everyday work, and that it would be immoral to form it around a particular leader.

Lipitskiy Comments on Rutskoy Relationship

954F2063A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 10 Apr 95 p 4

[Interview with Vasiliy Lipitskiy on Aleksandr Rutskoy, by Ivan Alinov; place and date not given: "'He Was a Partner Not Without His Uses'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **We have already written about the "divorce" of the two politicians (see VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK for 6 March) and have published the opinion of the supporters of Rutskoy, ex-vice president of Russia. Today we recognize Vasiliy Lipitskiy, deputy of the State Duma, who does not, it is true, like to expatiate on this subject. Nonetheless, he told your VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK correspondent some things, in any event....**

[Alinov] Aleksandr Vladimirovich had quite a lot to say about you in Novosibirsk. What do you say?

[Lipitskiy] Aleksandr Vladimirovich is not all that respectful of the party rules and program. Because, most likely, life has not afforded him an opportunity to grasp in depth what the party has lived by and the rules in its activity by which it has been guided: First he was vice president, then a prisoner. And since his release from Lefortovo, he has been preoccupied with the creation of Derzhava. He has acquired, therefore, a somewhat exaggerated notion of the degree of manageability of the party on his part, a notion that as Rutskoy decides, so everything will be....

When Rutskoy demanded quite out of the blue for everyone that the preoccupation with "this social democracy" be abandoned and that everyone become "patriots," it was impossible to agree with this. And it came as a very big surprise to him that, apparently, it is possible to disagree with Rutskoy. I believe that his actions and statements are somewhat inappropriate to the current situation. More than 60 regional organizations have taken part in the creation of the Russian Social Democratic Union, incidentally, and Derzhava has been created to this extent or the other by no more than 20....

[Alinov] That is, Rutskoy proved superfluous, and there is not enough room for the two of you in one party?

[Lipitskiy] We no longer consider him a member of this party.

[Alinov] But he does not consider you such either!

[Lipitskiy] There is a very simple criterion: When he joins some party, a person imposes on himself limitations, undertaking to abide by the demands of the rules. If you do not abide by them, you are not a member of the party. As has happened in this case.

[Alinov] There is the viewpoint that Lipitskiy was, figuratively speaking, the brains of the party, and Rutskoy gave voice to its ideas. And that this was advantageous to both....

[Lipitskiy] As regards the advantageousness of our cooperation: To be quite cynical, yes, this probably was, in fact, the case. Of course, in his vice presidency phase, Aleksandr Vladimirovich was not a political partner who was without his uses, to put it mildly.... But as regards who was the brain, who, the tongue.... I believe that this is a considerable exaggeration. Because Rutskoy was always an independent individual. If he listened to some recommendations, this by no means signified that he would follow them. He would frequently act in an

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entirely opposite fashion, even.... This, probably, is why the paths of the party and Rutskoy parted....

Duma Faction Leader Proposes Democrats Unite for Elections

LD0804141495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1230 GMT 8 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 8 (Interfax)—Leaders of the Russia's Democratic Choice movement Yegor Gaydar, of the "Russia, Forward!" movement Boris Fedorov, and of the Yabloko party Grigoriy Yavlinskiy should "by a definite time" conclude an agreement on unification of organizations headed by them into an election bloc. One of the leaders of the deputies group "Russia" in the State Duma Viktor Davydkin, co-chairman of the Russia's Choice movement, voiced this proposal at the sitting of the Russia's Choice movement in Moscow Saturday.

He also proposes, "if the negotiations between democrats' leaders are fruitless," to call on regional organizations of democratic parties and movements not to participate in collection of signatures necessary for participation of these leaders in parliamentary elections. "If these democratic leaders are unable to unite they have nothing to do in politics," he underlined.

Meanwhile, the other co-chairman of the movement Aleksandr Minzhurenko, member of the State Duma faction Russia's Choice is convinced that "Yavlinskiy will not unite."

Peasants To Form Coalition at Upcoming Elections

LD0804135495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1316 GMT 8 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Filatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 8 TASS—"Peasants will unite in a coalition for the upcoming parliament elections," Chairman of the Agrarian Party of Russia and head of the party's Duma faction Mikhail Lapshin told ITAR-TASS today.

In his words, the coalition involves the Agrarian Party of Russia, the Agrarian Union, the Trade Union of Agro-Industrial Workers, the Union of State and Collective Farms and Associations of Farmers on decision of the recent All-Russian Peasants' Assembly. The latter was held in Moscow to attract over 2,000 delegates from throughout Russia.

The assembly hopes that the coalition will be supported by consumer cooperative societies, melioration specialists, foresters, fishermen, agrarian scientists, students of agricultural higher educational establishments, intellectuals and businessmen working in the agro-industrial complex, residents of cities, towns and workers' settlements—all those who care for the future of the Russian countryside and Russia.

Speaking of presidential elections, Lapshin said they will join left-wing and left-centrist parties and associations in order to form a powerful election bloc.

INTERFAX Viewpoint Poll on Presidency

LD0604205395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1704 GMT 6 Apr 95

["Viewpoint" report; materials prepared by the Public Opinion Foundation, Viewpoint's sociological service, and the INTERFAX News Agency]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt]

WHO STANDS TO FEATURE AS THE RUSSIANS' CHOICE FOR PRESIDENT?

The respondents were allowed to give only one answer to the question of who is their likeliest choice for president. The answers can be compared with those obtained in a similar poll, last February.

	Feb '95 (percent)	Mar '95 (percent)
Yegor Gaydar	4	3
Boris Yeltsin	3	3
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy	6	6
Gennadiy Zyuganov	5	5
Sergey Kovalev	2	1
Aleksandr Lebed	4	6
Aleksandr Rutskoy	4	4
Ivan Rybkin	1	1
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn	5	4
Boris Fedorov	3	5
Viktor Chernomyrdin	2	2
Vladimir Shumeyko	1	1
Grigoriy Yavlinskiy	14	11
None of the above	22	21
Undecided	24	15
Refuse to vote		12

The farther from Moscow, the higher Zhirinovskiy's rating, with only one percent of those who live in Moscow and St Petersburg and as many as seven percent of those who live in the countryside hoping that the Liberal-Democratic leader will win the presidential race.

Thirteen percent of those who live in the countryside and 10 percent of those who live in Moscow and St Petersburg are willing to cast their ballots for the leader of the Yabloko bloc Grigory Yavlinskiy.

Boris Fedorov enjoys support mostly in Moscow and St Petersburg (9 percent). Those who live in smaller cities

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would rather see Gennadiy Zyuganov, Aleksandr Lebed or Grigoriy Yavlinskiy as the next president of Russia (8 percent each).

It is mostly the military (22 percent) and entrepreneurs (20 percent) who stand behind Yavlinskiy.

The military see Aleksandr Lebed and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy as their second and third best choice for president (respectively 15 and 10 percent). Unemployed favor Zhirinovskiy (10 percent), Lebed (9 percent) and Yavlinskiy (5 percent).

The industrial workers and citizens living on retirement benefits are divided between Zhirinovskiy (7 percent) and Yavlinskiy (8 percent).

A total of 1388 city and village dwellers were polled in March, 1995.

EVERY FIFTH RUSSIAN REFUSES TO SEE YELTSIN-LUZHKOV STANDOFF

The polled were requested to share their view of the following statement: "In defiance of Luzhkov's protests, the chief of the Moscow police force and the Moscow prosecutor were sacked in the wake of the Listyev assassination. Many explained the sackings by a standoff between Boris Yeltsin and Yuriy Luzhkov. Which of the two men would you rather support in case you agree that there is a Yeltsin-Luzhkov standoff?" The question admitted only one answer. I see no Yeltsin-Luzhkov standoff, 21 percent; Boris Yeltsin, 5 percent; Yuriy Luzhkov, 19 percent; neither of the two, 31 percent; undecided, 24 percent.

Moscow and St Petersburg emerge as Luzhkov's strongholds (44 percent in favor of Yuriy Luzhkov). Those who live in smaller cities are reluctant to support either of the two men (44 percent).

The farther from Moscow people live, the less important they consider that question and the more respondents were listed as undecided (28 percent against 10 percent in Moscow and St Petersburg).

A total of 1388 city and village dwellers were polled in March, 1995.

WHAT KIND OF A LEADER DOES RUSSIA NEED?

Numerous polls show that not a single political leader or party has won the hearts of more than 10 to 12 percent of the Russian voters and sociologists find it difficult to predict who stands to win the upcoming parliamentary and presidential races.

But generally speaking, they assume that the Russians will not favor those who support and will keep supporting Boris Yeltsin's line (only 15 percent of the respondents say thet they will) but will be likely to cast their ballots in favor of those who critisize and pledge to reject Yeltsin's policies.

Incidentally, that explains the recent defection of the Russia's Democratic Choice movement led by Yegor Gaydar. The Choice sensed the public mood but whether it stands to cash in on its defection, remains unclear now that elderly but less educated citizens in the lower social status brackets (industrial workers, those who live on retirement benefits and unemployed) are the angriest opponents of both Yeltsin and Democratic Choice policies.

Whether or not a political leader supports the Yeltsin line will most likely tell on his showing in the upcoming elections. Other than that, the "post-Soviet Russian voter" may yet surprise the sociologists.

The respondents were asked whose candidacy they would favor in the elections. The first batch of possible answers referred to the pace of anti-crisis action, and the second - to the deadlines for a scheduled recovery. The respondents were allowed to choose only one answer from each of the two batches.

1. I will support those who pledge to write an early end to the crisis (29 percent)

I will support those who pledge slower change for the better (44 percent)

Undecided (27 percent)

2. I will support those who set deadlines for the realization of their election programs (30 percent)

I will support those who refuse to set deadlines in the present conditions (47 percent)

Undecided (23 percent)

Approximately one third of the Russian voters may be expected to favor those who have had no experience of holding a high-ranking position although 37 percent of the respondents said that they would favor those who "have held a high-ranking position."

Whatever their political programs, "likable persons" may hope to enjoy support of thirty four percent of the Russian voters. Forty three percent of the voters will show interest in both personal qualities and political views of those who run for parliamentary and presidential mandates.

A total of 1303 city and village dwellers were polled in March, 1995. [passage omitted]

Decree on Federation Security Service Becomes Effective

LD1204163695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1117 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 12 (Interfax)—The decree "On Russia's Federation Security Service" (FSS) has come into effect after its publication in Rossiyskaya Gazeta.

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According to Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee Viktor Ilyukhin (the Communist Faction), in general this decree "is successful."

In an interview with Interfax he pointed out that "the State Duma (lower house of Russian parliament - IF note) gave its backing to the president-submitted draft decree on the Federal Counterintelligence Service, but it has substantially revised it and changed the name to the Federal Security Service, and Boris Yeltsin agreed to this."

Ilyukhin believes that "the decree has become more democratic, more specific, rich in content, and larger" after parliament revised it.

Ilyukhin pointed to the importance of the fact that for the first time activity of the state security bodies will be built on a legal basis. Mentioning the undoubtable merits of this decree, he spoke "about detailed regulation of rights and duties of FSS employees" and the fact that the decree "strictly defines the functions of the prosecutor supervising activity of the security bodies."

Ilyukhin noted that whereas the presidential version of the draft decree spoke about the prosecutor supervision only in one article, there appeared several articles in it after the State Duma revised the draft decree.

Ilyukhin opposed proposals of several deputies, in particular from the Russia's Choice faction, to withdraw supervision functions from the prosecutor's office.

Speaking "about absolute advantages of the decree on the FSS" Ilyukhin said that it strengthens juridical and introduces parliamentary control over activity of special services.

The post of the FSS Director is equal to the status of a federal minister.

Ilyukhin explained that the initial title of the decree was changed, which resulted in renaming the FSK the FSS, due to the fact that this service does not restrict its activity only to counterintelligence but carries out intelligence, search, and investigation operations.

Ilyukhin attracted special attention to the fact that "the decree provides for the creation of special detachments of the FSS." The service lost these detachments (Vympel and others) in December of 1993 in the course of transformations of Russia's former Security Ministry in the FSK.

Due to the fact that investigation functions on state crimes are returned to the FSS Ilyukhin spoke in favor of "returning the whole investigation prison, Lefortovo, to these bodies."

In an exclusive interview with Interfax last week a top-ranking official of the FSK said that in comparison with the Federal Counterintelligence Service Russia's Federal Security Service will receive new rights. Among them are the right to combat organized crime, to penetrate special services and organizations of foreign states and criminal groups, to conduct inquiries and preliminary investigation, to have and to use investigation prisons, to create special-purpose detachments, to create enterprises, departments, and organizations in order to fulfill the tasks facing the FSS.

In his words, the FSS has received the right for intelligence activity "in the interests of the country's security in order to increase its economic, scientific-technical, and defense potential." This activity will be implemented on the basis of an agreement with Russia's External Intelligence Service.

As he said, Russia's FSS and the bodies subordinate to it are legal successors of the Federal Counterintelligence Service. Its employees will be transferred to the FSS without any re-attestation or re-appointment.

The Interfax interlocutor said that the FSS tasks include informing authorities about threats to the country's security, ensuring security in Russia's armed forces and military formations, control over safety of data which present state secret and ensuring the security of the stage federal power bodies.

Law Gives Security Service 'New Look'

MM1204125195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 1

[Commentary by Boris Yamshanov: "Security Guaranteed. Federal Counterintelligence Service Gets New Look"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation president has ratified a law around which a lengthy polemic has been conducted in parliament and society alike. Well, of course—it concerns the Federal Security Service [FSB], the successor to the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

Possibly, with the adoption of this law the intoxicating era of the battle with the KGB and the glorious victories over state security are a thing of the past. Having been quartered (four massive structural reshuffles), this department was deprived of several huge structures. However, fulfilling its main task—ensuring the security of the individual, society, and the state—proved to be problematic without these structures.

For this reason it was necessary to restore the investigation administration. To this have been added detention centers, inquiries and preliminary investigations, and the special-purpose subunits—i.e. the power structures. All this has again engendered fears in some parts of society that "the old KGB is being revived under a new sign."

Indeed, it is possible to find many grounds for doubt in the new law. For example, the sanctity of citizens' dwellings is not put in question, but in certain situations

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FSB officers have the right to enter our homes unhindered. The private life of the individual is protected by the law, but in certain cases information affecting a citizen's honor and dignity could be divulged. No one impinges on the confidentiality of correspondence and telephone conversations, the choice of views and convictions, creeds, or friends, or on other civil liberties, but all these details can be kept in the said service's information systems, and, given the coincidence of a number of circumstances, an individual can be searched and detained.

On the other hand, supporters of the reorganization have their arguments, and it is quite probable that the majority of the population prefer them. Indeed, if a bloodthirsty maniac killed a woman and her children in an apartment or a barn, and the special service could only kick its heels at the gate: "We do not have the a prosecutor's warrant!"—would we feel pride in this devotion to principles? If a hired killer commits his dark deed and the security service has no information on potential criminals or forces to detain an unknown person fleeing with a pistol in his bosom, who needs such a service?

In the upshot it comes down to the perennial questions "What can we do?" and "What is to be done?", which some have heavy-handedly dubbed "Russian" questions. Whether we like it or not, a stable system is possible only given a balance of conflicting interests. Each of us makes his choice every day. It is safer to travel on foot, but we take a risk, boarding a train or a plane, for the sake of speed and comfort. To experience full freedom is a fine thing, but we voluntarily set limits on it with firm locks, guarding our homes from uninvited guests.

So too in the question of public safety there is always a certain risk. But people who are weary of rampant crime make their choice in favor of strengthening all the props of statehood, including the power structures.

During the discussion of the law in the Duma the following example was cited: If a man falls under the wheels of a motor car, it is not necessary to smash the car to pieces—the person sitting behind the wheel should be made to answer. Probably, here lies the golden key to the secret of the aforementioned eternal question. A car, even a state car, will go in the direction in which the wheel is turned. A well-oiled security system will not "run over" a dawdling freethinker for no reason, but will be able to protect citizens from gangsters, society from upheavals, and the state from being undermined and destroyed by its open and covert enemies.

Military, Nuclear & Space Issues

Grachev Reports 'Several Versions' of Dudayev's Whereabouts

LD1304205695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1810 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KOSTROMA, April 13 (Interfax)—Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev arrived in Kostroma (the Upper Volga Region) this evening.

He said there were several versions on the fate of Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev.

According to some sources, Dudayev is now in the North Caucasian mountains but his state of health could be doubted, Grachev said.

Grachev said that, according to another version, Dudayev had been wounded during a strike launched by federal troops.

Grachev said that, according to other sources, Dudayev was now out of Chechnya but still on the ex-USSR territory.

Yegorov Appointed Commander in Chechnya 'Temporarily'

LD1404105695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1038 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 14 Apr—The public relations center of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs made it clear today that Colonel General Mikhail Yegorov, first deputy minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation, has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in Chechnya only temporarily.

He will occupy this post for the period that Col. Gen. Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the interior troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, is on leave.

Deputies Accuse Russian Troops of Atrocities in Samashki

LD1304203995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1951 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—The events in Samashki were a "large-scale punitive operation" intended "to intimidate Chechen residents", Russian lawmaker Anatoliy Shabad said on Thursday.

Samashki, a flashpoint of separatist resistance 30 kilometres west of the Chechen capital Groznyy, was the site of an assault by Russian forces last weekend.

Witnesses of the assault and State Duma deputies who returned from a fact-finding tour of the village gave a news conference.

With reference to witnesses, Shabad said the troops attacked Samashki residents as they hid in their houses. "They found people in basements, and threw grenades in there", he told reporters.

"In some cases, they didn't throw grenades, but took men of any age outside and killed them in front of their wives and children", Shabad said. "We saw a place where two war veterans were shot down. They were dragged into their house and the house was set on fire. We saw their burnt bodies".

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His comments echoed those of refugees who fled the village after the Russian assault. According to them, Russian soldiers killed a lot of civilians and took away some 120 men, whose fate or whereabouts are still unknown.

The witnesses flatly dismissed the reports that the villagers were shot down by Dudayev loyalists from the so-called Abkhazian battalion. "There were no 'Abkhazians' in the village, while our volunteer fighters left Samashki a day before the assault", they insisted.

According to the lawmaker, the rebel troops of Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev had left Samashki before the Russian assault, and the resistance offered by a bunch of armed residents was not comparable in size with that in Groznyy.

Andrey Blinushev, a member of Sergey Kovalyov's group, reported with reference to local residents that Russian soldiers killed 47 villagers, aged from 18 to 70. Blinushev visited Samashki immediately after the assault.

All participants in the news conference flatly dismissed the reports that Dudayev fighters had shot down a group of Samashki eldermen, who earlier negotiated with representatives of federal troops in Chechnya. Shabad labelled these reports as "a lie", adding that he had met three participants in the talks.

Kovalyov, President Boris Yeltsin's human rights commissioner, told the news conference that Western leaders coming to Moscow on May 9 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Nazi defeat in World War II should make clear their disapproval of the war in Chechnya.

The prominent human rights champion called upon the public "to calmly investigate" into the recent events in the Chechen village of Samashki.

On Tuesday, Russian Interior Ministry spokesman Vladimir Vorozhtsov denied reports about "a huge casualty toll" among civilians in Samashki. Nor did he confirm that journalists were barred from the village.

Russia's military command had denied there were atrocities or widespread civilian losses in Samashki either.

According to a TASS correspondent in Chechnya, the village was completely sealed off by military posts on Thursday, and neither local residents nor Russian lawmakers and independent journalists were allowed in.

Gen. Lebed Predicts 'Sluggish, Endless' War in Chechnya

LD0804195495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1800 GMT 8 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Russian Army, said today that he has changed his position on Chechnya.

[Begin Lebed recording] Spring is coming and the leaves are appearing on the bushes. [Word indistinct] peacefully. Under those bushes a sluggish, endless war is going to begin. Every day there will be 10 or 12 deaths. That is not many. The mothers will give birth more. Well, if you count up the days there will be 120 dead after 10 days, and 1,200 after 100 days. It will be more or less like that for 100 years. They say that there are many human bodies and animal carcasses under the ruins of Groznyy. What with hepatitis, plague, and cholera, our prospects are excellent. Infection will travel all over Russia with the help of refugees, relatives, dying servicemen [words indistinct]. Spring will dictate the conditions. [end recording]

Defense Ministry To Discuss Army Morale; Chechnya Link Seen

MM1404094395 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by correspondent Eduard Dolya under the "Army" rubric: "Pavel Grachev Calls For Fighting Spirit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev appears ready to hold a "debriefing" on Chechnya. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has learned from a reliable source that "The morale of the personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and practical measures to bolster it" will figure as an agenda item for discussion at one of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Collegium's next sessions. In this regard the commanders in chief of branches of the Armed Forces, the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, and fleets, and the chiefs of Defense Ministry main directorates have received Telegram N172/11, in which Lieutenant General Sergey Zdorikov, chief of the Defense Ministry Main Directorate for Educational Work (the former Main Military-Political Directorate), requests that "an order be issued to officials of educational structures" to assess the Russian Army's fighting spirit and prepare proposals to ensure its drastic improvement by 15 April.

It is noteworthy that the first time such a question was examined was at the Eighth All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress in 1919. (Let us remember that a civil war was under way in Russia at the time). Given the "official absence" of any civil war mark-95 in Russia, such coincidences make you think that the process under way in Chechnya is not at all like "disarming illegal armed formations" and that complete victory over Dudayev is probably as far away as that over the Whites in 1919.

Meanwhile the submission of a question concerning the morale of "men under arms" to the Defense Ministry Collegium backs up the claim that there are problems with morale in the Russian Army. And even the chief political worker, Sergey Zdorikov, does not have the courage to hide—as a friend—these problems from Pavel Grachev.

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Grachev Says Topol-M ICBM To Be Tested in May

LD1404044095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1810 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [No place name as received] April 13 (Interfax)—Wages of Russian servicemen was raised by 1.3 times from April 1, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said.

He told servicemen of the strategic missile troops in the Saratov Region (Povolzhye) today that officers would be receiving a minimum of 600,000 rubles a month. Grachev added that an average wage in Russia was at present 340,000 rubles.

Grachev said that the second test launch of an SS-25 Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] would be carried out in May. The first launch took place in Plesetsk (the Arkhangelsk Region, North Russia) in December 1994.

Grachev said, when answering questions, that Russia had recently toughened its position on the issues of national security.

Speaking about NATO's enlargement, Grachev said that Russia would be capable of ensuring its security independently in any situation. He added that he was in favor of developing military cooperation between the signatories to the CIS treaty on collective defense.

Grachev visited several military units of the strategic missile troops, the Tatishchev missile division in the Saratov Region and left for Kostroma this evening.

Missile Warning System Coping 'for the Time Being'

MM1104143695 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0710 GMT 10 Apr 95

[From the "Military Courier" program: video report by Vladimir Sidorenkov and Dmitriy Biketov, identified by caption; footage attributed to VoyenTV]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted: duty watch reporting for duty—video shows servicemen reporting and boarding aircraft]

[Video of interior of A-50 airborne warning aircraft over music]

[V. Bystrov, missile attack warning center officer, identified by caption] The officers' attitude is probably characterized by inertia. Inertia pure and simple, that makes them continue to get on with their jobs.

[Sidorenkov over exterior, interior of Pechora phased-array radar early warning center] The space missile defense troops are part of the country's Air Defense Forces. These troops are constantly on alert duty. They are equipped with missile attack warning systems, space monitoring systems, and ABM defense systems.

[V. Smirnov, commander of space missile defense troops, identified by caption] This radar center monitors mainly the northern sector, and partly the northwestern sector. The northwestern sector is the most dangerous. This is because the main concentrations of ballistic missiles are still located on the [North] American continent, and in the ocean in the same sector. [video shows chart of missile bases]

[Sidorenkov over video of interior of airborne warning center] In present-day conditions when, for various reasons, breaches have appeared in the air defense system, airborne warning systems have acquired prime importance. The technical characteristics of the infrared detectors make it possible to record launches of medium- and short-range missiles at distances of up to 1,000 km from the alert duty aircraft, which flies at altitudes between 10 and 12 km.

The burdens placed on these systems today, when former air defense facilities are located largely on the territory of what are now foreign states, have increased several-fold. For the time being the hardware, and the people manning it, are coping with these burdens, albeit with difficulty. Only time will show to what extent the reserves of this technical and human potential are adequate.

[V. Smirnov] Without exaggeration, we have not allowed a single missile launched in our sectors to get through. Incidentally, this would be hard to cover up.

These are very sophisticated systems. A lot of money was sunk into them. Essentially they are everything that the Soviet Union with its standard of science, technology, and training was capable of.

[Sidorenkov] (?Would it be possible to build them now?)

[Smirnov] I don't think so. I don't think it would be possible now. Given the current situation I would even say: Definitely not. [video shows duty watch reporting for duty; interior of airborne early warning system; officer interview; glimpses of Pechora phased-array radar station; Smirnov interview; chart of U.S. bases; extensive footage of airborne early warning system interior; more of Smirnov interview]

Ministry Aide Outlines Guest List, Plans for Victory Day

MM1004085595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "All Heads To Be Our Guests..."]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow last saw something similar in May 1896, when the coronation of Nicholas II took place in the Kremlin's Dormition Cathedral. The celebrations for Victory Day 9 May 1995 will probably eclipse the festivities of a century ago, not to mention the

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series of funeral ceremonies in the early eighties, when foreign guests gathered almost yearly for the funeral of one more general secretary.

According to recent information, reported to IZVESTIYA by First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Israel, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United States, Finland, France, and Croatia, the chairman of the PRC, the prime ministers of Britain, Iceland, Spain, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal, and also the UN secretary general will come to the Russian capital. The leaders of the Baltic states have declined to come, thereby eliciting a statement harsh in tone from Smolenskaya Ploshchad. It is not yet clear who will represent Poland. Nor has there been a reply from the Serbs and Montenegrins, who consider themselves brothers—the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It seems likely that Turkish President Suleyman Demirel will come, but he will make the final decision on his return from a tour of Latin American countries.

The ceremonies will commence 8 May with the unveiling of a memorial to Marshal Zhukov in Manezhnaya Ploshchad. A ceremonial meeting and concert will take place the same evening in the State Kremlin Palace. At the same time Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will sit at a table with Helmut Kohl, John Major, and Francois Mitterrand, only not in Moscow but in Berlin, where the head of the cabinet will represent Russia in anniversary measures culminating in a ceremonial supper. The French president and the British premier will clearly have to spend the night in an aircraft: As early as 0900 hours the next day they are to appear in Red Square, where a speech by President Yeltsin and a parade of war veterans from Russia and the Commonwealth countries will open the strictly official part of the celebrations in Moscow of the 50th anniversary of the victory. Toward noon the delegations will set out to observe the military parade on Poklonnaya Gora, after which they will spend 90 minutes viewing the memorial complex. The day will end in a grand Kremlin reception given by the Russian head of state.

According to IZVESTIYA's information, no more than five people will arrive with each guest. Probably the only exception will be U.S. President Bill Clinton, who begins his official visit to Russia 10 May. But even he will hardly be able to bring more than three people with him to the official events—these are the Russian side's terms.

According to Igor Ivanov, requests to hold bilateral meetings with Boris Yeltsin have been coming in until very recently, but apparently none will take place. It is clear that it will be impossible to receive all who wish it, but we do not want to offend guests by a selective approach. Most of those who are coming will depart during the morning of 10 May, but some will probably stay on, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is already endeavoring to organize private programs for this category of foreign politicians. By 10 April Smolenskaya Ploshchad hopes to have received replies from all 56 heads of state to whom invitations were sent. A staff to prepare for the celebration of the victory 50th anniversary will start work in the ministry next week. [passage omitted]

Anatoliy Safonov, deputy director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, was most evasive: Service obliges. His department is devoting its chief attention to preventive measures and is cooperating both with representatives of the Main Protection Directorate and the Presidential Security Service and with the Foreign Intelligence Service and foreign colleagues. In reply to a question about what his people will do if national-communist demonstrators undertake an attempt to arrange disturbances in the capital 8 or 9 May, Anatoliy Yefimovich said: "We hope that serious politicians will be sufficiently wise to recognize the victory festival as a day of unity and peace. But where preventive measures are insufficient, it might be necessary to apply measures of limitation."

May 9 will also be a festival for Russians abroad. Receptions and ceremonies to confer the "50 Years of Victory" medal on foreign resistance members will take place in embassies. There are at least 50,000 such people. In addition, in a number of countries the ambassadors of Commonwealth states are organizing joint receptions - - a tribute of respect to the common triumph.

Decree Announces Servicemen's Pay Raise

MM1104124295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Ivan Ivanyuk under the "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and News Agency Correspondents Report" rubric: "Pay Raise at Last"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—Russian Federation Government Decree No. 311 "On Increasing the Base Pay and Allowances of Servicemen, Enlisted and Command Personnel of Internal Affairs and Tax Police Organs, and Also Employees of the Russian Federation Customs System" was signed 6 April 1995. In accordance with it, the salaries and wage rates for military (special) ranks set as of 1 July 1994 are increased 30 percent effective 1 April 1995.

The salaries of civilian personnel of the Defense Ministry central apparatus, of the apparatus of branches of the Armed Forces, districts, fleets, armies, and flotillas, and also of military prosecutor's office and military court organs and of employees of field establishments of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation are increased simultaneously as of 1 April this year.

We were told at the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Military Budget and Finance Directorate that the corresponding instructions on the recalculation of wage rates have been sent to the troops.

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New Types of Nuclear Weapons Developed at Arzamas-16

LD1404074495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0658 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Arzamas-16 April 14 TASS—The development of new types of nuclear weapons is going on at the Federal Nuclear Centre in Arzamas-16. Full-scale nuclear tests have not been conducted of late. The functioning of new structures is simulated with the help of "ordinary" explosions at special test sites, situated on the territory of Arzamas-16, Stanislav Novikov, head of the department of explosion studies, told ITAR-TASS today.

According to Novikov, all spring tests are conducted without plutonium and uranium. Imitators are used instead of them, specifically steel, lead or composite materials, whose mechanical characteristics are close to those of the splitting materials, used in weapons. Explosive materials are genuine, however. In this way scientists get a clear idea of how the weapons will function.

Most test explosions are conducted for peaceful purposes. A unique technology, developed in Arzamas-16, makes it possible to process phased out ammunition. Several grammes of the explosive material cut a shell in two, whithout damaging the "stuffing." A nuclear bomb that came to Arzamas-16 for processing, as well as a batch of obsolete torpedoes from the Pacific Fleet, were defused in this way at the Semipalatinsk test site several years ago.

Aside from it, specialists developed explosion technologies, which are being used in various branches of the national economy. They permit to cut with minimal expenditures large-size metal and reinforced-concrete structures, including granite blocks in quarries, ships and drilling platforms in the open sea, where no other equipment can be brought.

Radioactive Cesium Uncovered in Mari El

LD0904133495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1000 GMT on 9 April on its "Vesti" newscast carries a 1-minute video report on the discovery by Russian counterintelligence agents of two containers of highly radioactive cesium-137 in Yoshkar-Ola, Mari El Republic. The announcer reports that four young men had been trying to smuggle the containers to the Baltic countries. Video shows the two containers.

New Space Rockets Under Development

LD0804085995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0844 GMT 8 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Viktor Grichenko and Veronika Romanenkova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 8 TASS—The fleet of Russian space missiles will be modernised. For instance, testing of a new light rocket, Rokot, is now in progress, while work is now well underway on the heavy Angara and medium Rus missiles.

The need for improving rockets was prompted by "the ageing" of technology and competitive struggle on world markets.

The thing is that the main national boosters have been operated for decades now. For instance, Soyuz is an improved model of chief designer Korolev's R-7 rocket and has been in use since 1957. Operation of Molniya started a bit later.

These boosters "shoulder" the main burden of fulfilling the country's space programme. Modernised boosters of the Kosmos type, based on combat missiles R-12 and R-14 by chief designer Yangel, were developed and have been in operation since early 1960s.

The Zenit rocket which was developed in the 1970s and which was launched 25 times, is more advanced.

Federal Assembly

Duma Adopts Resolution on Lifting Sanctions Against FRY

LD1404101495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1000 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—The lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, said today it was fed up with sanctions against Yugoslavia and material damage caused by them to several parties including Russia.

The State Duma adopted a resolution calling for stepping up efforts aiming to lift economic sanctions imposed on the united Republic of Yugoslavia by the United Nations and to restore full-scale cooperation with it.

The Duma proposed to the president and Government of Russia to take effective steps aimed at redoubling the efforts of the country's officials in the U.N. Security Council and the international "contact group" to secure the lifting of sanctions on the united Republic of Yugoslavia and the resumption of its full membership in the United Nations and other international organisations.

The Duma recommended the Russian Government to have natural gas deliveries to Yugoslavia carried out, as well as increasing the volume of humanitarian goods sent to it.

The Duma proposed that the cabinet take additional measures to strengthen the legal framework of Russian-Yugoslav relations.

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At present, there is no reason for keeping the sanctions in place, since Yugoslavia has complied with the requirements contained in the U.N. resolution and backed up the proposals of the contact group, and it is no longer a party to the conflict, according to Russian parliamentarians.

Russian Duma members consider that "the imposition of sanctions against Yugoslavia on the initiative of West European countries has caused considerable material damage to Russia, and the elimination of them will allow to renew full-scale economic, political and cultural cooperation for the benefit of the two countries."

Duma Condemns 1915-1922 Genocide in Armenia

LD1404100995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1001 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 14 TASS—The lower house of Russia's Federal Assembly (parliament) today adopted a statement condemning the 1915-1922 genocide of the Armenian people.

The State Duma said in the statement that it "condemns the organisers of mass killings of Armenians, expresses its compassion with the Armenian people and regards April 24 as remembrance day commemorating the genocide victims".

On Russia's initiative, the European great powers in 1915 described the actions of the Turkish empire against the Armenian people as "a crime against humanity," the statement recalled.

Yeltsin's Aide Sees No Economic Grounds for Confidence Vote

LD1304113995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1054 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Serov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—No economic reasons guided Russian lawmakers who attempted to call for a vote of confidence last week, Russian presidential aide Aleksandr Livshits told ITAR-TASS on Thursday. According to the official, "only a political selfish consideration" was behind the attempt. The lawmakers consider whom the president will nominate if the cabinet resign, what will wait for the Duma and so on, Livshits said.

As to the cabinet's implementation of the president's annual message to the parliament, the government has assumed tough budget obligations and fulfill them strictly, the presidential aide noted.

Livshits recommended the Duma to adopt a resolution to ban laws contradicting to the budget.

The Russian parliament's intention to find reasons to make the government resign is not anything "exotic" and corresponds to the world practice, Livshits added.

DPR Insists on Vote of No Confidence

MK1304102195 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Gleb Cherkasov: "Stanislav Govorukhin Has Replaced Sergey Glazyev in the Post of DPR Chairman. Yuriy Petrov and Vasiliy Lipitskiy Are Creating a 'Left-of-Center Coalition'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Duma faction of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] changed its leader. In place of Sergey Glazyev, chairman of the Duma Committee on Economic Policy, who headed the faction after Nikolay Travkin's departure, Stanislav Govorukhin was elected the DPR deputies' leader. The intra-factional reshuffle is basically a tactical move: Govorukhin is substantially more popular than Glazyev. The replacement of the leader will not entail any changes in the DPR's political orientation: At least the faction does not abandon its intentions to vote no confidence in the Viktor Chernomyrdin cabinet. True, this week the no confidence question is not likely to be submitted to a Duma plenary session. The DPR intends to hold preliminary consultations with all factions and deputies' groups which criticized the government's economic course in the elections (the Agrarian Party of Russia, New Regional Policy, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the LDPR, PRES, Yabloko, and Women of Russia). Only then, no later than the Duma's first session in May, it will raise the question of no confidence in the government.

It appears, however, that consultations with PRES and New Regional Policy come somewhat late in the day: New Regional Policy leader Vladimir Medvedev said at a press conference yesterday that his group has concluded an agreement with PRES and the Stability group on working out a common position on fundamental matters of legislation. Medvedev believes that the agreement will also be joined by a recently created deputies group, Rossiya. Both New Regional Policy and Stability have already announced that they will not accept the demand for the government's resignation.

Touching on the subject of upcoming elections, Vladimir Medvedev stressed that New Regional Policy advocates a majority system in electing the next State Duma. Group members suppose that 450 deputies elected from single-seat constituencies could define their political affiliations and choose a faction to suit them in the Duma. True, New Regional Policy is ready for a temporary compromise, whereby the correlation between proportional representation and the majority system would be 1:2.

Preparations for the election campaign were also a dominant subject at a joint press conference by Russian Social-Democratic Union leader Vasiliy Lipitskiy and

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Realists' Union Chairman Yuriy Petrov. Although the Russian Social-Democratic Union and the Realists' Union have not so far announced the creation of a bloc, both organizations intend to work together on many matters, including in the process of the election campaign. True, Lipitskiy noted that until the rules of the game (election laws) have been defined conclusively, it is premature to talk about forms and methods of conducting an election campaign. Petrov for his part noted that his organization will collaborate with all political forces "from Shakhray to the communists" (according to Vasiliy Lipitskiy, Shakhray in this case plays the role of a "demarcation pole"). In any event, the emerging coalition will have a left-of-center orientation.

Travkin: DPR Has Too Few Members To Be Faction

MK1304113795 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Journal" rubric: "Nikolay Travkin Attacks DPR Faction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In view of the fact that the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia] faction is continuing its attempts to raise in the Duma the question of no confidence in the government, its former leader, Nikolay Travkin, came forward with a statement on 12 April. A minister without portfolio, Travkin believes that the DPR faction cannot raise the question of no confidence, since it lost the right to do so after seven of its members quit. "The remaining 8 out of 15 people," Travkin believes, "cannot enjoy the rights of a faction and cannot raise the most important political questions."

Duma Roll Call Votes Against Chechnya Law Listed

954F2075A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 15, Apr 95 p 3

[Unattributed article under rubric "Details": "Who Votes For the War?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In spite of the fact that federal troops have taken all the large population points on the territory of the republic, the war in Chechnya continues, and its end is not in sight. People are dying as before.*

On 5 April the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted in the first reading a federal law, "On Measures for Political Regulation of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic." There were 228 deputies who voted in favor of political regulation of the Chechen crisis and 56 who voted against it. The editors wanted to know who they were. For such an important issue there was a roll-call vote, and the voters may familiarize themselves with the list of deputies who spoke out in favor of continuing the civil war.

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia:
S.N. Abeltsev, Ye.a. Bolshakov, Yu.Ye. Buzov, M.P. Burlakov, M.Yu. Vakulenko—electoral district (hereinafter—e.d.) No. 93 (Kirov Oblast); A.V. Vasilishin, V.G. Vishnyakov, L.D. Gagut, V.Z. Gvozdarev, S.M. Zhebrovskiy, V.V. Zhirinovskiy—e.d. No. 114 (Moscow Oblast); E.G. Zhuk, V.Ye. Zhuravlev, V.V. Zhurko—e.d. No. 46 (Krasnoyarsk Kray); S.K. Zarichanskiy, A.A. Zvyagin, V.P. Ivanov, Vl.P. Ivanov, Ye.P. Ishchenko, A.V. Kapustin, A.M. Kashirovskiy, V.V. Kiselev, A.I. Kozyrev, V.U. Korniyenko, S.A. Korobov, V.M. Kostyutkin, N.V. Krivelskaya, Yu.P. Kuznetsov, M.Ya. Lemeshev, V.A. Lisichkin, G.G. Lukava, A.V. Mitrofanov, E.V. Mitrofanova, Ye.E. Mikhaylov—e.d. No. 141 (Pskov Oblast); V.V. Pcnelkin, Yu.M. Ruda, A.S. Sidorov, D.A. Skum, M.N. Snezhkov, S.V. Sychev, Ye.V. Tuinov, A.V. Filatov, O.A. Finko, and S.A. Churkin.

Yabloko:
A.G. Vasilyev—e.d. No. 219 (Taymir Autonomous Okrug).

Agrarian Party of Russia:
G.A. Medentsov.

Russia's Choice Bloc:
Yushchenko, A.A.—Volgograd Oblast.

Deputies not belonging to factions:
S.N. Baburin—e.d. No. 130 (Omsk Oblast); N.M. Bezborodov—e.d. No. 96 (Kurgan Oblast); V.S. Grigoriadi—e.d. No. 182 (Chelyabinsk Oblast); V.A. Marychev, A.G. Nevzorov—e.d. No. 210 (St. Petersburg); V.P. Utkin—e.d. No. 186 (Chelyabinsk Oblast).

Deputy group Stability
L.S. Maksakova

New Regional Policy Group:
M.A. Vasilyev—e.d. No. 30 (Udmurt Republic)

Group of Deputies Demands Immediate Chechen Cease-Fire

LD1304211795 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1420 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 April—Representing various factions of the State Duma, a substantial group of deputies numbering over 30, concerned at the "sharp exacerbation of the situation in the zone of the Chechen conflict," is demanding of the Russian Federation government an immediate cease-fire in Chechnya and the start of peace talks without prior conditions with the command of the armed formations opposing the federal authorities. This is stated in the parliamentarians' statement that was circulated in the State Duma today.

The deputies warn that if such talks do not start before 20 April they "will use their last opportunity to influence the government" by adding their signatures to those of their colleagues calling for a debate in the Duma on the question of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers.

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Vote on Chechnya Forces 'More Political Than Practical'

MM1404114895 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Yermolin: "Better Late... Duma Attempts To Cut Through 'Chechen Knot'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Duma has scaled a new height of interference in the Chechen drama. Whereas previously parliamentarians confined themselves to statements, news conferences, and appeals to the government and the president, on Wednesday the deputies' will took the form of a law. The federal law "On Provisional Measures for a Political Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic" passed its second and third readings at once. Some 286 votes were cast for it.

The law unequivocally prohibits the utilization of the Russian Federation Armed Forces for purposes not stipulated by Article 10 of the Law "On Defense." The Russian Federation Government is instructed to enter into negotiations with the command of the armed Dudayev detachments. The objective is to be an immediate end to hostilities on both sides without preliminary conditions.

The adopted law will most likely be more political than practical in nature. As Russian Federation Government Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin said, in Chechnya "things must be brought to a conclusion and the i's must be dotted." Any other kind of talk is impossible in the present situation since the Dudayev forces still prefer to talk to Moscow from a position of force.

Political Considerations in Votes on Conscription Law

MK1404091395 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 14 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Ilya Bulavinov: "Army and Politics. Security Problem as Political Bargaining Chip"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today the Federation Council is scheduled to look at the amendments, passed by the State Duma, to the law "On Military Service and Military Conscription." That is to say, it is supposed to agree or disagree with increasing the length of service and with imposing mandatory service for higher education students. It is, however, obvious that the outcome of the voting will not be the result of the parliamentarians' understanding of "national security interests;" rather, it will be an indicator of their personal ambitions of the moment. This acquires a special subtext before the elections when an army of one and a half million men becomes a tempting morsel for any party, and the results of voting on "military laws" will inevitably affect the army's attitude toward politicians. [passage omitted]

At first the Duma was guarded toward requests that it extend the term of service and impose mandatory one-year service for higher education students, and limited itself to passing a decree only on staffing the armed forces and the border troops with conscripts. But then, as if it sensed that its decision was short lived (it was subsequently thrown out by the Federation Council), the Duma went back to consider the amendments and passed them in one fell swoop. The voting results give one an idea of who is a Defense Ministry "ally." Probably, in exchange for a corresponding attitude in the future.

Nearly all of the Communists, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], the Agrarians, "Derzhava," and the pro-president "Stability" group backed the General Staff. Voting against, together with the "Women of Russia," were virtually all the rightists—"Russia's Choice," "Yabloko," "12 December," and more than half of the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord]. Shortly before the elections, this lineup (the men in the Defense Ministry always count who voted for what, and sometimes publish the lists in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA) looks impressive. To all appearances, the Federation Council will approve the amendments (although some changes are possible.) At any rate, the amendments raised no objections from the Defense and Security Committee. In addition to election considerations, the senators have some others. With half of its members being regional leaders, the upper chamber would hardly quarrel with the army because its friendship helps regional leaders solve social problems and develop infrastructure, and gives them additional levers for lobbying in Moscow. For that matter, Vladimir Shumeyko, who has not given up hope of running for president, invariably stresses his appreciation of the army's difficulties.

One should think that Grachev would be able to persuade Yeltsin to sign the law. And for a while, it would make the military men's life easier. It may even somewhat raise the army's combat readiness. That would, however, provide no answer to the question of what sort of army the country needs and what for. In its absence, arguments about canceling deferments and delimiting powers between the Defense Ministry and the General Staff will continue to remain a means for solving election or purely bureaucratic tasks.

Federation Council Passes Law on Raising Minimum Wage

LD1304130595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1157 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—The law on raising minimum wages passed unanimously by the Federation Council today stipulates fixing the minimum monthly wage at 34,400 roubles as of April 1 and 43,700 roubles as of May 1.

The law on raising minimum pensions, and the procedure of indexing and recalculating state pensions in the

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Russian Federation has also been endorsed. It fixes the minimum old-age pension at 43,739 roubles per month since May 1 and stipulates the increase of 27 per cent on all pensions calculated in accordance with the law "on state pensions in the Russian Federation", proceeding from the amount paid in April.

Both laws passed by the State Duma and the Federation Council had been turned down by the president as the required funds were lacking in the budget. As a result of the work of the conciliatory commissions, the deputies riched a compromise with the government: The wages and pensions will be increased but not to the amounts initially proposed.

The Federation Council did not discuss today another law turned down to the president—"On Restoring and Protecting Savings of Citizens of the Russian Federation". The State Duma has not amended the law, and the committies of the Federation Councils consented. In this case in order to override the presidential veto there is a need for the qualified majority of votes, but the needed number of deputies were not present in the council today. The law is to be discussed as a priority at the next meeting.

Federation Council Passes Package of Economic Laws

LD1304161095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1430 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—The Federation Council on Thursday adopted virtually without debating a number of economic laws referred to it by the State Duma. They include amendments and supplements to the law on the value-added tax and the law on profits of enterprises and organisations.

The supplements to the law on value-added tax, for instance, expand the list of food products and goods for children on which the minimum value-added tax of ten percent is imposed. Amendments apply to the procedure of paying the tax during the marketing of goods and services in the Russian territory by foreign enterprises that are registered with the tax organisation and those that are not registered.

Deputies passed the law on banks and banking, but rejected once again the law on the Central Bank as they disagree with its separate provisions.

The Federation Council came out with a legislative initiative, drafting a law on financial-industrial groups. The Federation Council has endorsed the draft, and it will now be referred to the State Duma. Deputies of the upper house have also endorsed the law drafted by the government on rescheduling the debt for centralised credits and interest on them from enterprises of the agro-industrial complex and for organisations delivering products to districts of the extreme north. According to deputies' report, enterprises of the agro-industrial complex ran a debt of 18,000 billion roubles for centralised credits and interests as of May 1. Under the law, the debt is referred to the state domestic duty.

Federation Council Meeting Put Off Due to Lack of Quorum

LD1404093095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0849 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—A meeting of the Russian Federation Council that was to be held on Friday has been put off for the same reason as on Thursday evening—there was no quorum.

As a result of this, the Federation Council failed to complete the discussion of matters connected with the situation in Chechnya, laws on presidential elections and elections of deputies to the State Duma, amendments to the law on military duty and a number of other problems including the draft law on the formation of the Federation Council.

"The same situation will be repeated in the new Federation Council if chiefs of power-wielding structures of subjects of the federation again prevail in the upper house. They are always in a hurry go home", Ramazan Abdulatipov, deputy speaker of the Federation Council, told ITAR-TASS. "We should take this into consideration when the law on the procedure of forming the Federation Council is being adopted".

The next meeting of the Federation Council is planned for April 25.

Duma Adopts Law on Trade Unions

LD1404110195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1040 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—The federal law "On trade unions, their rights and guarantees of their activity" was adopted by the Russian State Duma on Friday [14 April].

Under the law, trade unions represent and protect rights and interests of trade union members on matters of individual labour relations and, as regards collective rights and interests, the rights of all employees regardless of their membership in trade unions.

In their activity, trade unions are independent of state authorities, local government bodies, employers, political parties and other public organisations. They are not accountable to them and not controlled by them.

Under the law, trade unions have a right to organise and hold in accordance with existing legislations strikes,

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assemblies, rallies, marches, demonstrations, picketing and other collective actions. They can use these actions as means of the struggle for the right to work and other social and economic rights and interests of the working people.

Trade unions own, use and dispose of their property, including money, to fulfil the tasks stipulated in their charter.

Trade union educational institutions at federal and regional levels can be subsidised from appropriate budgets, says the law.

Regional Affairs

Chechen Refugees in Tatarstan Discussed

954F2065A Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Tamara Levina, IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA: "Scattered by the Wind; More Than 200 Families From Chechnya Have Arrived in Tatarstan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A TV correspondent asked a general who was leading his unit out of Groznyy to its permanent station: How would you answer the question, for what reason did you bring your troops to Chechnya? And the general, without a moment's thought, reported: For the very same reason that General Yermolov did—to defend Russia's integrity.

Historical analogies are dangerous. Especially for politicians and military commanders who try to justify their objectives and means with the authority of long since departed forebears. I will not cite the opinion of official historiography concerning that Caucasus war—it has changed repeatedly. The opinion of it of witnesses is far more reliable. For example, the opinion of Mikhail Lermontov, who was exiled under Chechen bullets. Read at least his "Hero of Our Times," and you will understand that the 19th century of imperial order affirmed itself with far less blood than did the constitutional 20th century.

Today, the history of undeclared bloody war is written not only with the fate of soldiers who died and were wounded on the battlefield, but also of children, women, and old people, allegedly for the sake of whose legal defense residential quarters were struck by heavy cannon.

The winds of war will scatter those who survived this kind of "defense" throughout the peaceful oblasts and republics of the Russian Federation. More than 200 families have arrived in Tatarstan. In drawing up documents in the migration service, the refugees and enforced migrants were obliged to answer this question: What compelled you to leave the place where you lived? Lilya Beyanova (the names are changed) who came from Groznyy to Kazan with 10-year-old Azamat wrote: "My husband sent me off with our son so that we would survive somewhere." The tragedy of hundreds of thousands of peaceful citizens of Russia cannot be defined more accurately and terribly!

However, the hostile winds were raised not by foreign conquerors, but by their own rulers—more than 50 years ago they deprived her father and mother of their paternal shelter. The motherland. Then, in 1994, they, the minors, together with the parents, were deported from the Caucasus Mountains to the Kazakhstan steppes. Bela grew up and grew prettier, and Nursultan grew to manhood. The young people also met there, fell in love, and celebrated their wedding, and they were happy there with the birth of their eldest son. But when the disgraceful ban on people living on the land of their forebears was lifted, they returned to their native mountains and settled in Shali. They returned without being bitter against all humankind, but with one desire—to restore their home and their family. So, four sons and four daughters have already grown up in the big Samatov house. Lilya, already acting like a bride, introduced her beloved to her parents. Viktor's father is a Chechen and his mother is a Russian—from Stavropol. However, the nationality of Lilya's father and mother was not disturbing, as long as the man was good. They had understood this truth back in Kazakhstan, where both Russians and Kazakhs helped their families to survive.

....I am sitting with her in a room in the attic of a dilapidated house next to the Kazan central market, which Lilya succeeded in renting together with her Aunt Lida, who was also forced to leave Chechnya. A bright spring sun is peeping into a small window under the roof, but even it cannot disperse the gloomy thoughts of the young woman.

And I am again amazed by the accuracy of Lilya's assessment of what has happened to her and her family and to the peaceful population of Chechnya. And it turned out that everyone lived quite well (regardless of national origin), particularly in pre-Dudayev times. Her husband worked as a tractor operator in the oil business, the father-in-law—on a construction site, and she worked in the military commissariat. The brothers, having served in the army, returned to their native Shali, and they found peaceful work there to their liking. The peaceful life ended with Dudayev's coming to power. Lilya, as a matter of fact, was left without work: The general banned recruitment for the Russian Army. Wages were not being paid either to workers of the military commissariats, or to teachers. Schools frequently ended up being closed. Azat has really not been studying since 1993. The mother-in-law went on old- age pension, but she has not received a ruble. The money that was transferred to the pension fund went to arm Dudayev's fighters.

But it was necessary to feed the family, and Lilya had occasion to become a "shuttle," a speculator, as she herself puts it. She took skirts and fabrics to Kazan that were in demand, and she sold them to second-hand dealers and quickly returned home.

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When it became especially dangerous to stay in Chechnya, she and her son set off to Kazan, with which they were not too familiar. She thought it would be for three weeks or so (she hoped that in that time the military and the politicians would come to their senses), and it turned out to be—for months....

Lilya is afraid to watch information programs, but, nevertheless, she watches them. She became sick when she saw trenches in a Groznyy park where the unidentified bodies of children, women, and old people were being dumped.... She and her son survived, but are relatives and people who are close to her alive there, in Chechnya?...

Robust Azamat, face reddened from the sun, came in from the outside. By virtue of his young age, he is quite satisfied with his life today: He is not sent to school—all he has to know is how to play.

"I reproach myself for not enrolling him in school immediately, and I was always hoping that we will soon be on the road back," said Lilya, and suddenly she breaks out into a scream: "To whom was it necessary to destroy our life?"

What awaits those like Lilya in Tatarstan? I was asked in the migration service: "Are you interested in only those who come from Chechnya, or everyone who is forced to seek refuge in Tatarstan? When you stay here a while, you will get acquainted with the people."

As far back as the 1930's, the wind of the struggle against the kulaks but, in reality, against large owners who were able to work, lifted the family of Iskander-aby Vafin from the fertile lands of Buinsk and dropped it in Siberia—in a settlement of the same kind of peasants who were exiled from all ends of the then immense Union. Years passed. Iskander-aby died in a foreign land. But his children also were not permitted to return to their native Tatarstan. But to live in Baku was becoming more and more dangerous.

They settled in Azerbaijan, and here grandsons and great grandsons were born. But the wind that scattered the Soviet Union compelled them to take to the road.

"I ran from permanent service in the Azerbaijani Army," admitted Marsel, Iskander's 22-year-old grandson. "I have already fought for two years in Nagornyy Karabakh. Not enough? Today any man can be detained on the streets of Baku and put under arms. I do not want to be killed for the glory of political leaders who are fighting each other."

The opinion exists that only the older generation, which is unable to adapt to the new conditions, feels a nostalgia for the former monolithic enormous power. But you become more and more convinced that its lightning-like destruction has created an extraordinary situation for the young also. For example, for Ildar Sultanov. His mother is Belarusian, and his father is Tatar. He himself lived in Riga, and he served in Baltmorput as a seaman-helmsman first class. And suddenly, in his 27th year of life, he turned out to be a second-class person, since he was refused Latvian citizenship. All told on 1 April 1995, more than 32,000 persons in Tatarstan received the status of refugees or enforced migrants. A majority of them had local roots. In the years of a unified state, they left Tatarstan on Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] travel orders to develop the Kazakhstan virgin land, and after graduating from VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and technical schools, they received assignments in various republics of the Soviet Union. And they did not think, and they did not guess, that the wind of time would scatter them throughout sovereign states where they were transformed into aliens, and that they would still have to prove the right of return to their homeland. Those who do not have Russian citizenship are given the status of refugees, but those who are fleeing in panic from the horrors of war in Chechnya are given the status of enforced migrants. And although the status of enforced migrant according to existing norms gives even more rights for permanent living arrangements in a new place, the Chechen variant distorts the real state of affairs. It makes it possible for the government not to employ measures adequate to the tragedy.

As Rafael Zaripov, the deputy director of the migration service of Tatarstan, explained to me, they are continuing to work in the former mode. No additional resources for the support of people saving themselves from the war in Chechnya were received from the federal budget. That is why the capabilities of the service are very limited. It is being suggested to refugees from Chechnya (I will call them according to the true state of affairs), as well as to others, to find apartments themselves. Single mothers who have children up to three years of age, single pensioners, invalids, and large families who find shelter and register in Tatarstan cities are paid an allowance of 30,000 rubles [R] each, and in rural localities—three times more, but on the condition that a residence permit is acquired and able-bodied members of a family go to work (the employment fund of the Republic of Tatarstan provides additional subsidies). Last year, refugees and enforced migrants received more than R358 million. In addition, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies assist refugees from the zone of armed conflict. It was there that Lilya received R100,000 for herself and Azamat. But all of this is a drop in an inflationary sea.

It would be easier for people to wait out the military upheaval in a well-arranged and managed temporary residence center. The State Committee for Labor and Social Questions of the Republic of Tatarstan has already petitioned for the transfer to it of an appropriate building a long time ago. It is a pity that the federal authorities are not participating actively in these troubles. It is as if the war that they unleashed had not scattered unfortunate victims all over Mother Russia.

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Special Services To Take Over From Army in Chechnya

MK1304123795 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer in the "Special Service" column: "The War In Chechnya Has Ended. The Time of Terror Has Come. Russian Special Services Will Liquidate the Chechen Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Duma, by an overwhelming majority, adopted a law on settling the situation in Chechnya, which forbids "the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces for purposes not related to their functions." The federal military command was told to begin negotiations on a ceasefire with Chechen commanders. As far as can be judged, the law was coordinated beforehand with Boris Yeltsin, and so there should be no fear of a presidential veto.

A couple of months ago such a law could indeed have substantially affected the course of events in the Caucasus region, but in mid- April the situation on the battlefield has changed, and the generals began to talk about the actual end of the war earlier than the parliamentarians.

General Kvashnin, commander of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD), told SEGODNYA's correspondent that "Dudayev no longer has an army: just groups of 100 to 200 men. After what we saw in Groznyy in January, this is nothing." According to the military, only the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service should deal with the remains of the Dudayev detachments, because the NCMD Staff is now engaged in deploying a new force, the 58th Army, on Chechnya's territory, which naturally responds to the army's immediate purpose (preparations for repulsing a possible outside aggression). In particular, in the area of the Groznyy-Severnyy airport an army brigade will be permanently stationed in defense-ready positions.

The military operation in the Samashki-Bamut area is being conducted by combined Ministry of Internal Affairs, Special-Purpose Militia Detachment (OMON), and SOBR [Special Fast Response Detachment] units. Ministry of Internal Affairs Troops Commander Lieutenant General Anatoliy Antonov told SEGODNYA's correspondent the day before yesterday at a command post near Samashki that Ministry of Internal Affairs troops should have their own tanks and combat aviation: "Then there will be no need to use the army for purposes not related to its assigned functions."

The Russian authorities, however, understand that some Dudayev supporters will fight to the end, even though further resistance is absolutely senseless. Therefore Russian special services are making preparations to conduct a tough antiterrorist campaign in Chechnya in the next three to four years. A highly placed representative of one Russian special service told me in Mozdok: "We shall be acting just as decisively as the Israelis. We have created a special detachment of 30 to 40 men, which is assigned to liquidate the Chechen leadership."

Reportedly, last week Sultan Geliskhanov, chief of Chechen state security forces, was killed on the territory of Dagestan in the area of Khasavyurt (army sources report, though, that Geliskhanov was not killed but badly wounded). The next names on the list are Chechen Vice President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Dudayev himself. No negotiations will be conducted with them. Other Dudayev supporters apparently still have a chance to come to terms with Moscow somehow. In particular, it was reported that Chechen Chief of General Staff Aslan Maskhadov is being persistently urged to enter serious negotiations, to make peace, and thus save his life.

Exchange of Prisoners in Chechnya Described

MM1304104295 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Igor Mezhakov by Nikolay Starodymov; date and place of interview not stated: "Lieutenant General Igor Mezhakov: We Think Constantly of Those Who Are Held Hostage"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lieutenant General Igor Mezhakov, deputy director of the Russian Federation Counterintelligence Service [FSK], is today the FSK's senior representative in Chechnya.

Our first meeting was fleeting—he brought to Mozdok the latest group of servicemen released from captivity under Dudayev. I did not manage to get close, the general was surrounded by the mothers of those who are still languishing at the hands of the gunmen. "When will you free our sons?" the women shouted. "We are doing all we can," he replied. "You started the trouble, you are responsible!" one of the mothers hurled in his face. Igor Alekseyevich's face turned gray:

"...Other people started the trouble. I am having to sort it out."

Dudayev's men still have over 70 servicemen captive. We met later.

[Starodymov] Igor Alekseyevich, if it is not a secret, how exactly do you manage to free servicemen who have ended up as hostages of Dudayev's supporters?

[Mezhakov] There are many options. The main one is to know how to find contact with the people you need. After all, ultimately outlets are needed to the Chechens who are, so to speak, on the other side of the front and are far from always well inclined toward us. When contact has been established everything goes into the job: persuasion, inducement, material benefits....

As for the technical aspect of the matter, here is an example. Recently we managed to free five men at once. They were in one of the rayons in the extreme south of

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the republic. The people with whom we established operational contact brought our boys across the Dudayev supporters' battle formations. It was complicated and dangerous. But there were no other options. Sending a helicopter deep behind the line of the armed opposition was an unjustifiable risk.

We get our men back on various terms. Most often we are obliged to exchange them for captive gunmen. We even release criminals whose term of imprisonment is coming to an end or whose crimes are not that terrible.

[Starodymov] There was a rumor recently that two of our soldiers had been exchanged for two grenade throwers....

[Mezhakov] We do not do that. The price could be inappropriate—after all weapons are used for shooting. In this case it was all rather different: One Chechen interested in releasing his relations himself suggested the exchange to the gunmen. Dudayev's supporters demanded two grenade throwers. He bought them but, I stress, not from Russian troops. As a result we were able to release our soldiers from incarceration.

Incidentally, this is not the only case of relations acting as middlemen in an exchange. Thus, one woman bought private Khokhlov from Dudayev's men for $1,000 and in exchange was able to obtain the release of her husband.

[Starodymov] Naturally, before beginning talks you must know the place where our man is being kept. For that you cannot do without reliable sources of information "on the other side." As, incidentally, you do to obtain other information of interest to our command. Can you say something about the sources of this information?

[Mezhakov] A reply from the field of daily intelligence work. We have many assistants among the local population. After all, the absolute majority of the republic's population has suffered from Dudayev's regime. There have not been even elementary human rights here—the right to work, medical aid, and education.... There is a convinced opposition, albeit passive in its majority. The task is to persuade it to join in helping us. Most often this succeeds and we learn where prisoners are being kept and where the Dudayev supporters' forces are concentrated.

And, of course, there are agents. Thus, on the eve of the storming of Gudermes our people returned from there with very valuable information. Considering the information received from them and from other sources of ours, the army command and the internal troops leadership had a detailed idea of the city's defense. And they planned the operation accordingly.

I shall speak immediately of paid sources. They also exist. Intelligence and counterintelligence have not managed and will not manage without them. But, first, we do not pay that much. Second, there are not many such sources. You should not rush to condemn them. They run risks, including a risk to their own lives....

[Starodymov] You let slip that apart from the release of servicemen captured by the gunmen your staffers also have other tasks.

[Mezhakov] It was not a slip. We are resolving a whole complex of tasks. he main strategic task is to obtain the fullest possible information about the enemy. How that task is being performed is borne out by the facts—the taking of Argun, Shali, and Gudermes. Thanks to the information received, including that received by us, the artillery and aviation have recently been firing not at target areas but at specific targets. But here it must be considered that the gunmen do not stand still. They are mobile and move easily and quickly. Sometimes the situation changes within a short space of time and the information becomes obsolete.

Here is an example. The day before the blockade a group of 150 gunmen managed to break out of Gudermes. They moved to a population center, occupied the rayon executive committee building, and announced: We are the bosses now. We received promptly the information about the group's departure and its new whereabouts. Appropriate measures were taken, as they say.

[Starodymov] Does the FSK know the whereabouts of the ruling clique of Dudayev's leadership?

[Mezhakov] Of course. But that is all I can say for the time being.

[Starodymov] Recently KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote of the links between some of Moscow's "Chechen mafia" and Dudayev's regime....

[Mezhakov] Yes, there was such a link. And you were right to say that it was some of the criminals of Chechen nationality who were cooperating with the criminal regime. I am speaking of criminals in the ordinary sense, I am not talking about the people. That is a separate subject. The people have nothing to do with Dudayev and his cutthroats. Just one fact—in three and one half years virtually the entire intelligentsia has left the republic!

As for the truly anarchic criminal rampaging here then that deserves a special mention. Someone may say: Do we need this Chechnya at all? During the time of Dudayev's regime industry has ceased to function in the republic. Agriculture has been destroyed. Virtually the entire male population has been living on money not earned from work. The republic has armed itself. A precedent has been created whereby a criminal-political regime has formed in part of Russia. What were these hungry people, virtually abandoned by Russia, to do next? Die? Move to other regions? That had in fact begun—the seizure of hostages with a view to getting ransom money, livestock rustling from Stavropol Kray, looting on transport facilities....

You mentioned Moscow. yes, some of the racketeers, the so-called promissory note airlifters, and other representatives of Russia's criminal world gave Dudayev active

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material support. It is known that counterfeit money was printed in Groznyy. On orders from the Chechen capital impressive deals were done with obsolete bank notes not removed from circulation at the same time....

So that talk about "whether or not it was necessary to take measures" we shall leave to the conscience of those who are safeguarded against people breaking into their apartment, against having the merciless barrel of a pistol pointed at their stomachs at the most unsuitable moment, those whose savings are in a foreign bank a long way from Chechnya.

How, by what methods, we had to intervene in the situation is another matter. There can be arguments here.

[Starodymov] Everyone knows that forecasting is a thankless task. Nonetheless, the main illegal formations of Dudayev supporters including those near Shali and Gudermes and now Samashki have been routed. What comes next, what comes after, when the troops leave?

[Mezhakov] The big gangs are left. We will have to fight them for a while yet. Then we will fight the small gangs. And then there will be talk of finally introducing order. But in general I am sure that the multinational criminal world has suffered in Chechnya its first and god grant not its last palpable defeat.

Moscow Seen Finally Winning Chechnya War

MK1304104395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 3

[Report from Groznyy-Samashki-Moscow by Pavel Felgengauer under the "Chechnya" rubric: "Chechnya Lacks Weapons and Special Training for a Guerrilla War. In Sergey Stepashin's View, No Country Is Giving Dudayev Real Assistance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The conflict in Chechnya is in its fifth month now, but the "Afghan-style guerrilla war" which the Chechens have been promising since December has never started. Chechen units continue putting up desperate resistance from time to time, as they did in Samashki. But this is not "guerrilla war." Defense in positions prepared in advance remains the basis of Chechen tactics.

Recently, however, the Chechens have started using nighttime small-arms fire increasingly often against posts of Russian troops and the new pro-Moscow militia. Right after the visit to Groznyy by Oleg Soskovets and Viktor Yerin, on the night of 7 and 8 April, the building of the Oil Institute in Groznyy, which houses the Provisional Government of Salambek Khadzhiyev, came under fire along with the positions of Russian troops protecting the Groznyy-Severnyy airport, where the advance post of the joint staff of the Russian group of forces is located. The firing continued for a few hours, but no losses were reported. In the area of Samashki-Bamut in western Chechnya, where currently operations are under way to eliminate Chechen strongholds, advance posts of the Internal Affairs Ministry troops are fired upon every night. A few soldiers have already been wounded, but on the whole all these attacks are basically harassing in nature: Two or three fighters, even if they have night sights, are unable to seize a fortified post, nor have they tried to.

Chechen commanders—Aslan Maskhadov, chief of the Chechen General Staff, and Dzhokhar Dudayev himself—formerly held fairly high-ranking positions in the regular Soviet army, but they have no experience of setting up guerrilla movements. The Chechen commanders managed to put up tenacious resistance to regular troops in Groznyy by operating in accordance with the basic provisions of army field manuals. Russian officers specializing in carrying out combat operations in the enemy rear, who are currently in Chechnya, attribute Chechen failures in organizing a guerrilla war primarily to the absence of well-trained field commanders.

In order to organize effective "guerrilla" strikes on well-armed posts, subunits, and columns of regular troops, one needs to have at least some sort of heavy weapons—mortars and recoilless guns, such as those that were in service with Afghan mujahidin. Also needed are portable surface-to-air missile systems and heavy machine guns to combat aviation. But Dudayev's supporters have lost almost all the heavy weapons they had and have not shot down a single plane or helicopter using missile systems since last December (the Russian military have managed to block missile systems of the "Igla" and "Strela" types, which were seized by the Chechens at army depots in 1992, while numerous reports about U.S. "Stingers" being received by the enemy have never been confirmed).

During the fighting in the area of Samashki, the Chechens used army controlled anti-tank mines, grenade launchers (including the up-to-date "Shmel" grenade launcher), and also small arms. They did not have a single armored vehicle, a single gun, or a mortar. At the main command post near Samashki, where the headquarters of the Internal Affairs Ministry troops were located, not a single shelter was dug out: The Chechens had no artillery all the same and the likelihood of a shelling was nil.

FSB [Federal Security Service] Director Sergey Stepashin thinks that "although we have not managed fully to close Chechen borders, there are no mass arms deliveries to Dudayev." Russia "has agreements" with the governments of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey that these countries will not assist Dudayev's followers. Sergey Stepashin met with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and reached "complete understanding." Turkey itself is currently carrying out a troop operation in Iraqi Kurdistan, so the Ankara authorities have no doubts about the need for the armed struggle against separatism. Understanding has also been reached with Iran, which has behaved "in a surprisingly decent manner" during the Chechen conflict. Not a single country of the world is

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giving Dudayev real assistance, not even Jordan, home to an influential Chechen diaspora.

After losing Groznyy, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Achkhoy-Martan, and also other villages and towns, the Dudayev army has begun falling apart in reality, not only in the reports of official Russian press centers. Many former levy-en-masse force members are returning to Groznyy and to their villages, taking "their" weapons (those they bought using their own money) with them, which diminishes even further the combat capabilities of those who still continue fighting.

Some of the former levy-en-mass force members are even signing up for service with the new pro-Moscow government of Salambek Khadzhiyev, including, reportedly, with the newly created Chechen militia, which presently numbers as many as 1,600 men. General Anatoliy Antonov, commander of the Internal Affairs Ministry troops in Chechnya, told me that "in some cases we even allow former fighters to keep their weapons to defend their villages from Dudayev's followers." The numbers of the submachine- guns and the lists of those who possess them, however, are to be given to the Russian military authorities.

About 250,000 people have already returned to Groznyy, and over 5,000 former residents continue coming back every day. Many of them, without doubt, fought in the war, but high-ranking Russian officials do not appear to be too much concerned about the possibility that former participants in the Chechen resistance may once again take up arms against the federal authorities.

FSB Director Sergey Stepashin told your SEGODNYA correspondent in Groznyy that they are screening "those who come to sign up for service, and if they do not have blood on their hands, we do not object." In addition, as refugees return to Groznyy, the network of Internal Affairs Ministry and FSB informants, which was disrupted under Dudayev, is being restored. Operational work specialists think that they will now be able to keep the overall situation in the city under control, "although isolated pinpricks and losses over the next few years will be inevitable."

Military commanders also think that the main threat is over. General Anatoliy Kvashnin, who was given his third general's star after the seizure of Groznyy, thinks that the Chechens will be able seriously to take up arms again not earlier than in 20 to 30 year's time, when a generation grows up which did not see the current war and the crushing of Groznyy with their own eyes. "Presently the Chechens are burying arms for a future war. This is part of their national character. Recently our troops seized a fully combat-ready German mortar manufactured in 1941, which they buried during the Patriotic War in the hope of using it in the future."

The main strategic objectives of the Chechen campaign have already been achieved—Russian troops are in control of the key strategic oil and gas pipelines, motor roads, and railways. On 7 April, after the railway troops restored a bridge across the Sunzha River within two days, the first freight train arrived in Groznyy (via Gudermes). Russian Railways Minister Gennadiy Fadeyev told your SEGODNYA correspondent that railway communications with Baku will be restored by the end of the month. Russia will once again have a full-blooded two-track railway link with the Transcaucasus, which will considerably increase Moscow's economic and political influence in the region and reduce the cost of maintaining Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia. Communications with Dagestan, which have been cut for more than six months, will also be restored. In addition, once it has solved the "Chechen problem," Russia will be able seriously to offer its "northern" option for a new major oil pipeline to pump crude oil from Azerbaijan's Caspian shelf production sites to Europe.

Russian strategic interests in the region require that the key infrastructure facilities in Chechnya—communications, transport, electric power supply, and petrochemical industry—be restored as soon as possible. It so happened that precisely these facilities, even the inter-city telephone station, which is located in downtown Groznyy, were not damaged particularly heavily during the battle for the city. Specialists assert that the key capacities will be put into operation without significant investment by the summer.

The Chernomyrdin government does not intend to allocate any significant funds to reconstruct Groznyy itself, however, lest it jeopardize the policy of financial stabilization. At a meeting in Groznyy on 7 April, Oleg Soskovets sternly told "peaceful" Chechens: "You should work hard, not beg for money. People are walking along the streets in fancy clothes while the city is in ruins. As soon as you start working, you will start earning money. If you need starting capital, pump oil from the reservoirs and sell it," Oleg Soskovets advised.

Internal Affairs Minister Viktor Yerin brushed aside all Chechen complaints that foreign aid is disappearing God knows where and that interior troops are looting and raping innocent civilians: "Initiate criminal proceedings, conduct investigations, and then we will be talking with established facts in hand." Soviet power is back in the Caucasus.

Court Review of Secret Chechnya Edict Previewed

MK1404093395 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 14 Apr 95 pp 1, 2

[Report by Veronika Kutsyllo: "Vladimir Shumeyko: I Am Not Your Information Bureau!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitutional Court is confronted with a complex task. Whereas it could at least try to evade the State Duma query on the Chechnya war, this trick will not wash with a query submitted yesterday

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to the court on behalf of the Federation Council. Presidential Edict 2137s of 30 November 1994 on measures to restore constitutional law and order in the Chechen Republic, which thanks to the press is no longer a secret, directly contradicts the Constitution. True, only in one phrase: "The edict enters into force upon its signing."

It is noteworthy that the text of the edict looks fairly decent: "With the aim of restoring constitutional law and order... to create a group controlling the process of disarming and liquidating armed formations... to introduce and maintain a state of emergency in the Chechen Republic...." The Constitution does not prohibit the president from introducing a state of emergency. It only says that he must immediately inform the Federation Council and the State Duma about it. Strictly speaking, the president told Vladimir Shumeyko, who, as is known, represents the Federation Council at the top level. Apparently Ivan Rybkin was also in the know. It is another matter that the edict's serial number includes the letter "s," and the vigilant Shumeyko did not consider it possible to brief his house's deputies on it, citing the law on state secrets and also the fact that "the permanent rules do not say that the chairman must ensure the house's right to information."

Shumeyko could cite not only arguments like "I am not your information bureau!" but also the fact that although the phrase "state of emergency" is mentioned in the body of the edict at least three times, there is no emergency in its title: This is only an edict "On Measures...." And the house must approve only edicts on a state of emergency.

It is amazing that the authors of the confidential document were not even savvy enough to replace the words "emergency situation" with Shakhray's old but still brilliant invention: "special administration order." Then it would be very difficult to find fault with the edict.

If the Constitutional Court could approach the task in a comprehensive manner, it would have to deal with several questions at once. First, if the word combination "state of emergency" is not included in the edict's title, is it then an edict on a "state of emergency" subject to approval by the senators? Second, are the head of the Federation Council and the Council itself absolutely interchangeable entities? Third, what should guide the house speaker in this activity: the law on state secrets or the Constitution? However, (and this will apparently be the justices' credo in considering this rather delicate affair) discussion of actions by the authorities—let alone their world outlook—is not within the court's jurisdiction.

It is absolutely unpredictable how quickly the court's consideration of the edict will go. On one hand, it is a tradition in Russia to sleep on unpleasant problems until they become absolutely uninteresting to everybody. Under current regulations, the court may drag it feet on the query for up to four months. On the other hand, presidential elections are drawing nearer. Is it therefore not better to resolve the problem now, declaring "part" of the edict unconstitutional, reproving the president, weathering the deputies' storm of indignation, and forgetting all this as if it were a bad dream? It is anybody's guess which tactics the president's advisers will recommend to him and whether the constitutional justices will also follow these tactics.

Charges Brought Against Servicemen in Chechnya

LD1304142295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1044 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow. April 13 (INTERFAX)—The Central Military Prosecutor's Office has instituted 12 criminal proceedings on crimes committed by servicemen against local citizens since the beginning of the campaign to restore constitutional order in Chechnya, Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor Stanislav Gaveto reported in an interview with Interfax Thursday.

In his words, "each case of legal violation by servicemen, about which the Central Military Prosecutor's Office learns about, is investigated on site by prosecutors and investigators."

As many as 25 officers of the Central Military Prosecutor's Office have worked in Chechnya for three months already, Gaveto said.

Russian Forces in Chechnya Begin Operation in Bamut

LD1304141495 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1335 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 13 Apr—According to information from military sources, federal forces started an operation to capture the settlement of Bamut [about 30 km west of Groznyy] today. However, by 1600 [1200 GMT] today ITAR-TASS did not have information on the progress of this operation.

According to military sources, Colonel-General Vladimir Semenov, commander-in-chief of Russian land troops, is in the Chechen capital now. The main goal of his trip is to solve issues of the permanent stationing of units of Federal Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic [as received]. ITAR-TASS has learned that the 58th Army is expected to be deployed in Chechnya in the future with its headquarters in the settlement of Khankala.

Ingushetia-Kabardino Highway Reopened After Security Alert

LD1304164295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1442 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maisigov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran April 13 TASS—Traffic on one of the main highways leading to Ingushetia via the settlement of Verkhny Kurp in the neighbouring Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria has been resumed today. The highway was blocked for several days apparently for security reasons as President Yeltsin had been visiting Kabardino-Balkaria.

An officer on duty from the local traffic police told ITAR-TASS that the road had been closed in accordance with an instruction issued by the Interior Minister of Kabardino-Balkaria. According to the officer, Ingush lawmakers were among the motorists who made futile attempts to go by this road during the days when traffic on the highway was banned.

Reports of 211 Killed During Storming of Samashki Village

LD1304162595 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] More details of the storming of the Chechen village of Samashki on 8 April have become known. According to Sergey Kovalev and Andrey Blimeshov, members of the law protection group, 211 peaceful citizens died as a result of the storming of Samashki.

According to testimonies that Andrey Blimeshov was able to acquire at the scene of the events, on the night of 7-8 April Russian troops occupied the whole western and central parts of Samashki. During the morning of 8 April, armored personnel carriers carrying interior troops began to move along the central streets of the village, firing at every house from machine-guns. Then, mortar salvos were fired at every house from a following infantry fighting vehicle. According to Blimeshov, 20 percent of the village's buildings were razed to the ground. [passage omitted including indistinct portion]

Grachev on Dudayev's 'Remnants', Whereabouts, Health

LD1304175095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1633 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Guskov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kostroma, 13 Apr—"The information from Chechnya today gives grounds for saying that the remnants of Dudayev's mercenaries and illegal formations have now fled to the mountains in small groups. They no longer present any particular danger," Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated in an exclusive interview with the ITAR-TASS correspondent after he arrived in Kostroma.

When asked about the whereabouts of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the minister noted: "I cannot say exactly where Dudayev is, although one version is that he is in the mountains. The satisfactory state of his health being emphasized by his associates is open to doubt." But that is just one version, Pavel Grachev stressed. A second version, he said, is that Dudayev was wounded during a battle. There is a third version, the minister continued, according to which Dudayev is now beyond Chechnya's borders, but within the borders of the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Chechnya's Khadzhiyev Assesses Situation, Leaves for Moscow

LD1304191495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1706 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Groznyy April 13 TASS—"It is early to say that a military operation aimed at neutralizing illegal armed formations in Chechnya", leader of the Moscow-backed Chechen Government Salambek Khadzhiyev told TASS. [sentence as received] According to him, the government for national revival is now capable of controlling 70 per cent of the republic's territory.

In Khadzhiyev's view, the major goal at the current stage is to convince people in localities to recognize a "normal government". It is also crucial to ensure that "localities elect a government which reputation would have no bloodstains and which would be able to solve all problems on the basis of compromise".

Commenting upon a course of restoring the republic's economy, Khadzhiyev said "different Russian ministries and agencies are unfolding their efforts" in Chechnya. Funds which have been so far transferred by the Russian Finance Ministry are not sufficient, he stressed.

One of the major problems in today's capital Groznyy is that the authorities have failed to fully involve city residents in public works. Most of them are busy with restoring their private housing, Khadzhiyev said. "Despite this fact, we will try to improve the city, at least to some extent, by May 9. The May 9 is the day of victory over fascism, and we believe that now we are crushing our fascism in the republic," he stressed. By May 9, the government plans to ensure gas and electricity supplies to the most part of Groznyy.

Touching upon the situation around the settlement Samashki area, Khadzhiyev said he did not know it in detail. It is only known that before federal troops ensured control over the settlement, several explosions of railway bridges had been reported and some supporters of Russia-backed opposition had been detained by Dudayev's troops.

Khadzhiyev left for Moscow on Thursday to solve some problems related to the restoration of the Chechen Republic.

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Dudayev Official Claims 670 Civilians Killed in Samashki

LD1304201795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1810 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—Over 670 civilians were killed during the storm of the village Samashki from April 6 to 12, Dzhokhar Dudayev's press secretary, Movladiy Udugov, told Interfax over the telephone Thursday.

On the whole, over 1,500 civilians have been killed in various cities and villages of the republic since late March.

Prior to this, Russian military sources categorically dismissed the reports on mass killings of civilians during clearing Samashki from pro-Dudayev militants saying "130 militants were killed and 124 taken as prisoners."

The head of the Federal Security Service public relations center, Aleksandr Mikhailov, told Interfax Thursday it was "senseless" to comment on the allegations of mass killings and destruction in Samashki, because they had been refuted long ago. He recalled that journalists had visited Samashki Tuesday to see "the so-called mass destruction" with their own eyes.

"Documentary films on the actual situation in the village were shown on the screen as evidence that there was no mass destruction in Samashki," he said.

58th Army Set To Be Stationed in Chechnya

LD1304210995 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1940 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal forces in Chechnya today began an operation to capture the settlement of Bamut, TASS reported, quoting military sources.

It also became known today that the 58th Army is expected to be stationed on Chechen territory, with headquarters in Khankala. Major General Semenov, commander in chief of ground troops, left by air for Groznyy today to help resolve issues related to this plan.

Fate of Dudayev's Close Aide Geliskhanov Still Unknown

LD1304211195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2010 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Chaikova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—The fate of Sultan Geliskhanov, chief of the special department of Dudayev's rebel troops and Chechnya's former state security minister, remains unknown. According to Moscow officials of the VAINAKH-PRESS News Agency under the government of Chechnya's national rebirth, Geliskhanov has recently been "shot down by General Dudayev's closest aides".

This report disagrees with those by some mass media asserting, with reference to reliable sources, that Geliskhanov was killed last Friday in a shelling by federal troops.

However, the CHECHEN-PRESS News Agency on Thursday denied, with reference to Dudayev's spokesman Movladi Yudugov, the reports about Geliskhanov's death. According to them, "Sultan Geliskhanov remains Dudayev's ally and chief of the Chechen Army's special department".

According to Geliskhanov's recent remarks, "the main functions of the special department are to organize subversive and terrorist acts against federal troops and exposure of Russian special agents".

Grachev Orders Replacement Marines to Chechnya

LD1404053395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0522 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Grachev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok April 14 TASS—Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev ordered to send new marine units to Chechnya to replace a regiment from the Pacific Fleet which had fought against Chechen militants for a long time already.

The press service of the Pacific Fleet told TASS Friday, that according to Grachev's order received by the command of the fleet, marine units from three Russian fleets are to be simultaneously airlifted to Chechnya in the end of April to replace the regiment which had lost 32 killed and 102 wounded in the fighting. Another 177 marines of the regiment were hospitalised with various diseases.

The Russian top military have been stressing of late that the military operation in Chechnya has come to an end and that the interior troops have taken over the control over the situation in Chechnya.

However, the army is still used in the rebel republic where militants are being gradually pushed to the mountains.

The State Duma has recently passed a law banning the use of the armed forces in Chechnya. However, it is yet to be approved by the Federation Council and signed by the president.

On Thursday the Federation Council requested the Constitutional Court to rule whether the decree of the president sending troops to Chechnya last December was constitutional.

Russians Surround, Shell Chechen Stronghold Bamut

LD1404084295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0805 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok April 14 TASS—Russian troops surrounded the last Chechen-held bastion of Bamut on Friday and continued to shell the strongholds of Chechen militants in the settlement, TASS learned from a spokesman of the Russian military command in Mozdok.

Bamut is situated 40 kilometres south-west of Groznyy and is the last settlement controlled by militants in the plains of the republic. Russian troops began operations to seize it on Thursday.

Kulikov Sees Dudayev Forces Sealed in Mountains by Summer

LD1404125495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1146 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 14 (INTERFAX)—The backbone of Dudayev's militants will be forced up to Chechen mountain areas to be sealed off by Russian Interior Ministry troops. Such a view has been voiced to INTERFAX by Aleksandr Kulikov, Russia's deputy interior ministry.

He ruled out any further major battles with militants and predicted that federal troops will have to fight against small groups of Dudayev supporters and guard key industrial sites.

"Dudayev and his entourage do not want life in Chechnya to return to normal, and they do all they can to set the population against constitutional power," Kulikov said, adding that to keep humanitarian relief, building materials and other essential cargoes from reaching Chechnya, militants had been blowing up newly spanned bridges and had been planting explosives along the railway.

Kulikov reported that as more and more people had been returning to the republic's liberated areas, the situation there had been coming back to normal. In populated areas, Russian Interior Ministry forces have been setting up small garrisons, assigned to fight militants and form law enforcement structures from among the local population.

As Kulikov explained, the functions of protecting industrial sites will be gradually delegated to local police. He reported that the formation of a Chechen police battalion, 500 men strong is nearing completion to protect a number of electric stations and oil refineries in and around Groznyy.

Interior Forces Using Ambushes To Fight Dudayev Militants

LD1404125795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1146 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 14 (INTERFAX)—The Interior Ministry forces are laying ambushes to deal with Dudayev militants penetrating into Groznyy, Deputy Interior Minister Aleksandr Kulikov told INTERFAX.

He said since this tactics was introduced a few days ago, four snipers who fired at federal troops bases and the most important city facilities during the nights had been eliminated.

"Tranquillity sets in in the districts after we eliminate the sniper operating in them," said Kulikov.

In his opinion, the situation in Groznyy will get back to normal after the Chechen police start patrolling the streets. "I don't think Chechens will fire at Chechens," said Kulikov.

Federal Troops Tighten Grip on Chechnya's Bamut City

LD1404122595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1154 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok April 14 TASS—Federal troops by Friday morning encircled the town of Bamut, the last stronghold of separatists in lowland Chechnya, 25 kilometres away from Groznyy. They are shelling positions of illegal armed groups, military officials told ITAR-TASS today.

In the course of the day, sources close to Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, confirmed that Bamut had not yet fallen.

Heavy battles are raging near the settlement, head of the pro- Dudayev information centre Aslanbek Dadayev told ITAR-TASS on Friday.

Dadayev said that "despite the fact that Russia used warplanes and artillery, (Chechens) succeeded in repulsing two attacks."

Before 1980, four strategic missile silos were deployed in the vicinity of Bamut. After that, the shafts and other equipment were completely destroyed, but Chechen rebels have fortified the former Soviet army positions.

Operational sources in Ingushetia, bordering Chechnya, told ITAR- TASS that federal troops shelled Bamut on Friday morning using multiple rocket launchers. Before Friday noon, federal aircraft dropped bombs on the settlement too.

Rumours that Dudavey was wounded, as well as those that he left the territory of Chechnya, do not correspond to reality, ITAR-TASS learned in the Ingushi capital Nazran.

A well-informed official told ITAR-TASS on conditions of anonymity that he spoke with Dudayev on Thursday.

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TASS Reports Resistance of Dudayev's Fighters Ebbing

LD1404133395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1323 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok April 14 TASS—Dudayev's unlawful armed units have not undertaken any major actions on the territory of the Chechen Republic during the past 24 hours.

The main operations are now under way in the area of Bamut, which was surrounded by the federal troops today morning. The outskirts of this populated locality is being subjected to heavy shelling. There are still no official reports on the progress of the operation.

ITAR-TASS was told at the press centre of the command of the joint group of troops, deployed on the territory of the Chechen Republic, that a 5-man Chechen sabotage squad was now active in the Staro-Promyslovskiy and Zavodskoiy districts of Groznyy.

According to military sources, the local population is refusing to give asylum to Dudayev's men in the high-land villages of the Shatoiskiy and Vedenskiy districts. Dudayev's men have reportedly carried out several intimidation actions. They have mined buildings and roads in the districts where the local population refuses to back Dudayev.

According to the same sources, representatives from the populated locality of Kharachey have warned Shamil Basayev, one of Dudayev's field commanders, on April 11 that a vendetta would be declared against him and his relatives if his men provoked federal air raids on the village.

The press centre of the command of the joint forces possesses information that attempts were made to reinforce Dudayev's units by recruiting refugees in the populated localities of Binoy, Nozhey- Yurt and Engenoy. Chief of Dudayev's headquarters Maskhadov and ex- chief of a sector in the gudermes security department Razuyev, backed by the local clergy, tried to organise the enlistment of volunteers to the unlawful armed formations. However, only a handful of villagers agreed to join the illegal units for money.

Agents of the Federal Security Service have discovered a depot, containing 270 mines, on the southeastern outskirts of Shali.

As earlier reported, Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov, the new commander of the joint group of troops in Chechnya and deputy minister of the Russian Interior Ministry, has assumed office here today. He replaced Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the Russian Interior Ministry's internal troops.

Dudayev Suffers Military, Psychological Defeat in Samashki

LD1404143695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1330 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOZDOK, April 14 (Interfax)—A senior Russian command official has said that in Samashki Dudayev suffered military and psychological defeat. He said the take-over of Samashki by federal troops triggered an unprecedented propaganda campaign by Dudayev.

The officer said that Samashki, a home village of some of Dudayev's relatives, was seen as a major strong-hold by the militants. The community was surrounded by deep defence lines. However, as a result of prolonged negotiations the federal command managed to persuade a number of residents of Samashki, including some elders, that further armed resistance would be useless.

The Russian command spokesman said that with the help of local residents the military managed to find passes through mine-fields and spot two hidden positions of anti-aircraft guns and heavy machine-guns as well as sniper and machine-gun emplacements. As a result federal troops acted very effectively and took the militants by surprise.

The events in Samashki have shown once again that ever more local civilians begin to realize that hostilities make no sense and are prepared to support proposals by Russian command.

Air Force Denies Chechens Shot Down Aircraft Over Bamut

LD1404142095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1330 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAZRAN, April 14 (Interfax)—One SU-25 attack aircraft and two helicopters of the federal troops were shot down during the battle to seize the high-mountain village of Bamut, controlled by Chechen militants, sources in the command of the Chechen forces' western grouping told Interfax.

The general headquarters of the Russian air force have denied these reports, however. They stated that they have not "received any reports about shot down Russian aircraft either today or previously."

The Chechen side alleges that by afternoon, April 14, the federal troops had carried out two attacks on Bamut, both of them unsuccessful. The movement of Russian troops began after artillery preparations involving missiles.

The Chechen sources told Interfax that the federal troops are moving and regrouping their units with support and under the cover of attack aircraft.

It also alleged that both sides were sustaining enormous human losses.

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Commander of the western Chechen grouping Ruslan Gilayev said that the militants have a preponderance due to the knowledge of the terrain.

The civilian population was earlier evacuated from Bamut.

Economic Issues

Chubays Says IMF Decided To Grant Stand-By Credit to Russia

LD1204163795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1117 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 12 (FIA-Interfax)—On April 11 Directors board of the International Monetary Fund adopted an official decision to grant a stabilized stand-by credit to Russia amounting to $6.25 billion in accordance with the agreement reached earlier.

In an exclusive interview with the Financial Information Agency Russia's First Vice Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays reported that "Russia's Finance Ministry will receive the first installment totalling $1.1 billion before the end of this April." In accordance with the agreement with the IMF the credit will be issued before 1996 in equal parts amounting to $500 million every month.

Earlier Chubays declared that the stand-by credit of the IMF is intended for partial financing of the budget deficit and inflation restraining. In addition, this credit "improves Moscow's positions at the negotiations with the Paris Club (it unites the largest countries-creditors—Interfax) in the field of re-structuring Russia's debt because presence of an agreement with the IMF is the Club's key provision," Chubays said.

Peasant Party's Chernichenko on Agrarian Reform Concerns

954F2034A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 14, Apr 95 p 5

[Interview with Yuriy Dmitriyevich Chernichenko, chairman of the Peasant Party of Russia, by Vasiliy Voronetskiy; place and date not given: "Frozen Farming"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The upsurge of the farmer movement in Russia was followed by its decline and the beginning of mass bankruptcies. But this was a Pyrrhic victory for the kolkhoz-sovkhoz monopoly: The material base of the agrarian sector is being stolen and subverted. This was the conclusion arrived at by the IV Congress of the Peasant Party of Russia [KPR]. "The president's message to parliament is essentially not directed against the negative processes," said Yuriy Dmitriyevich Chernichenko, "where it says that 1995 must become a year of REAL agrarian reform."

[Voronetskiy] And what kind of reform was it for four whole years?

[Chernichenko] "Your own farm on your own land"—this was designated in the message as a long-term point of reference. And that was all. Renaming the kolkhozes into joint-stock companies was "form," and that was about all.

[Voronetskiy] But farming is a reality.

[Chernichenko] In 1994 almost 27,000 farmers "went under" and filed bankruptcy. During the year the overall number of farmers increased by only 9,000, while in 1992 the increase was 134,000. And the fact that in this financial, political, and moral climate 279,000 farmer-run farms are surviving on 12 million hectares of land is a manifestation of heroism, which is rare in our time, and of Russian faith: "God will take care of his own."

[Voronetskiy] You speak about the moral climate.... Have the chairman not gotten used to the farmers? In the rayons, one hears, they now support them.

[Chernichenko] Take the central council of our Peasant Party. Tatyana Yatsimirskaya from Sakhalin had her home blown up. Aleksandr Suslov from Lipetsk Oblast had the KamAZ he used to haul potatoes set on fire in Burtov. The grown son of Ovidiy Kander from the Moscow area died at the hands of the mafia.... Is that not enough? AKKOR [Association of Peasant Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives of Russia] Vice President Viktor Pashinin was forced to enter a psychiatric hospital: He was looking into where the money for the farmers had gone. In Mordvinia the farmer woman Valeriya Strelyanaya was forced into a psychiatric hospital. War is war.

[Voronetskiy] But the kolkhoz workers have been permitted to accept certificates for their shares of land. Everyone can dispose of it as he wishes.

[Chernichenko] Remember the story about the mice who decided to hang a bell on the cat? As it turned out, that took somebody much stronger than the cat. The principal distinction of today's changes is that conducting the reforms has been entrusted to the segment against whom they were directed. The population do not know their rights, they cannot defend them, and they are afraid, and almost everywhere the local authorities are pro-communist.

[Voronetskiy] Do you agree that the majority of kolkhoz workers support the agrarian party?

[Chernichenko] Under the cover of reforms, there has been a disintegration of the AgroGULAG and theft of the property of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The material assets of all of Russia and its peoples have been taken out from under the protection of the law, the procuracy, and the courts. Over four years 16 million head of cattle have been slaughtered in the state sector, including 4 million cows, as well as 14.5 million hogs and almost 24 million sheep and goats. Is this supposed to be an economy? The damage caused to the national wealth of

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Russia is comparable only to the losses from Stalin's cattle slaughter of 1929-1933.

[Voronetskiy] They tell us this has to do with the prices of fuel and technical equipment. They lose money by keeping livestock.

[Chernichenko] A structure that has someone in charge operates in a zone with the same prices, but the number of head of cows of the private owners increased by as much as 2 million, there were 1.5 million more sheep and goats, and 1.2 million more hogs. The free worker has considerably softened the blow caused by the failure of the kolkhoz farms. Figures for January of this year: Agricultural enterprises have reduced the sale of meat by 20 percent and the farmers have increased it by 12 percent. The milk yield in the public sector has dropped by 19 percent and among farmers it has increased by 10 percent. In Russia today more than 80 percent of the potatoes, more than 60 percent of the fruits and vegetables, and 40 percent of the milk and meat are already being produced by private subsidiary farms and farmers.

One does the heavy lifting, and the other gets the rewards! The shower of money from the budget (remember the last 6 trillion for "planting") is falling down strictly according to class: for support of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes—practically all of it, and for the farmer—87 times less than under Silayev!

[Voronetskiy] In terms of your views, you are a radical reformer. Do you want to put an end to the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system once and for all? Are you taking into account the situation in the country and the customs and traditions of current residents of rural areas?

[Chernichenko] The kolkhoz is the brainchild of socialism and of Comrade Stalin personally in particular. Agricultural lobbyists are stealing from Comrade Stalin when they depict the kolkhoz as something like the popular creation of the people of the regions of Pskov, Kostroma, or Ryazan.

The Agrarian Party skillfully conceals the black market in land: Around any city they are selling out—plowed land and agricultural acreage are being sold secretly to the nouveau riche. The Agrarian Party is a super lobbyist that is deliberately impeding the adoption of laws on land and cooperation....

[Voronetskiy] But you will not deny that they won in the elections.

[Chernichenko] The victory of the agrarians in the elections to the Duma was ensured, first, by the real power of the nomenklatura in the local areas. I myself have read the telegrams on the treasury forms: "Make sure of a turnout for the meeting with Lapshin." The governor of Tula filled an entire garbage can with instructions like these. Second, it was helped along by the relatively sharp deterioration of the lives of the kolkhoz workers (the average wages in agriculture are one-tenth of what they are for Gazprom workers!). The preservation of the overall structure of the AgroGULAG had an impact as well.

[Voronetskiy] Are you convinced that the farmer with free labor on his own land can feed Russia? And what has the Peasant Party of Russia done for this breadwinner?

[Chernichenko] Our party has endured and has already held its fourth congress. It has not changed a single word of its program and has not sullied itself with political horse trading. We have participated actively in the preparation of draft legislative acts concerning agrarian reform and have exerted a good deal of effort to make sure that the Russian Federation Constitution should contain an article on private ownership of the land. Now we are working for the adoption of the Land Code.

[Voronetskiy] The election of deputies to the new parliament are approaching, and then for the president. Who will the people who think as you do vote for?

[Chernichenko] We are against the Zhirinovskiys, the Zyuganovs, and also the Lapshin-Starodubtsevs; we are against the "great power politicians," the "statesmen," the "patriots," and other reincarnations of communism. But which of the Fedorovs the Union of Farmers will vote for—the oculist, the financier, or the rector of a technical university, whether for Yeltsin or for Gorbachev, will depend on the specific conditions in which the rural areas find themselves on the eve of the elections.

Special Report Recommends Ways To Overcome Energy Crisis

LD1004081295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0716 GMT 10 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 10 TASS—BUSINESS-TASS has commissioned a major, in-depth report of Russia's oil industry which is now available.

1994 was a year of mixed feelings for the future of that core industry. Brief results of activities in 1994 one will find in the introduction to the study. It reveals the remarkable opportunities that still exist there—and which are desperately needed—for foreign companies.

The state comprehensive fuel and energy program is about to be adopted by the Russian Government and the main features of this document are presented in the report. It deals with recommendations on overcoming the present energy crisis in Russia, outlines the means of carrying out the energy program, the plan for the modernization of the oil industry, presents two scenarios of production of primary energy in Russia, describes the energy potential of Russia, gives guidelines for foreign economic cooperation and energy diplomacy of Russia and so on. After being adopted this document will determine the whole Russian energy strategy up to 2010.

Other documents vital to the Russian oil industry—the oil management concept and the president's decree "on

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priority measures for improving oil companies activities" are as well discussed in the oil report. A special attention is paid to company structure of emerging Russian private oil industry and government control of its activities.

Special part of the oil report deals with foreign trade in oil and oil products, underlines latest libelalization moves in this field.

The oil report also contains vital information about foreign investments into Russian oil industry, about the situation on the stock market, gives production and foreign trade statistics.

The special report is now available only in English, exclusively, through ITAR-TASS for a special price of 70 USD.

For details contact ITAR-TASS Commercial Centre in Moscow
Fax: (095) 292 3690.
Tel: (095) 290 3951, 202 1814.

Companies Should Bear Own Credit Risks

MM1204102995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 First Edition p 3

[Report by Yelizaveta Leontyeva: "The Road to Credit Paradise. Enterprises Are Continuing To Take Foreign Credits Under Government Guarantees. This Is Costing Us Billions of Dollars"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By the end of the year Russia will owe its creditors exactly $130 billion—this is the sum of the Soviet debt and the new Russian debt. Indeed, after 70 years the Union left us with a legacy of 100 billion, while we have accumulated 30 billion in the past four years. And we have done this so rapidly that we have become one of the world's biggest debtors, second only to Brazil. Nevertheless, having had between $100 and $300 billion, according to experts' assessments, leave Russia and go into Western banks, the country's economy has been enveloped in a dense network of lines of credit in which it has already lost its way. For instance, the Novo-Yaroslavskiy Oil Refinery took out a loan of $200 million from the Japanese Export and Import Bank to finance purchases of equipment to expand production. The Ministry of Finance and the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity [Vneshekonombank] signed documents with the Japanese side. The terms were stipulated for advance payments, the payment of the debt, and the payment of interest and commission on the credit to be made from the "Yaroslavnefteorgsintez" open-type joint-stock company's own funds. Yaroslavl Oblast Administration signed an agreement with the Ministry of Finance on guarantees for the full repayment of the funds connected with the use of the credit. And, on the instructions of the government, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is carrying out efficient monitoring as to whether the contract is satisfactory. How to pay, when to pay, and what burden will these funds place on the economy? If Yaroslavl does not pay it back, then the guarantor will be responsible—that is, the state, and therefore you and I.

The "Yaroslavlstroy" limited partnership also developed a need for equipment to retool its construction industry base to manufacture articles and construct housing on the basis of technology from the French company "Phenix." The scenario is unchanged: The Ministry of Finance and the Vneshekonombank sign documents and conclude an agreement to return the credit with the Yaroslavl Oblast Administration. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, as in the previous case, ensures monitoring. So another line of credit is ready.

But it is not just individual enterprises that want to obtain credit guaranteed by the government. For example, a proposal was adopted under which Russian ship owners suggested financing the repair of the fishing industry and science and research fleets to the tune of 65.4 million German marks. Furthermore, it was decided to take out a credit to build ships to the tune of 114 million German marks over the period 1994-1997. The Ministry of Finance and the Vneshekonombank are all set once again: The Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations is prepared to ensure efficient monitoring, and the ship owners are certainly delighted that this is not their concern. They will not have to pay for ages!

Not only that, the Russian republics also want to get their hands on the prize of a credit guaranteed by the government. For instance, Tuva desired 25 million German marks for the structural restructuring of its economy. Possibly it wanted more, but this was the sum that was deemed necessary to open a line of credit. Subsequently everything went according to the same pattern.

But it was the "Moskvich" joint-stock company that broke the record. In November 1994 the government made arrangements for a credit to be issued from the Japanese Export and Import Bank to the tune of $140 million to fund the purchase, assembly, and installation of equipment. Then the Ministry of Finance did not just sign the documents but also envisaged the allocation in 1995 of currency to the tune of $21 million—for advance payments for the imported equipment.

Furthermore this year it has been decided to draw a credit from the U.S. Export and Import Bank to the tune of $82 million for the same "Moskvich." And again the Russian Ministry of Finance has to allocate currency to it, on the government's instructions, for advance payments on the contract.

There are generally more than enough examples here. In each case the enterprise does not ask for credits itself; the government acts on its behalf every time, using diplomatic tricks and putting its own reputation on the line. At the same time, because there is an official stamp in

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the corner of such applications saying "considered essential" or something along those lines, the government take a heavy credit burden on itself. In any event it assiduously insures borrowers for years while they pay only the interest, if that—peanuts, essentially. Maybe that is why the taxes we are paying are not decreasing at all.

Why should the joint-stock companies, limited partnerships, and so on not reach agreements with foreigners themselves and take out credits themselves? But then why, pray, should they be in a hurry to do that if they already have the government's concern? Enterprises have gotten used to such behavior and see no difference between being state enterprises or private or joint-stock enterprises.

"The situation is difficult for the government," Minister of the Economy Yevgeniy Yasin commented. "Do you think that the government is really seeking to take these concerns on itself? Certainly not. After all, a lot of people do not pay back the credits and we have to write it off."

Incidentally, it is simply impossible to check with a sufficient degree of thoroughness the quality of equipment which is not owned by anyone. This can be done by the boss of an enterprise who puts his own money into a purchase. Not state money, not credits, but his own money. Then he will determine with the precision of an apothecary's scales whether he needs the equipment or not. If he needs it, then what the quality should be, how much it should cost, and where he should obtain it. But when the director of a plant is using not his own funds but state funds, the scale of parasitic behavior, corruption, and the inefficient use of other people's money and of expensive foreign purchases obtained virtually free of charge is very great. Of course the government is interested in developing our industry. But our borrowers should at least get slightly used to the idea of relying on their own reputation rather than someone else's.

Agriculture Experiences New Low in Resources, Equipment

LD0804140295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1230 GMT 8 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 8 (Interfax)—Russia's agroindustrial complex has "never over the last 25 years entered the spring sowing campaign with such an enormous lack of resources and equipment," Russian Agriculture and Food Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk told journalists covering agrarian issues in Moscow Saturday.

Nazarchuk said only 0.48 out of 19 million hectares had been ploughed, while only 1.4 out of 71 million hectares of crops had been sown by today. In addition, about 0.4 out of 2.3 million hectares of died winter crops were sown anew, while a mere 1.2 out of 13 million hectares of the total winter crops were fertilized.

Nazarchuk said the main reason for the slow pace and low quality of spring field works was "the government's anti-farming policy and, as a consequence, the agroindustrial complex's financial insolvency." In effect, the agricultural sector is supplied with fuel and lubricants by only 50 percent, while only 0.3 million tonnes of mineral fertilizers had been purchased since the start of 1995, against "up to 13 million tonnes annually spread manured in 1986 through 1990."

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is expected to sign a telegram to fertilizer manufacturers on "the immediate delivery of fertilizers to the agroindustrial complex," because "if there are no mineral fertilizers, there will be no bread."

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International Affairs

'Blue Helmets' in Croatia Subjected To Shelling

LD1304221795 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1850 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—A Ukrainian observation post No. 15 in the south of the zone within the responsibility of the 30th Independent Special Battalion which is part of the UN "Blue Helmets" in Croatia was subjected to shelling on 12 April.

The battalion commander, Mykola Shpanko, says the shelling opened without warning from the Moslem side. One round exploded 3 meters away from the observation post and another three shells at a distance of 20 to 70 meters. None of the Ukrainian "Blue Helmets" was killed or wounded. The personnel were evacuated from the dangerous place on order.

At present, the battalion is getting ready for rotation which is due to begin on 11 May.

This has been reported by the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Kiev Expected To Contribute to EBRD's Authorized Fund

LD1304222795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1740 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received]—At the fourth session of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], which was held on 10-11 April, Ukraine presented three projects: The second stage of modernizing the "Borispol" airport, the "Kovelinterport" [Kovel international port], and the "Odessa oil terminal" projects.

The Ukrainian Government delegation, led by Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Mityukov, passed the documents concerning these projects to the EBRD to be worked at the bank's special departments.

It is planned that the projects will be financed according to the following scheme: One third will be financed by the EBRD, one third will be covered at the expense of Ukrainian enterprises, and one third at the expense of attracted (domestic or foreign) capitals.

It is expected that by 1997 the EBRD's authorized fund will grow by 2.5 billion ECU, and it is not ruled out that Ukraine will contribute to that growth (at present, EBRD's authorized fund is $10 billion).

As regards Ukraine's further cooperation with the EBRD, it was emphasized at the sittings behind closed doors, held at ministries and departments on the results of the visit to London, that Ukraine was completing the stage of negotiations with the EBRD, and further on its domestic structures would cooperate with the bank, as was the case with Russia.

Council of Europe Agrees With Crimea Decisions

LD1404102495 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0820 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—"The problem in Crimea is that each side sees it from its own standpoint rather than through dialogue," said Hanne Severinsen, a Council of Europe rapporteur on relations with non-member countries, at a meeting with Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz on 14 April. "There is no doubt that the Crimean authorities have gone too far," she said, adding that the Council of Europe delegation which visited Crimea agrees with the recent decisions by the Ukrainian parliament and president.

Severinsen also stressed the need for a clearer definition of autonomy. "When Crimea understands where it belongs, it will never pass anti-Ukrainian legislation," she said.

The Supreme Council chairman said that if need be, Ukraine will grant the Crimean parliament a time extension to draft the new Crimean constitution.

Parliaments Appeal to Duma To Refrain From Discussing Crimea

LD1304163695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1516 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 13 (Interfax-Ukraine)—The Ukrainian parliament approved on the whole Thursday [13 April] an appeal to the Russian State Duma to refrain from the discussion of the Crimean question at a plenary session. The appeal was approved by 319 deputies with 13 voting against and two refraining.

The appeal says that the Ukrainian parliament is alarmed by the activities of part of Duma members as far as the Crimean question is concerned.

"The world community has definitely determined that affairs related to Crimea are the sole prerogative of Ukraine," the appeal stresses.

The decision of the Duma to debate the lawfulness of the surrender of Sevastopol to Ukraine and its approval of a moratorium on the unilateral reduction of the Black Sea Fleet contradict general norms of international law and Russia's commitments under bilateral agreements, the document says.

The Ukrainian parliament said that such decisions do not promote bilateral relations and can be regarded as interference in Ukraine's internal affairs.

Members of the Ukrainian parliament urged the Duma to demonstrate wisdom and refrain from the discussion of matters that can cause tension in relations between the two countries.

The appeal is expected to get its final approval by the end of Thursday.

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Russia Accused of Interference in State Affairs

LD1304205195 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Mikhail Osokin] A new aggravation in relations between Russia and Ukraine—today tough accusations were voiced in the Ukrainian capital vis-a-vis Moscow. Our correspondent reports from Kiev.

[Vladimir Skachko] Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz has read out the address of Ukraine's Supreme Rada [parliament] to the Russian State Duma. The document states inter alia:

[Begin Moroz recording in Ukrainian, with superimposed Russian translation] The decision of the Russian State Duma to put on the agenda such issues as the illegality of handing over the city of Sevastopol to Ukraine and the adoption of the Russian Federation federal law on the moratorium on the unilateral reduction of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as extending the invitation to the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to visit Moscow and to speak to the State Duma—all this contradicts accepted international norms of law, and the principles and undertakings of the Russian Federation in the framework of the bilateral Ukrainian-Russian agreements. The Supreme Rada of Ukraine has been forced to state that such decisions unfortunately do not help Ukrainian-Russian relations. They can be described as interference into Ukraine's internal affairs. [end recording]

[Skachko] The scandal in Ukraine's Supreme Rada caused by different political approaches to the president's law on authority has continued today. For three hours, deputies walked uselessly around parliament because there was no quorum. Deputies of the left did not register themselves protesting the procedure of the adoption of the law. When the sitting finally resumed people's deputy Petr Simonenko, the Communists' leader, said: We do not want to take part in a constitutional coup; and explained the position of his colleagues. They maintain that the law on authority cannot be passed by a simple majority of votes (as the inter-party conciliatory commission has suggested) because it breaches the current Constitution of Ukraine. Therefore it must be passed by the constitutional majority as an amendment to this very Constitution.

National Affairs

UNA-UNSO Deputy Tears Up Russian Flag in Lvov Council

WS1404090995 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0209 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lvov, April 13—Roman Koval, Lvov council deputy of the Ukrainian National Assembly [UNA], tore up a Russian flag at the council session Thursday. Koval said he did it on a commission from the UNA-UNSO [UNA-Ukrainian National Self-Defense] to support the action of his two UNA colleagues in the Ukrainian Parliament last week.

After tearing the flag Koval threw the pieces out of a window, where 10 UNA supporters waited to trample them. Having trampled the Russian flag's strips, the gathering demonstratively burnt a cloth that resembled a red flag.

Neither the Lvov council session nor its chairman, Vasyl Kuibida, reacted to the incident.

Kuchma Meets Council of Europe Delegation

LD1304180295 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In the opinion of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine is trying to do all it can to resolve the issue of its accession to such an influential international organization as the Council of Europe in a positive manner. He said this at a meeting with a delegation of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly reporters, which is now visiting Ukraine.

Mykhaylo Doroshenko, the head of the Ukrainian president's press service, told the mass media that the meeting had discussed, among other issues, problems that stand in the way of Ukraine's movement toward acquiring, as soon as possible, the status of a full-fledged member of the Council of Europe. As is known, one of the prerequisites is the adoption of a new Constitution.

Leonid Kuchma said an active constitutional process of an open nature is under way in Ukraine. A wide range of issues dealing with the progress of the economic reforms, the safeguarding of human rights and freedoms in Ukraine, etc., were also touched upon during the conversation. Much attention was paid to relations between the official Kiev and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The Council of Europe's delegation showed understanding of the Ukrainian Government's stance and approved of Ukraine's striving to resolve the issue by democratic means. As is known, it will be touched upon at an international conference due to the held in Switzerland in May. An attempt will be made at the conference to help Kiev and Simferopol come to terms.

Crimea's Tsekov Dissatisfied With Negotiations in Kiev

LD1304162995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1338 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—The joint visit of deputy Chairman of Russia's State Duma Gennadiy Seleznyov and Chairman of Crimea's Supreme Soviet Serhiy Tsekov to Kiev Wednesday [12 April] failed to meet the hopes of the head of the Crimean parliament. Serhiy Tsekov declared this in an interview with Interfax Thursday after his return to Moscow.

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According to Tsekov, he hoped "to find a compromise decision even under the present difficult situation." However, meetings in the Ukrainian parliament have not demonstrated any responses on the part of Kiev, he said.

"As before, all decisions of the Ukrainian president and Supreme Soviet are viewed as correct and the Crimean parliament is recommended to engage itself with "writing a new Constitution," Tsekov declared.

As Tsekov said, he was told in Kiev that his appearance in Russia's State Duma, scheduled for Friday, is "undesirable" and could inflict "great damage on Russian-Ukrainian relations."

"I do not understand why it is possible to address parliaments in Poland and Germany and it is impossible in Russia," Tsekov said.

On Thursday morning Tsekov met with Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Dubinin. He also had a conversation with leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia], Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. In the afternoon he is scheduled to meet with Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council Ramazan Abdulatipov.

Meshkov Deplores Kiev Actions in Crimea

954F2064A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 95 p 1

["Appeal of the President of the Republic of Crimea to the People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Citizens of the Republic of Crimea!

The authorities of Ukraine are continuing the phased liquidation of our young republic. The results of the referendum of 20 January 1991, when on the basis of general equal and direct suffrage and by way of free and secret expression, the majority of Crimeans advocated the reconstitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as a component of the Union and a subscriber to the Union Treaty, not an administrative-territorial entity of the unitary national state of Ukraine, are being flouted unceremoniously and from imperial positions.

The Ukrainian leadership embarked on this path of the shameless flouting of generally recognized democratic standards as of the moment of the proclamation of the state independence of Ukraine in August 1991. It deprived Crimeans of the right, in accordance with Union legislation that was in effect at that time, to conduct on 1 December 1991 simultaneously with the all-Ukraine referendum an all-Crimea referendum on the question of its status in constitutional law for the independent determination of its further fortunes.

In the spring of 1992, almost a quarter of a million Crimeans advocated a referendum on the independence of the Republic of Crimea in a union with other states, but a moratorium was imposed on it under power pressure from Kiev, in spite of the law on a referendum of the Republic of Crimea. Then, under the same totally undisguised pressure, the constitution of 6 May 1992 was revised.

At the elections in January 1994 the people of Crimea supported the institution of a presidency, and it became legitimate. In March 1994 the citizens of our republic confirmed that at this stage they supported the building of relations with Ukraine on the basis of a treaty and agreements, and they at that time supported the institution of dual citizenship and thereby confirmed the foundations of the constitutional system of Crimea.

In spite of the internationally recognized norms of the building of a democratic state based on the rule of law, the Supreme Council of Ukraine abolished in the fall of 1994 the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Crimea and a number of other fundamental legislative acts, and thereby once again flouted the will of the people of our republic and their right to participate in deciding their fate.

In March 1995 the Supreme Council of Ukraine perpetrated an unprecedented most flagrant violation of the generally recognized norms of the building of a democratic state based on the rule of law and abolished the constitution and other legislative acts of our republic, which had been hard won by the people of Crimea in a five-year struggle for their rights. The Republic of Crimea was thereby essentially made a rank-and-file oblast of Ukraine. The law on elections to the local councils was trampled, and the activity of Crimean political parties banned, virtually.

The edict of the president of Ukraine on the transfer of the executive authority of Crimea to the jurisdiction of Kiev officialdom directly makes the Republic of Crimea some neo-colonial formation deprived of the right to pursue an independent socioeconomic regional policy, and the people of Crimea have, in fact, been deprived of the right to take part in the administration of their republic.

This is one further example of the totally unwarranted violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in accordance with which the people of Crimea, through the will of the leadership of Ukraine, are no longer the main authority, as clause 3 of Article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights proclaims. The abolition of the Supreme Council of Crimea and the other organs of the power of the people will be next.

Kiev officials are hypocritically covering all their unlawful actions with verbiage about compliance with the laws, protection of human rights, and concern for the socioeconomic position of Crimea. Certain former and present members of the government who are incapable of understanding the course of history and the command of the people, and who are unwilling to part with their comfortable positions, and also the chairmen of certain city and rayon councils who have been condemned at citizens' rallies and who realize that the people of Crimea would not elect them at the coming elections, are helping

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the authorities of Ukraine here. It is the desire to remain in office at any price and to preserve their influence on the process of the privatization of Crimean property that explain their policy and their actions, however they attempt to don the garb of zealots for the people.

The people of Crimea have already proven repeatedly that they are capable of adopting solidary and responsible decisions. The citizens of our republic have opted once for all for a peaceful and democratic path of the building of their statehood. And no one and no forces will succeed in turning history back and forcing our citizens to leave this path and renounce the right to determine their fate themselves.

Only by the joint efforts of the legitimately elected representatives of the authorities of Crimea, public and political organizations, and all Crimeans can we counterpose to lack of rights and lawlessness right and law.

[Signed] Yu. Meshkov, president of the Republic of Crimea

City of Simferopol, 6 April 1995

No 1412.

Moroz on Progress of New Constitution

LD1404094595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0830 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received]—The text of Ukraine's new constitution may be published as early as a month or month and a half from now, [Supreme Council Chairman] Oleksandr Moroz told a group of Council of Europe representatives led by rapporteur on political affairs Jean-Pierre Masseret. Moroz added that the establishment of a constitutional court was "at the middle stage."

He said the law on power that is being discussed by the Ukrainian parliament laid down "unconditional" principles of self-government. Decisions on government appointments are to be made "in coordination between legislative and executive authorities," but each of the power structures should perform its functions independently, the speaker said.

Moroz stressed that apart from the law on power there was a need for a law on local government—that is, the law on local councils of people's deputies. This law should be passed after the adoption of the power law, which has a constitutional status. "The local government law will regulate the functions, duties, and rights of local authorities at each level," he said.

Kuchma Walks Out of Parliament After Accusation

LD1304150495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1338 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 13 (Interfax-Ukraine)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who planned to call for rapprochement between himself and the deputies on Wednesday morning, had to walk out of parliament after accusations of trying to usurp power from Deputy Aleksandr Steshenko.

Kuchma in a speech, the text of which was made available to Interfax-Ukraine, describes the new power sharing bill as a compromise between the executive, legislature and different political groups.

He spoke of the supreme authority vested with the president and parliament (Verkhovna Rada) being put to a trial test of statesmanship which places the need for self-restriction in the name of national goals.

Kuchma says the proposed legislation has accounted for Rada proposals and searches were under way for compromise solutions to the thorniest issues.

He warns against attempts to try to break up the bill into separate units to avert causing power imbalances.

The president says the approval of what he calls an interim constitution could help towards Ukraine's incorporation in European structures and enhance its international prestige.

He also points to the long-awaited signs of rapprochement between the deputies and president and calls to prove together that the process is irreversible.

Kuchma To Try For Public Support for Parliament Attack

LD1304190795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 13 (Interfax - Ukraine)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma is likely to try to reserve for himself public backing for "an attack on the parliament" and will hold a referendum on the draft law on power, leader of the Ukrainian People's Rukh Vyacheslav Chernovil told journalists today.

On April 12 a member of the Communist faction, Aleksandr Steshenko, said, while the parliament was discussing the draft on state power and local self-rule, that "unlimited authoritarianism would come if the law was adopted."

Kuchma left the parliament's hall after such a statement.

Head of the Conciliatory Commission on Preparations for Discussing the Draft Law on Power in the Parliament Vasiliy Durdinets told journalists today that he was in favor of passing the law.

He said he hoped that the law would be approved in the second reading in the version proposed by the Conciliatory Commission.

Durdinets criticized the idea of the parliament possibly dismissing itself. He said he was in favor of the parliament working "though not as it is working now."

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The Ukrainian parliament failed to decide on the procedure for discussing the draft law on power in the second reading this morning.

Criminal Proceedings Begun Following Derogation of Kuchma

LD1304165395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1448 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Pavlov for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol April 13 TASS—The Crimean Prosecutor's Office has instituted criminal proceedings following leaflets which were spread in the Crimean city of Simferopol in which the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was portrayed with a hairdo similar to Hitler's style.

Speaking to journalists today, Deputy Crimean Prosecutor General Aleksandr Demin declined to give any details about people involved in the case.

Socialist Party Joins Opposition to Kuchma

LD1304204295 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1850 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—At its evening session, the Supreme Council of Ukraine continued the second reading of the law "On power and local self-government in Ukraine." Deputies approved 13 articles of the draft law. At the end of the plenary session they passed a procedural decision—not to interrupt plenary sessions until the second reading of the law on power is finished.

Parliamentary grouping "Yednist" [Unity] issued an appeal to Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz in connection with the fact that the Socialist Party had gone over to opposition to the president since 9 April. A Socialist Party of Ukraine weekly called "TOVARISHCH" was distributed among deputies. It carried an excerpt from the party's resolution: "The Socialist Party of Ukraine considers itself to be in opposition to the authority structures whose policy leads to the destruction of Ukraine."

Sevastopol Union Demands Rescinding Kuchma Edict

LD1304220695 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1520 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sevastopol—The 5th session of the Sevastopol City Council continued its work. Before it got down to business, the city council building was picketed on the initiative of the Sevastopol City Union of Trade Unions. The reason behind the picketing was the Ukrainian president's Edict No. 227 "On measures to ensure relative normalization of the discipline of payments in the national economy of Ukraine," which caused the indignation of the work force, as the picketers pointed out.

In the trade unions' opinion, the edict further aggravates the difficult conditions of those engaged in the sphere of material production and contributes to paralyzing industrial enterprises. The picketers put forth the following demands to the Supreme Council and the president of Ukraine:

—to rescind Edict No. 227;

—to cut taxes and stimulate production;

—to approve a law "On the remuneration of labor" in April 1995.

If the leadership of Ukraine fails to satisfy these demands, the trade unions reserve the right to take more resolute actions, in particular, to stage a strike and appeal to the work force of Crimea and other regions to give support.

The picketers were allowed to attend the city council session, where they set forth their demands and called on deputies to support them. The deputies did support the picketers' demands—a relevant decision will be sent to the Supreme Council and the president of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, representatives of the so-called "People's Veche [Popular Assembly] of Sevastopol" led by its chairman, Crimean Supreme Council Deputy Oleksandr Kruhlov, were picketing the city council building on the opposite side of the street. They were protesting against the attempts by the Sevastopol City Council to consider a project of incorporating Sevastopol into a special economic zone. The picketers pointed out that Sevastopol was and will always remain under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. As Oleksandr Kruhlov said, "we must fracture the treacherous law on a special economic zone and demand that Sevastopol's mayor, Viktor Semenov, implement the will of the people of Sevastopol and form an official delegation that will go to the Russian Federation with the aim of considering a treaty on returning Sevastopol to the Russian Federation in real terms." Deputy Kruhlov emphasized: "If Ukraine hampers the fulfillment of these decisions, we will respond by force."

Sevastapol Newspaper Editor 'Seriously Injured' by Bomb

AU1404104595 Paris AFP in English 1029 GMT 14 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sevastopol, Ukraine, April 14 (AFP)—The editor-in-chief of a local Sevastopol newspaper was seriously injured Friday morning in an explosion, caused by a remote-controlled device, police said.

The device exploded in front of Vladimir Ivanov as he left home at 7:30 a.m. (1030 GMT), the police said.

A spokesman for THE GLORY OF SEBASTOPOL [as received] told AFP that the editor had been admitted to hospital in a very serious condition and that both his legs might have to be amputated.

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The newspaper published in the Crimean port on the Black Sea recently began a campaign denouncing the Crimean Mafia, and had stated its opposition to a project by a Ukranian-Swedish company to build an oil refinery.

In addition, the paper has published articles for and against the instigation of a free economic zone at Sevastopol.

Odessa Spacecraft To Shuttle Between Earth, Asteroids

AU1404093895 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 13 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Road Toward Stars Starts in... Odessa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] More than a dozen countries, including Russia, the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have signed accords with the Odessa design office "Kosmos" [Space] on participation in creating a unique spacecraft that was designed there. Its main function is to transport rare metals and other raw materials from asteroids to earth. The partners believe that the spacecraft may be built as early as in 1998. The designers expect that it will be able to reach asteroids 18 million kilometers away from earth in just two days and deliver millions of tons of cargo from there to earth.

Odessa Scientists Reportedly Develop New Rocket Fuel

LD1204221995 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 12 Apr 95

[Item as heard throughout]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of Cosmonauts' Day, a group of Odessa scientists seem to have achieved a major success in developing fundamentally new space equipment.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Yuriy Selivanov] To tell the truth, what we were shown by workers at Odessa's Kosmos design bureau at first seems an absolutely fantasy. What we have here is nothing more or less than a completely new space technology allowing mankind to begin the large-scale conquest of interplanetary space.

Created as a result of 17 years of efforts, the fundamentally new rocket motor allows the construction of space ships with previously unseen lifting capacity.

[N.P. Razumnyy, general designer of the Kosmos chief international design bureau, identified by caption] [Razumnyy means sensible] The completely new type of fuel that is used—metallic fuel—and the physico-chemical processes that take place make it possible to achieve great lifting power, totalling up to 136 million tonnes, and to move a payload of up to 8-10 million tonnes in near-earth space.

Thanks to this, the real possibility appears of commercial extraction of minerals beyond the earth, which opens up the path to resolving the very acute raw materials problems facing our civilization. If everything goes according to plan, the new space vessel will be launched on 1 January 1998. [end recording]

Nuclear Waste Dumps Increase in Donetsk

95WN0131A Donetsk DONBASS in Russian 31 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Marina Vildanova: "To Be or Not To Be for a Burial Ground for Radioactive Wastes?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Do you know that even in Donetsk itself there is a "stony grave"? Although it is far from sacred. I am speaking about the graveyard for radioactive wastes created in 1966 on the territory of a rubber and chemical items plant. These are increasing in number in the Donetsk area. And this "filth is being spread" through the cities and villages. Traces of pollution from Chernobyl, where zones with increased radiological monitoring were established at the right time, can be found in Makeyevka, Snezhnyy, Shakhtersk, Mospino, Yenakiyevo....

"Well, we have crawled on our knees and gathered up this 'dirty' earth, but what are we to do with it?" L.V. Guseva, chief of the department of radiation hygiene of the oblast state association for protection of the health of the population, asked this question of the audience.

"We also have other sections (in Pershotravnevyy, Volnovakhskiy, and Krasnoarmeyskiy Rayons) with increased radionuclide content," Larisa Valentinovna continued to show the cards to participants in a news conference held at the university by the State Administration for Ecological Safety and the newspaper NASH KRAY for journalists regarding the question of warehousing and processing radioactive wastes in Donetsk Oblast.

Additionally, more than 3,000 sources of ionizing radiation have been accumulated at the enterprises, and these need to be replaced periodically and the used ones must be buried.

Radioactive wastes must immediately (or soon they will be everywhere; they will be found even in the pockets of schoolchildren) be gathered into one "stony grave," more precisely—a temporary concrete storage facility—and then shipped to somewhere around Chernobyl. To a centralized burial ground that does not exist yet. Such was the directive (for all oblasts) of the preceding president L. Kravchuk. Where should we dig the "grave" for the burial ground? Donbassgeologiya has investigated 118 possible sites.

In some places there are mineral deposits, in others—developments, and in still others—geological infringements. The choice went to the Stepnoye farm of the

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Donetsk anti-erosion experimental station in Yasinovatskiy Rayon! They did not find anything better. And they could not. According to the conclusion of the Ukrainian Institute of Soil Science and Agrochemistry imeni Sokolovskiy, the soil at the station (which, incidentally, is prohibited for use for nonagricultural production) has a special scientific research status. Technological experiments have been conducted here for many years, and they are significant for protecting the soils of Ukraine from erosion, and the landscape environmental protection monument, Sukhaya Valka, is also located here.

At the end of last year the oblast executive committee held a conference, at which they considered the question of choosing a site for construction, and specifically on the territory of the Stepnoye experimental farm. Were it not for the public outcry caused by the article in the Yasinovatskiy Rayon newspaper and the document that was drawn up subsequently, it would have been approved. The facts that were made public also disturbed the local authorities of Dzerzhinsk and the village of Novgorodskoye. What do they have to do with it? It turns out that it is not very far (a little more than a kilometer and a half) from the planned burial ground to the only phenol plant in the country, which itself could drive anybody to the grave. Each year, about 400,000 tonnes of harmful wastes are discharged into the air over the village. They contain an immense quantity of nitrogen oxides, carbon, hydrogen sulfide, and also phenols and naphthalene. The childhood disease rate here is 17.5 times greater than the average level for the oblast. Cases have been recorded of children being born without a brain or extremities. It seems that the story about sister Alenushka and brother Ivanushka ("Do not drink the water, brother, you will become a goat") is acquiring new significance.

The location not far away, in the center of an urbanized industrial region, of a burial ground for nuclear wastes is strategically dangerous as well. If something were to happen, the central Donbass, with its industrial and energy enterprises which play an important role in the economy of Ukraine, would be subjected to pollution. This could have severe consequences, which was proved by the Kyshtym accident at a similar facility in the Urals.

Incidentally, the state administration for ecological safety for Donetsk Oblast, represented by its chief S.S. Kurulenko in his report-recommendation "On the Selection of a Land Section" to the administration of land resources of the oblast executive committee suggested solving the problem of burying radioactive wastes at already existing points outside the oblast.

Thus, perhaps our administration should take this question to the Supreme Soviet and the president, taking into account the special status of the former "all-Union stoke hole": The Donbass is being called the next zone of ecological disaster after Chernobyl.

Kuchma, EU, G-7 Agree on Chernobyl AES Closure Date

LD1304185595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1710 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 13 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station must be closed by 2000, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the EU and G-7 delegation agreed during their meeting in Kiev today.

Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council Vladimir Gorbulin told journalists after the meeting that the parties had agreed to dismiss the decision of the G-7 summit in Naples in accordance with which granting financial aid to Ukraine was toughly conditioned with closing the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station's first and third energy blocs.

Gorbulin said the EU and G-7 countries would help Ukraine to resolve the problems concerning the station's closing. He said the main task for Ukraine was to maintain its energy system for which Ukraine would build near the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station two vapor-gas plants as a compensating capacity.

Gorbulin said Ukraine ought to resolve the issue of recycling wasted fuel and radio active waste as well as social problems of the station's employees.

He said he hoped that after the meeting in Kiev the EU and G-7 countries would grant to Ukraine financial aid for resolving the problems. Gorbulin also voiced the hope that the EU would give to Ukraine 85 million ECU under the agreement achieved at the end of 1994.

Gorbulin said Ukraine would draw up all necessary documents by May 15 after which another meeting between the Ukrainian leaders and the G-7 delegation could be held. He said that afterwards corresponding documents for the next G-7 summit to discuss the issue, would be prepared. The next G-7 summit will take place in July 1995.

Director: Plant Closure To Cost $4.4 Billion

LD1304132895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1210 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received]—The management of Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] will agree to shut down the nuclear plant if the West compensates for Ukraine's losses and pays for the construction of a steam gas power station with the capacity of 3,000 MW near the neighboring town of Slavutych, plant director Serhiy Parashyn told a news conference. The compensation, amounting to $4.4 billion in total, would solve the problems of safety, power output, and social protection of the plant's personnel and residents of Slavutych, the base of Chernobyl staff.

The G-7 already rejected proposals to build a new nuclear station near Slavutych because of the high cost of nuclear power generating sets and the length of construction—96 months.

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A steam gas unit can be built in 40 months, and the entire station would cost $2 billion, Parashyn said.

The difference between the cost of the station and the total compensation, about $2.4 billion, can be used to buy gas fuel that is three times more expensive than nuclear fuel, he said.

According to Parashyn, these proposals have been passed to the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Chernobyl management hope they will be included in the document to be submitted to the G-7.

Nuclear engineers are also studying proposals forwarded by the transnational concern Energiya for building an underground nuclear power plant in place of Chernobyl. The idea is worth considering, Parashyn said.

'Zero Level' Water Leak at Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Station

LD1304184895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1740 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received]—On 13 April at 1050, a water leak was detected in one of the pipelines of the second (non-reactor) circuit at the fifth generating set of the Zaporozhye nuclear power station. UNIAN has been informed of this at the information center of the former State Committee of Ukraine for Control of Safety in Nuclear Power Engineering.

The fault did not essentially influence the operation of the generating set. According to the international scale of events at nuclear power stations, the accident belongs to a zero level.

It is envisaged that the fault will be corrected tonight, when the generating set will be put out of operation in order to carry out a routine test of the reactor control and protection system.

Economic Issues

World Bank Grants Loan To Modernize Hydroelectric Plants

WS1404091695 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0705 GMT 14 Apr 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On April 12, a meeting of the Interdepartmental Commission for Economic Reform chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Dyuba was held at the Ministry of Energy. It was announced that six state-owned power-generating companies have been created in Ukraine (4 at the thermal stations and 2 at the hydropower stations), and that the work on their corporatization and transformation into state-owned joint-stock enterprises is underway. The National Power Company is also being formed that will operate transmission lines and substations with net voltage of 220 kV [kilovolts] and higher. The company will not be subject to privatization. It was planned to create yet another state-owned company, ENERHOMARKET, on the basis of the National Power Dispatch Center and eight interregional dispatch centers.

Vilen Semenyuk, the Minister of Energy, said that on April 11 the Board of Directors of the World Bank approved the first portion ($114 million) of a hydropower modernization loan for Ukraine. The total cost of the project is $190.2 million. As our INFOBANK correspondent was told in the World Bank Representative Mission office in Kiev, the loan will be granted to the Government of Ukraine and will be disbursed by the National Power Dispatch Center and the DNIPROENERHO joint-stock company. 57 percent of the loan funds will be used for the rehabilitation of eight major hydropower stations of the Dnepr chain, 38 percent—for the modernization of the dispatch office communications means, and 5 percent—for the introduction of a dam safety monitoring system at the Dnepr reservoirs and the technical assistance provided by the World Bank. World Bank experts estimate that the execution of the project will provide a possibility to extend the operation of Ukrainian hydropower stations for another 20 years.

The loan is to be repayed during 17 years with 5 years of grace and the standard variable interest rate of 7.1 percent. The project will be co-financed with grants provided by the governments of Switzerland, Canada, and Norway.

Van Den Broek on Financial Aid for Chernobyl

MS1304124395 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 12 Apr 95

[Interview with Hans van den Broek, EU External Affairs Commissioner, by Kirsty Wark, on 12 Apr; van den Broek in Brussels, Wark in London; from the "Newsnight" program—recorded]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Wark] Why has it taken so long to put a reasonable financial package together?

[Van den Broek] I don't believe it has taken that long, because the package in fact is on the table already for many months, but I think what we need actually is an engagement also from the Ukrainian side that one indeed is prepared, in the framework of this package, to strive for the complete close-down of the Chernobyl nuclear reactors which we consider not to be safe enough.

[Wark] But the fact is the Ukrainians are upping the financial anti all the time. First it was to be between three of four billion, now it is to be 10 billion pounds, and you don't have the whip hand, do you?

[Van den Broek] Well I think that the whole discussion about the exact amounts cannot be concluded unless we have, let's say the next volumes of the report which still has to be drawn up. But I think that, generally speaking, also our visit to Kiev tomorrow, serves the purpose of meeting the President, the Prime Minister, and the

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Minister for Environment in fact to listen carefully to them and to hear whether they agree with us that in all circumstances we should strive for a complete close-down of Chernobyl in the coming period.

[Wark] But what about a sense of urgency in all this, rather than waiting for the next report. We understand that the Ukrainians are planning to put another reactor at Chernobyl back on stream that was damaged in 1992. Surely this is worrying?

[Van den Broek] I wouldn't jump to conclusions regarding reactor II, we will hear tomorrow what the exact plans are. You know that at the moment reactor II is not functioning because it is under maintenance, and I hope that we can persuade the Ukrainian authorities not to reopen reactor II, and that we can concentrate on the fate of reactor I and III that have a lifetime cycle that ends by the end of the century. And to get the engagement for that also would be the end really the end of these reactors, that they will not be rechannelled and modernized, and then let's say continue functioning, in our view, in a not sufficiently safe way, also let's say into the next century.

[Wark] You can't accommodate the 5,000 thrown out of work, though, if Chernobyl shuts, you cannot accommodate the energy loss that the Ukrainians would feel. The fact is it is not as urgent for you as it is for them?

[Van den Broek] You can of course discuss whether for instance their calculations regarding their energy requirements in the coming decade, whether those are sound enough, because you know that we've also offered in fact to assist and also to finance partly the completion of three other reactors outside Chernobyl as such, which from the Ukrainian point of view, only serves the purpose of their additional requirements in the coming years, whereas we have the feeling that in combination with energy-saving programs, and what have you, it will serve more than that purpose.

Joint Stock Oil Corporation Set Up With Russian Companies

WS1404091495 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0705 GMT 14 Apr 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On April 12 the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil and Gas held a meeting to discuss the establishment of a closed-type joint- stock company named RUNT Corporation (RUNO in Russian) that stands for Russian-Ukrainian Oil Corporation. According to the record, the first mission of the corporation will be the distribution of 6 million tons of crude oil to be supplied to Ukraine from Russia in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement that was signed during the March 21 visit to Kiev of Oleg Soskovets, First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia. Other missions for the corporation were also defined, including the expansion of the petroleum products market, the petroleum products supply to south-western regions of Russia and eastern part of Ukraine, the facilitation of foreign investments for the restructuring of Ukrainian and Russian oil-drilling and oil-processing enterprises.

RUNT Corporation will be comprised of the SINKO joint-stock company, Russia; the YUKOS oil company, Russia; the following joint-stock companies—KONDRPETROLEUM, TRANSNAFTA, TRANSNAFTOPRODUCT, PERMNAFTA, all from Russia; LYSYCHANSKNAFTOORHSYNTEZ, LYSYCHANSKNAFTOPRODUCT, both from Ukraine; Russian-Ukrainian joint venture OLPETROLEUM SYSTEM, Ukraine; and the Property Fund of Tyumen Oblast, Russia. The following enterprises hold the most significant interest in RUNT Corporation: LYSYCHANSKNAFTOORHSYNTEZ—25 percent of shares; SINKO and KONDRPETROLEUM—15 percent each; OLPETROLEUM SYSTEM—13 percent; and also the Property Fund of Tyumen Oblast, Russia—10 percent. Ukrainian share is 40 percent, Russian—60 percent The original capital of 200 million rubles was formed out of the founders' contributions.

Ukraine Obtains More Oil Supplies From Bashkortostan

LD1104210295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 11 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—Ukrainian companies' debt to their Bashkortostan partners currently stands at some 40 billion Russian rubles at 1992-1993 prices, Vladimir Rakitskiy, vice president of Bashnaftokhim petrochemical company, told UNIAN. He was in Ukraine as part of Bashkortostan's government delegation.

Enterprise arrears today account for five percent of Ukraine's total debt to Bashkortostan, Rakitskiy said. "These are mainly payments owed for oil supplies. Bashkortostan has requested the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy to take measures to repay the debt."

The head of the Cabinet of Ministers department for ties with the CIS, Kostyantyn Petrov, told UNIAN that the debt to Bashkortostan for 1992-1993 has already been settled as part of the debt agreement with the Russian Federation: some of it has been repaid, while the remainder has been restructured for repayment over 12-13 years.

During the Bashkortostan delegation's visit on 11 April, the two governments signed a protocol on implementation of the intergovernmental agreement on economic and cultural cooperation in 1995 and an appendix to the protocol on mutual deliveries of certain products and commodities.

"Ukraine will receive tens of thousand tonnes of oil," Vladimir Rakitskiy said. "This will be exchanged for machine-building products, rolled metal and food. Some of the products will be bartered, some—paid for in hard currency or Russian rubles."

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Belarus

Parliament Votes To Hold Referendum 14 May

LD1304120395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1132 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By BELINFORM correspondent for TASS]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk, 13 Apr—Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's threat to dissolve the parliament and suspend preparations for elections have had an effect and today the republic's Supreme Soviet changed its original decision and agreed to hold the national referendum on the 14 May. All the four questions proposed by Lukashenka are to be included.

A majority of 177 deputies voted for this decision. They adopted a very important reservation, though. Regardless of what the people decide on the main issue—the president's right to dissolve the parliament—it will have only a consultative nature.

The three other questions are mandatory and must be implemented. Citizens of Belarus are to decide whether they agree to give the Russian language equal status with the Belarusian language, support a new flag and coat of arms for the republic and agree to economic integration with Russia.

Last Monday [10 April] the parliament agreed to put only one question for the referendum, that of integration with Russia. In response Lukashenka threatened to suspend the parliament if the decision is not changed, "opt for a strong-arm action and suspend preparations for elections" and set the referendum by his own decision.

"I will not surrender the smallest part of my proposals," the president stressed.

The referendum will be held simultaneously with the parliamentary elections in Belarus.

Interior Ministry on 'Eventful Night' in Parliament

WS1304134895 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1230 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The press-office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has circulated a press-release where the Ministry stated its version of this eventful night in the House of Government.

"On April 11 this year, at 8.25 p.m. [1700 GMT], the service on duty for civil defence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus received official information from the Board of Internal Affairs of the Minsk-City executive committee about the presence of an explosive device in the House of Government. This information was given by an anonymous man over the telephone. In view of the situation the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence put into effect an operations plan to ensure security in the House of Government and in the conference-hall of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus. The service of field-engineer subunits was enlisted for the realization of the plan. From 10.00 p.m., April 11 to noon April 12, arrangements for the evacuation of all persons being in the House of Government and the inspection of administrative premises were carried out. During the work for the ensuring of safety a group of people, including MPs of the Supreme Soviet and representatives of the mass media, tried to counteract the realisation of the aforesaid arrangements. At noon on April 12 this year the inspection of the House of Government, including the premises of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidential administration and the Cabinet of Ministers, was completed and the access to the administrative and household premises was restored."

Lukashenka on Cooperation Shown in Parliament

LD1304175195 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Belarusian Parliament has voted in favor of holding a referendum on 14 May on four issues proposed by President Lukashenka.

Today there was no trace of the political passions that have flared up in the Belarusian Parliament over the past few days. The opposition, which has become the focus of the conflict, did not give any reminder of them, either—it was simply absent from the chamber. The remainder of the deputies decided to hold what was now their very last plenary session in total agreement with each other and with the president. It looks as if Aleksandr Lukashenka came out in solidarity with them.

[Begin Lukashenka recording] I am very sad that we have not had this atmosphere all along, because we could have worked this way, we could have done. Now they are bound to say that there was some kind of pressure on the deputies, or something. But no—you see, today has shown that both the president and the deputies are working in the interests of this state, and that there will not be any other state. Today I have understood the mistakes that we have made in our work in this body over the past seven months—we should always have had an agreement to work things out jointly. [end recording]

On the last day of parliament, the deputies ratified a major treaty on friendship and cooperation signed in February by the presidents of Belarus and Russia, and also Belarusian-Russian agreements, including one on customs union. It was following this that the positive result came up in the vote on the national referendum to be held on 14 May, on election day, on all four issues proposed by the president. It was with a feeling of a duty fulfilled that Belarus' corps of deputies had their photo taken together with the president for memory's sake.

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More on Lukashenka Address; Deputy Says President 'Lying'

WS1304133895 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1230 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At the parliamentary sitting of April 12, the leader of the opposition Zyanon Paznyak declared that "if troops are brought into the parliament it can no longer be regarded as a parliament," that the opposition could not work any more in the Oval Hall, would vacate it and simply continue the hunger-strike in another place. All the 19 MPs on hunger-strike went away and arrived at the Supreme Soviet press-centre.

Then Alyaksandr Lukashenka took the floor to state his version of the events that took place last night in the House of Government when a group of MPs was driven out of the Oval Hall by force. According to the President, he was aware of what was going on there as he was informed every 30 minutes by Mikhail Tsyasavets, Minister of Defence Anatol Kastenka and Leanid Sinitsyn by telephone. "Don't worry, nobody went without food here," Mr Lukashenka said, "Everything was here. Both things to eat and on which to sleep. And some people burst into here from the outside, bringing something to eat... Nobody would die of starvation in the Oval Hall."

Alyaksandr Lukashenka defined his role in this "incident" as follows: "The protection of the lives of the MPs on hunger-strike." "When I was informed of the anonymous telephone call I immediately thought it was a provocation," the President said, "I thought that they may want me to drive the MPs out of the building." And the President ordered to take him to the House of Government from his country residence. But, according to him, he was refused by his guards who could not guarantee his complete safety at that time. So, the President concluded, he could not have been in the House of Government that night as the hunger-strikers asserted. In the President's opinion, they "needed a turmoil in order to show the whole world a display of dictatorship in the centre of Europe." That is why he insisted on a cultural and delicate treatment of the hunger-strikers when they were "escorted" from the Oval Hall.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka stressed that the operation for the eviction of the MPs had not included reprisals with them. The President has available a VHS videotape on which all that took place in the Oval Hall that night was recorded and, according to him, when all this is rerecorded onto a tape meeting the standards of television material will be shown not only to the parliamentarians and the Prosecutor's Office but also to the public at large.

The President also told the parliamentarians that last night M. Tsyasavets "with tears in his eyes" informed him that "they cannot drive out the deputies in an amicable way, the hunger-strikers pulled out knives and threaten to cut their wrists and heads." "It is the limit, such actions in the House of Government!" the President declared. In his opinion, besides the hunger-strikers are MPs they are also citizens of Belarus and nobody allowed them to breach order in the official presidential residence.

As for the continuation of the hunger-strike, the President said: "I won't stand for any hunger-strikes in the building of the House of Government. We do not need such a laughing-stock. The same is for the other state administrative buildings both of the government and the Supreme Soviet." The hunger-strikers have not yet decided where they will continue their action.

Commenting on the President's speech in an interview with a BELAPAN correspondent [opposition deputy] Uladzimir Zablotski defined Lukashenka's statements that the hunger-strike was false and that they threatened with harm themselves as a lie. "When Lukashenka is lying we can take it easily but when the President is lying this is a tragedy," Mr Zablotski declared.

Supreme Soviet Concludes 'Extremely Productive' Session

WS1304130195 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1200 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Soviet concluded its session one hour ago. The deputies were extremely productive. This is testified to by the number of documents adopted today. They include [documents] on the customs union with Russia and the ratification of an agreement between Russia and Belarus on joint efforts to protect state borders. The deputies also considered and adopted addenda to legislation on awards, patents on plant species, local administration and self-government, service in the state apparatus, national holidays, and other documents.

Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka addressed the session, providing amendments and explanations to many draft laws.

Opposition Deputies End Hunger Strike

LD1304122295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1152 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By Belinform-TASS]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk, 13 Apr—Today opposition deputies in the Belarusian parliament, who went on hunger strike on 11 April, took a decision to stop it. Opposition leader Zenon Poznyak explained this decision by the fact that in the building of the Supreme Soviet, where the parliamentarians were going to continue their hunger strike, they were not allowed to be together and that the possibility of their repeated forceful removal could not be ruled out. Incidentally, he said that now the main task of the opposition is to prepare for new parliamentary elections.

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Moldova

Lebed: 14th Army Cannot Leave Dniester Within Three Years

LD1304184295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 13 (Interfax)—The commander of Russia's 14th army deployed in Trans-Dniester Aleksandr Lebed believes his army cannot leave Trans-Dniester within the next three years. Speaking in an interview he said there were three groups of reasons for that: political, economic and technical.

As a political reason Lebed described the results of the March 26 referendum in Trans-Dniestria, in which 93.3 percent of the population opposed the idea of the army's withdrawal. "To begin with I will be denied wagons and that will be the end of the withdrawal affair", General Lebed said.

About the economic reasons General Lebed said that Russia had no spare money before the beginning of the Chechen massacre, and now it had still less. He recalled that the army's withdrawal would require heavy financing.

As for the technical reasons, General Lebed said that the 15-kilometer long rail line leading to the 14th army's munitions depot had not been repaired for the past seven years. "It's good for nothing", General Lebed said. He believes that before it can be used to remove ammunition, experts must present their conclusion about the condition of the rail track. "Otherwise we will take the risk of having another Arzamas or something worse", General Lebed said.

He recalled that nothing was being done about any of the three problems. "We can say 'honey' a hundred times, but that would not make things sweeter. We must do business. There is no place for political likes and dislikes. There should be calm and impartial professional computation", General Lebed said.

Russia's Transdniester Moves Termed 'Intervention'

LD1304191295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moldovan President Mircea Snegur told a group of Moldovan journalists that "Russian deputies' presence at the referendum in Transdniester and the State Duma's possible consideration of the 14th Army's non-withdrawal caused amazement about Russia's true position on the Transdniester issue."

Snegur regarded this actions by "certain Russian circles" as "intervention in Moldova's internal affairs."

Snegur emphasized that the referendum "made the sociopolitical situation in the republic more tense." IF Note: At the referendum in Transdniester, the overwhelming majority of the population voted against pulling out the 14th Army from Transdniester saying it acted as guarantor of peace in Moldova.

Experts Fear 'Acute' Energy Crisis

AU1304125295 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930 GMT 10 Apr 95

["Economic Commentary: Energy Supply—Strategic Problem for Moldova"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 10/4/1995—Moldova is facing an acute energy crisis. The experts who stated this mention that "without a program for strengthening this area, the economic reform is jeopardized." According to official data, 60 percent of all thermal-electric equipment has been used for 21 years, and 40 percent for 26. The rate of energy used in production is seven times greater than in the West. "There is a financial blockage which threatens not only the functioning of the energy sector in the near future but also Moldova's independence," according to a report by the Academy of Sciences' Energy Institute. By the end of 1994, the energy sector owed its creditors 1,807 million lei ($410 million), including foreign ones 1,176 million lei. The energy program worked out by the Energy Institute is therefore of vital importance. Ion Comendant, one of the authors of this program, said the program aims at diversifying suppliers and fuels, increasing energy production, reducing debts for energy resources and revision of energy fees. "It is abnormal that over the last two years gas methane consumption exceeded 45 percent of the total," said Comendant, let alone that fuel is imported only from Russia that can surprise anyone at any time. On the other hand, "the uncertainty in resolving the Dniester dispute maintains a permanent tension regarding energy supply to the right bank of the Dniester." The 1992 political events as well the drop in Russian gas supplies revealed the vulnerability of the national energy system. Since there are no alternative energy sources, not only certain economic sectors will be blocked but also the entire economy. Experts think it is a mistake to raise the share of gas in energy production by setting up joint ventures. They propose to bring down the share of gas to 33 percent of all energy resources used. Advantageous for Moldova is considered the interconnection of Moldovan and Romanian electric networks, participation in the construction of the Atomic Power Station at Cernavoda, Romania, as well as the completion of the Giurgiulesti port by 1997. However, these projects are sometimes given a political nuance, which does not allow to fathom the economic advantages. According to the program by the Energy Institute, the energy resources consumption will rise from 8 million metric tons of conventional fuel in 1993 to 10 million in 2005. It is forecast that by 2005 electricity consumption will increase 36 percent, thermal

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energy consumption 36.2 percent and energy resources consumption 28 percent per capita. The program has to be put into practice in two steps: the first between 1998-2000 will include stabilization of the energy sector and after 2000 take-off of the energy sector. Government sources relayed that the Spanish company "Montreal" drew up a national energy program for Moldova as part of the TACIS [Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States] program. ECU two million ($2.6 million) were allotted for this program. The Energy Institute was allotted 25,000 lei from the budget. This sum is 8 times less than the sum required. Local observers point out that two years ago an energy program was worked out for the period until 2010, but it did not prove to be viable.

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Kazakhstan

Deputy Defense Minister Arrested for Abuse of Position

LD1304171395 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Russian 1400 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The wave of arrests of influential people is continuing in the republic.

As we have been informed by the republican Military Prosecutor's Office, its employees have detained Major General Valeriy Satpayev, the republic's deputy defense minister. He is accused of abusing his official position. An investigation is under way.

Kvyatkovskaya Denies Being Nazarbayev Pawn

954F2054A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 19, 19-26 Mar 95 p 11

[Article by Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, under the "Eurasia—Kazakhstan" rubric: "A Plaintiff's Tale"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **A citizen of Kazakhstan explains what prompted her to bring a suit that would result in disbandment of the republic's parliament. Many deputies are convinced that Kvyatkovskaya is a shill of the president, who wanted to usurp power. But Nazarbayev himself, speaking at the parliament, said that the decision of the Constitutional Court was a surprise to him and that the authorities had missed that trial. One may come to an understanding of who is right by turning to recent history.**

Outraged by the fact that my constituents and I had been frankly duped with the election results (the essence of my complaint consisted in the fact that the borders of the electoral districts were unfairly drawn), I filed a statement of claim at an ordinary court. And was turned rudely away. In this way, my constitutional rights and the Constitution itself were trampled twice over. The bureaucrats cynically demonstrated that they were all-powerful and that citizens were nobody. I had to seek protection from the Constitution itself and to turn to the Constitutional Court with my suit.

No one had any confidence that I would win my suit. Maybe just the electorate, who knew of my stubbornness from my previous journalistic work. But even they hoped at best only for repeat elections in Abylaykhanovskiy District only.

The trial dragged on for a year: I submitted to the rules that were dictated to me. I was planning to try to prove chiefly the unconstitutionality of the practice of applying the articles of the Election Code, but I was deprived of that possibility. The Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission] sent the Supreme Council an inquiry-request to explain whether the Constitutional Court had the right to examine the practice of applying the law, and filed a petition in court, in order that the matter not be considered before receipt of an answer. Everyone understood that there would never be any answer to the inquiry: That would be disadvantageous to the parliament.

The Constitutional Court apportions the administrative work, and by the time of the examination, it had only the Tsentrizbirkom decrees left. This did not seem dangerous to my opponents. Although the decree on the creation of the districts was what violated the norms of the code (the Abylaykhanovskiy district really is two or three times as large as the others in the capital), it was extremely complicated to prove that my constitutional rights had been violated at that time. Although what kind of equal rights of citizens can there be, if some elect a deputy from a population of 100,000 persons and others—from a population of only 16,000....

When I expanded my claims and asked the court also to evaluate from the point of view of constitutionality the Tsentrizbirkom decree on the methodology of calculating the votes, the ranks of the participants in the game experienced a shock, but a light one. Everyone continued to believe that it was a pocket court, that the authorities would not let anything happen, and at the very worst they would "give" that implacable Kvyatkovskaya just Abylaykhanovskiy District.

Those who wish to see in me a shill of the president hint that the judges themselves brought me around to the idea of expanding my claims and asking that all of the Tsentrizbirkom decrees on the formation of the districts be found unconstitutional, and not just the point that speaks about Abylaykhanovskiy District. The judges really did put that question to me; after all, in my concluding remarks I had used a comparative analysis by district. But they put that question to me most likely out of confusion. Formally, though, I refused to expand my claims. Why should I, in defending my personal constitutional rights, try to prove the unconstitutionality of other districts as well? It would be entirely sufficient that my electoral district, in number of voters, be brought into accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. It is not possible to do this without dragging in other districts? But pardon me, this is already outside the bounds of my suit; these are legal implications.

I understood that for me to expand my claims would be a saving chance for many. After that, the Tsentrizbirkom would have had grounds to request a routine break in the judicial process, in order to weigh, study, and come to a determination, and in this time, the parliament would have been able to abolish the Constitutional Court itself....

A great political game began after I, in my concluding remarks at the trial, laid out all my trump cards, which I had been holding till the final moment.

The Constitutional Court clearly did not expect to be driven into a corner, that compromise options would not be left for it. It was faced with either refusing to grant my suit on the material fully proven by me and forever to secure its own reputation as a pocket court, or to grant

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the suit. For a long time, the other branches of power have attempted to hold the Constitutional Court as merely a democratic screen. The trial dealing with my suit became for the Constitutional Court a marvelous chance to stand on its feet. The case was too famous for the court's decision to be ignored. And if the decision were acknowledged by the president, the political inviolability and independence of the Constitutional Court itself was assured.

In order to play such a game, a certain kind of courage was required of the judges, and they demonstrated it. The independence of the Constitutional Court is a great gain. After all, it is also a guarantee that the president will not exceed his authority, will not altogether refuse to conduct elections for a new parliament, will not attempt to replace his own election with a referendum, or otherwise to "fix" the Constitution.... Now any rank-and-file citizen will be able to turn to the Constitutional Court with a suit. It is hard to imagine that, having today presented himself in the eyes of his people and of the world community as a champion of legality and a defender of the Constitution, that tomorrow the president should himself encroach on the Constitutional Court.

The other active participant in the unfolding game was, of course, the parliament. But it turned out to be the least talented player. But then, the president bore himself magnificently. The motives behind all his actions in the present situation were almost irreproachable. I personally would have wanted only one more thing from the president: a public acknowledgement that the illegitimate parliament was his own creation.

Last year's elections after the extraordinary self-dissolution of the previous parliament and the local councils were held singlehandedly by the executive power; the overwhelming majority of those who came to parliament were its representatives, the "presidential" candidates.

Are early presidential elections, or their execution at the same time as the parliamentary elections, possible? Or the accomplishment of a referendum on amendments to the Constitution, with a "makeweight" on confidence in the president and his policy? The president will probably undertake something along these lines. The situation is completely suitable: Inarguably, the rating of Nursultan Nazarbayev, thanks to his observation of the Constitution, must rise. And if in addition to this he allows to be thrown on the scales of justice a few major mafiosi and corrupt officials, the people will exclaim in a literal chorus: Has there ever been another such candidate?!

But will the people be satisfied with a one-time triumph of the law? Can we, bewitched by political effects, forget without a trace that the main job of a head of state is to conduct such a policy as to improve the life of the people? It was precisely for this that the economic reforms were undertaken. Yes, in Kazakhstan the situation is better than in certain other CIS states. We have no civil war—blood does not flow like a river. But people are saying more and more loudly that their lives were not as hard as they are now even during the years of the war.

The president should be ready for the people to evaluate his rule through their standard of living and the prosperity of the state. Both in the event that the president becomes a usurper, justifying the most gloomy predictions (he will singlehandedly rewrite the Constitution, will drag out new parliamentary elections for years, will appoint to all state posts his own clansmen exclusively and will permit them to continue to plunder the state), and if he tries to become an "enlightened" one-man ruler and to do as much useful as possible for the states [as published].

The president has today entered this home stretch himself, voluntarily. There is no parliament—there is no longer anyone to keep him from improving the lives of the people. The 15 months of the latest government program, after which an improvement was promised, are running out. And soon every Kazakhstani will begin to sum up the work of the head of state.

The rank-and-file "citizen Kvyatkovskaya," having won her case in the Constitutional Court, has forced the president to enter into this difficult home stretch. Which means that she is no shill in any long-planned presidential game. It still only remains for the president to make his main play.

Production Association Issues Appeal Backing Nazarbayev

954F2072B Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 1

["From the Appeal of the Work Force of the Sokolovsko-Sarbay Mining-Concentrating Production Association to Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With every day that goes by, we treasure increasingly the tranquillity in our home. Against the background of the interethnic conflicts that are occurring in many republics of the former Soviet Union and that have brought death and loss of shelter to hundreds of thousands of people, the balanced policy of President N.A. Nazarbayev in the solution of nationality questions is a guarantee of the preservation of peace and tranquillity on our land.

N.A. Nazarbayev's initiative concerning the creation of a Eurasian Union is engendering hope of a calm and stable life not only among the people of Kazakhstan, but among other peoples of the CIS also. The president is actively championing a strengthening of legality and law and order for the eradication of crime in the republic. The Law and Order operational-preventive action, whose results we have felt in our city even today, is currently conducted today in all cities and villages.

The president is pursuing consistently for an upturn in the economy a policy of support of the commodity producers. The rates for electric power and railroad

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transportation were lowered as of 1 April. Paths of an improvement in the tax system have been charted.

Privileges have been created on the president's initiative for foreign investors in order to attract investments in Kazakhstan's economy. Thanks to the efforts of the president, the question of language and citizenship has been removed. A session of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan was held in the republic for the first time.

The president supports all ventures of the SSGPO [Sokolovsko-Sarbay Mining-Production Association]. The flawed practice of the shipment of the works' products on credit was ended as of last November. A contract concerning the transfer of management of the SSGPO to the Icelandic Ayvedon firm, which will guarantee the stable prepayment and clearance of all debts, has been concluded at government level.

The works' employees have received wages and advance payments regularly throughout recent months.

There was three times as much output in January-February of this year as in the corresponding period of last year.

Today the president has supported the producer, that is, the works. Tomorrow, standing on its own two feet, this producer will be able to pay taxes to the treasury in full. And what does the treasury mean? With its normal replenishment, medicine, education, and the law enforcement authorities can operate normally. And this means not only the physical but also the moral health of ourselves and our children. It means a tranquil old age for our fathers and mothers, who have by their hard life earned the right to a decent pension.

If you treasure your tranquillity and the tranquillity of your near ones and dear ones, we employees of the integrated works call on you to go to the polls on 29 April and support President N.A. Nazarbayev.

Commission Establishes Referendum Ballot

954F2068A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 2

[KazTAG article: "Ballot Form Approved"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By a decree of the Central Election Commission, a form of a ballot for voting in the republic referendum on 29 April has been approved. The ballot must be printed in the state language and the language of international communication or in the language of the majority of the population densely residing on the territory of the corresponding administrative-territorial unit. The words "Yes" and "No" (in the Kazakh, Russian, and other languages) on them shall be printed in blue, and the words "Leave the selected answer" and "No need to cross out" (in Kazakh, Russian, and other languages)—in red. The ballot will be 144 millimeters wide and 203 millimeters long.

Graphically, the blank form should look like this:

For voting in the republic referendum [centered]
BALLOT [centered]
29 April 1995 [centered]
Do you agree to extend until 1 December 2000 the term of office of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev, who was elected by all the people on 1 December 1991?
Yes (I agree) [in Kazakh and Russian]
Leave the selected answer
No (I do not agree)
No need to cross out [Text of blank form also rendered in Kazakh]

When organizing the voting, referendum commissions must be guided by Article 46 of the Election Code, in which it is written: "Every voter must vote in person; voting for other individuals will not be allowed. The ballot must be issued to the voters on the basis of election lists upon presentation of a document certifying the identity of the voter.

"Voters shall sign the list for receiving ballots.

"The commission member who issued the ballot shall place his signature on it and also sign the list across from the name of the voter who received the ballot.

"In the event that certain voters, because of their health or other reasons, are unable to vote in person, the precinct electoral commission at their request must organize voting in the place where these voters are located.

"In the event that no later than three days before the elections the voter has learned that he will not be able to be present in the polling place on the day of the elections, he shall have the right to obtain a ballot early from the precinct election commission. The voter shall sign the list upon receipt of the ballot. After filling out the ballot, the voter shall place it in an envelope, which shall be sealed and stamped or certified by the signatures of members of the election commission and turned over to the commission. The sealed envelope must be stored in the precinct election commission premises until the day of the voting."

Article 47 of the Election Code determines that "ballots filled out by absentee voters and stored in the precinct must on the day of voting be dropped into the ballot box in a sealed envelope by the chairman of the commission in the presence of other members before the beginning of general voting. At this time they shall make sure that the envelope is intact, the seal or signatures are on it, and also that the number of envelopes corresponds to the number noted on the list.

"The ballots shall be filled out by the voters in a secret voting booth or room. Nobody except the voter shall be allowed to be present during voting. A voter who is unable to fill out his ballot independently shall have the right to employ the assistance of an individual whom he trusts. This individual may not be a member of the election commission or representatives of candidates in attendance at the precinct."

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Upon voting, the citizen who is voting shall be instructed to cross out one of the answers indicated on the ballot—"Yes" or "No." A violation of this requirement by the voter shall invalidate the ballot in compliance with Article 28 of the edict of the head of our state, which has the force of a constitutional law, "On the Republic Referendum."

As we know, it establishes the following procedure for declaring a ballot invalid when tallying results of the republic referendum:

"Ballots of a different model from the one established and ballots which lack a signature of a member of the precinct election commission shall be declared invalid upon tallying the results of the referendum.

"Ballots shall also be declared invalid if:

"one of the proposed answers to the question raised has not been crossed out;

"both versions of the proposed answer to the question raised have been crossed out;

"for other reasons it is impossible to determine the will of the voter.

"A decision to declare a ballot invalid when tallying the results of the referendum shall be made by the precinct referendum commission. If there are differences of opinion, the question shall be resolved by the precinct commission through a vote."

In the event that there is consent to extend the term of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the citizen (voter) shall cross out the answer "No" and if he does not consent—"Yes."

Five-Party Joint Statement on Referendum

954F2067A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 2

[Joint political statement of the People's Unity of Kazakhstan Party, the People's Congress of Kazakhstan Party, the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, the Revival of Kazakhstan Party, and the People's Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan: "Referendum—Highest Manifestation of Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakhstan is at a complex stage of historical development as a sovereign state that has become a part of the world community. The events of 6-11 March connected with the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the republic on the illegitimacy of the Supreme Council gave rise initially to a parliamentary and, on the whole, a certain constitutional crisis. In this situation, when the president has in the past 18 months twice had to assume the discharge of legislative functions, the decision to hold a national referendum on 29 April 1995 on an extension of the presidential term to 1 December 2000 is logical and justified.

We reject the position that the referendum is contrary to the Constitution and that President N.A. Nazarbayev is endeavoring to extend his power in defiance of the popular will. On the contrary, a referendum is the highest manifestation of democracy and real confirmation that the people are the source of power. The people have the right to respond to a question of great state importance that has been posed directly, and the question that has been put to the referendum is such.

The main credit for the fact that there really is peace, tranquillity, and interethnic accord in Kazakhstan goes to the multinational people of Kazakhstan. But the personal factor of the head of state is of great significance also. It is for this reason not fortuitous that the people link stability in the country with the name of N.A. Nazarbayev.

We call on all political parties and public associations pursuing political ends and other organizations, displaying social harmony, to initiate extensive canvassing and propaganda for an extension of the term of the president of the republic to 1 December 2000. We have and, naturally, will continue to have disagreements in views on the model of the country's socioeconomic development, the state arrangement, and the forms of political democracy, but on one thing we are united—the aspiration to preserve interethnic peace and social harmony in the republic. And in this respect we support N.A. Nazarbayev, who has performed a pronounced role in the formation and development of a multiparty system in Kazakhstan.

We call for 29 April to be made a day of unity of all Kazakhstanis, for no reforms are possible without the unity of the people.

[Signed] K. Sultanov, chairman of the People's Unity of Kazakhstan Party Central Committee
V. Rogalev, first deputy chairman of the People's Congress of Kazakhstan Party
Ye. Yertsybayev, cochairman of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan
A. Zhaganova, chairman of the Revival of Kazakhstan Party
U. Sarsenov, chairman of the People's Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan

Rudnyy Miners Support Nazarbayev

954F2072A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Bulat Yerezhepov: "Miners Support the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of representatives of the work force of the Sokolovsko-Sarbay Mining-Production Association devoted to the upcoming referendum has been held in the city of Rudnyy. Worker meetings had preliminarily been held in all subdivisions of the association, and, judging by the speeches, the 25,000-strong collective of miners of Rudnyy is of an unequivocal and decisive mind to vote for an extension

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of the president's term to the year 2000. Machine operators, drivers, electricians, and engineers mounted the rostrum one after the other, and all said that it was thanks to Nazarbayev that interethnic harmony had been preserved in the republic, that the president was fighting perseveringly for the integration of the republics of the former USSR, and that his initiatives are given high marks throughout the world. Yet quite recently, even, Rudnyy was the most socially tense point on the map of the oblast—public meetings and strikes over the late payment of wages were directed precisely against the former government. But, as the miners now believe, it is thanks to the president that there has been an abrupt change for the better in the association's position. The power engineers had intended as of 1 April to double the electric power rates, but, as directed by the president, they have halved them. The government also has lowered the rate of railroad shipments by 30 percent. Gas has become only half as expensive, and for an association in which energy sources constitute two-thirds of the prime costs of output, this is more than appreciable assistance. The government's decision to transfer the SSGPO [Sokolovsko-Sarbay Mining-Production Association] to management by a foreign company has contributed to a stabilization of the operation of the enterprise also. A steady sales market has appeared. The Ayvedon firm has assumed all the debts of the SSGPO and is investing funds in the association's recovery. As a result, the miners are today regularly receiving not only their pay but advance payment also. The SSGPO's related subcontractors have been made aware of the support also, and the local treasury has been replenished considerably. The confident tread of the SSGPO has had a positive effect on the life of the city and the oblast.

In the opinion of Mikhail Bazhenov, general director of the SSGPO, and the work force supports him here, were there to be new presidential elections, there could be two years of anarchy in the republic. Everyone would for a year be involved in preparations for the elections, and a further year would be spent in adapting and trying on for size, and the economy would fall apart. This cannot be allowed.

Aleksandr Mashkevich, vice president of the Ayvedon firm, who took part in the meeting of representatives of the SSGPO work force, observed that, thanks to Nazarbayev's efforts, good conditions had been created in the republic for the attraction of foreign capital. It was for this reason that Ayvedon was in Kazakhstan, and it is far easier and more pleasant for foreign firms to operate here than in any other republic of the former USSR.

Aleksandr Mashkevich observed also that in the West and throughout the world, Nazarbayev is considered a great politician, and that many politicians and businessmen have faith in him.

The meeting of representatives of the SSGPO work force showed clearly that President Nazarbayev is appreciated and supported where people have known how to avail themselves of the economic and political conditions created by the president and the government for enterprises and territories. After all, the finest edicts and decrees will be insufficient if people cannot or are unwilling to work better.

The people of Rudnyy can and are willing. And they are today supporting their president not only in word but in deed also. The meeting of representatives of the SSGPO work force adopted an appeal to all citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan that they support the decision of the first session of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan and vote for an extension of the president's term to the year 2000.

Ministry Production Plans Focus on Gold

954F2037A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 13, 1 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Drozd: "At the Collegium of the Ministry of Industry Attention Was Focused on Gold Mining"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 30 March there was a meeting of the Ministry of Industry and Trade collegium. Four questions were on the agenda: the draft of the concept Gold of Kazakhstan, the course of the implementation of the program for business reorganization of the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine and the Pavlodar Aluminum Plant Joint-Stock Company, measures for overcoming the production recession and developing ferrous metallurgy enterprises of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the program for computerization of the ministry.

The project Gold of Kazakhstan, developed by the Altynalmas Company with the participation of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the national joint-stock company Kazakhstan Tusti Metallary, envisions a sixfold increase in the production of gold ore in order to achieve an annual gold production of 50 tonnes by the year 2000. And it states in the program that the only possible way of achieving this is by developing in the next five years areas that require minimum expenditures and risk. This includes bringing to full capacity the enterprises under construction on the basis of the Bakyrchikskoye, Vasilkovskoye and Akbakayskoye fields, the creation of additional production capacities for processing gold ores through the construction of new enriching factories and the reconstruction of old ones, the construction of installations for heap leaching of gold from poor and ballasted ore, reconstruction of the hydrometallurgical plant of the Tselinnyy Mining-Chemical Combine for processing ore containing arsenic, concentrates and gold pyrite cinders from sulfuric acid production, and also the organization of refining with the maximum possible use of free production space and professionally trained labor resources. In order to implement the programs it is intended to spend about $1.5 billion in six years, and $1 billion is to be covered with outside funds (domestic and foreign investments, bank credit).

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It was noted at the meeting of the collegium that the gold industry is one of the few branches which can actually count on special attention from the authorities and investors. Predictions of geologists show that the raw material base in the country makes it possible to maintain a level of gold production of 500 tonnes a year for the period up to the year 2005, and with the assimilation of the funds envisioned for geological prospecting, for the longer- range future. The need to adopt such a program is justified also by the fact that since 1993 the Ural plants have limited the acceptance and processing of flux ores from Altynalmas, and this tendency will obviously continue in the future. The mines of the largest deposits of Kazakhstan contain arsenic: This makes it impossible to work them by the traditional methods because of ecological counterindications, which creates the need to introduce fundamentally new technologies in Kazakhstan's gold mining industry.

The program's developers are presenting the following scheme for attracting the funds that are lacking: 1995—$302.46 million, 1996—$319.44 million, 1997—$252.14 million, 1998—$55.09 million, 1999—$83.09 million, and 2000—$48.97 million. It is planned to invest $72.4 million centrally from Altynalmas and $287 million—directly from the enterprises. The gold mining industry is requesting the introduction of tax benefits and exemption from income tax for members of gold prospecting teams, thus restoring their previous status.

The collegium considered the situation at Karmetkombinat. It was noted that during past months there has been a certain growth of production in terms of the main indicators as compared to last year. Thus the production of coke increased by 10.8 percent, iron—8.75 percent, steel—11.5 percent, rolled metal—17.5 percent, and tin plate—86.6 percent. There was also a reduction of expenditures per 1 tenge of finished product. But for radical financial improvement the combine will have to attract credit resources for a total of no less than $130 million to supplement working capital. So far there are no apparent sources of such credit—before 15 April the department in conjunction with the ferrous metallurgy department must submit suggestions regarding this. In addition to inadequate attention paid to the amortization policy the management system was criticized as "not making it possible to have reliable accounting, effective control, or correct comparison of expenditures and results."

The collegium was especially interested in considering the condition of the Pavlodar Aluminum Plant where for the first time in the practice of domestic industry management has been turned over to a foreign firm. During the three months that have passed since the contract was signed they have managed to agree on the sales of annual volumes of alumina (122 percent of 1994 amount) at a competitive price with prepayment. At the same time they are fully satisfying Kazakhstan's needs—42,000 tonnes a year. During the past months the monetary receipts have amounted to 3.3 billion tenge. During three months the local administrative personnel and the Uytsven [as transliterated] Limited firm have managed to repay debts amounting to $1.3 million and 1 billion Russian rubles—to associates. Contracts were concluded with firms for receiving commercial credit in the amount of 522 million for acquiring soda ash, 15,000 tonnes of caustic soda, 400,000 tonnes of goal, 170,000 tonnes of fuel oil, and 50,000 tonnes of diesel fuel. Indebtedness on wages has been repaid and social programs are being maintained or increased: The quarterly stipend for pensioners will be doubled, and for pensioners living in private homes 3 tonnes of coal is to be delivered free of charge while the subsidy for reducing the cost of food will be 2 million tenge. Among the enterprise's remaining extremely crucial problems is the introduction of new technologies into production and also improvement of containers and packaging and the acquisition of an aluminum granulator, which will make it possible to raise the prices of products by approximately 20 percent.

The ministry collegium, taking into account the extremely difficult situation of ferrous metallurgy and in order to prevent further decline, has given instructions to prepare within a month's time calculations and a justification to be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for the allotment of preferential long-term credit for supplementing working capital in the amount of 18 billion tenge. Social and cultural facilities are to be transferred to the balance sheets of the local organs and it is planned to propose to the Cabinet of Ministers that a centralized fund for the branch's development be formed with deductions from the production cost.

Among the priority construction programs subject to priority financing with credit the collegium mentioned the objects of the raw material base. At the present time negotiations are continuing with foreign firms for investment in projects at the Zharemskiy Manganese Combine, the Tishinskiy mine, and the Shalkiya mine and the 50-Letiya Oktyabrya mine. Joint ventures have been created with foreign firms for working the Kayraktinskiy and Kumystinskiy fields and processing production wastes in Leninogorsk.

Prospects for Baykonur, Leninsk Reviewed

954F2047A Almaty SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 2

[Interviews with Gennadiy Dmitriyenko, head of the Leninsk city administration, and Yergazy Nurgaliyev, the Republic of Kazakhstan's special representative at the Baykonur space launch station and the city of Leninsk, by Galina Kryuchkova and Valeriy Khizhnyak; place and date not given: "Here Starts the Road to the Stars"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The fate of the Baykonur space launch station and the city of Leninsk continues to concern all Kazakhstan residents. The opinion that the republic's "space harbor" must be preserved is unanimous. However, in the current circumstances it can only exist on the basis of international cooperation. The space complex's huge potential must serve all people of the Earth.**

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At the same time, there are quite a few problems associated with the space station's lease. Some of them are discussed in the interviews conducted by our correspondents, which we now offer to our readers.

1. Running the City Requires New Structures: Interview With Gennadiy Dmitriyenko

The head of the Leninsk city administration is Gennadiy Dmitriyenko, a citizen of Russia. A colonel who served at the Baykonur space launch station for more than 20 years. In keeping with the agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia, he was appointed by the edict of President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, with the concurrence of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev.

We talked to him on the eve of his trip to Almaty, where he was to meet with the head of our state.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Gennadiy Dmitriyevich, what did you decide to deal with first, and what you have put aside for later?

[Dmitriyenko] Following the decisions of the two presidents, I assumed my duties as the administration head, and familiarized myself with the city's municipal services and the work of the previous administration. One thing became clear: The old methods of work may have been correct for that period, but now we cannot conduct business this way.

It had been a little more than half a year since the presidents signed a lease agreement on the Baykonur space launch station and Leninsk. This meant that since Baykonur was here to stay, so was Leninsk.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Which means that city authorities are needed in addition to military ones.

[Dmitriyenko] Naturally. The military should take care of their own business, and the civilian authorities—theirs. Unfortunately, it so developed over time that for many decades the city authorities here existed in name only. It is not their fault—rather, it is their misfortune. The city housing and municipal sector was in the hands of the military, and the executive authority existed in a truncated form, for all intents and purposes simply as a ceremonial body. Because of this, the population's attitude toward the city authorities is, shall we say, cool. Because, as I said, decisions on all matters were in the hands of the military. And now, having encountered directly the state of our city's municipal services and the tasks that have been passed over to me, it became absolutely clear to me that this administration is unable to handle the city's municipal services. This is the foremost, and acute, issue.

There is no real, strong administrative apparat, the needed structures. A lot of things have to be put together from scratch. And you would agree that it is always difficult to create something, especially these days. Especially considering that relations between the military and the administration probably are not always right either.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Right now you yourself, Gennadiy Dmitriyevich, having taken off your colonel's uniform, have become a civilian and apparently have suddenly felt yourself uncomfortable, have you not?

[Dmitriyenko] You know, this is the right word: uncomfortable. In what sense? You assume your duties, put two flags—Russian and Kazakhstani, the symbols of two states—behind your chair, but this does not mean that you have acquired authority. Until you take the city's municipal services into your hands, until you tighten all the screws to make this huge wheel turn smoothly, without squeaking and stops, without disruptions, constantly gaining speed, you will have no authority.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Right now new departments, new city structures are being set up in Leninsk; are you putting things in a new order?

[Dmitriyenko] Yes, you may put it this way. But we should not reinvent the wheel. We are simply continuing what was done and in a way somewhat expanding what has been. By now the protocol of transfer of the city municipal services has been signed, and in principle it is all ours.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Does it mean that military structures are completely removing themselves both from housing maintenance and municipal services?

[Dmitriyenko] No, at this point we have not yet put together the departments that should handle it. But one thing I know: If we procrastinate, if we begin to create city structures without having full authority over the city...

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] You will again find yourself in the position of figureheads, who ostensibly represent the authority but in reality have none?

[Dmitriyenko] Yes, and all our intentions will not materialize, as happened on the scale of the former Union. For instance, in the USSR there existed a construction industry corporation, and an industry corporation. Juggernauts, huge structures were created, but for all practical purpose they did not have clearly defined tasks. There was no control over the money flow.... In a way, Leninsk has incorporated most fully all the shortcomings, all the contradictions that exist today, after the disintegration of the Union. So we have to define as clearly as possible the spheres of influence. First it was legally formalized that the city is ours; then an agreement was reached with the military that for the time being—I emphasize, for the time being, temporarily—they will continue handling the municipal services, while we are creating the structures needed to run the city. That is, the personal responsibility of both the administration and the military already has been defined.

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[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Gennadiy Dmitriyevich, so the responsibility and the authority have been established. What about finances, without which no authority can exist? After all, it is precisely the financial part that was the point of contention between Russia and Kazakhstan for the past several years.

[Dmitriyenko] You know, this is the sorest spot. In the past, for instance, we went to the capitals—Almaty and Moscow—to fight for allocation of resources and equipment; now it is money, money, money.... The hopeful sign is that the draft 1995 budget of the Russian Federation contains the figure 161 billion rubles [R]. Now we are told that this figure has been adjusted, and the city budget will get R185 billion. The Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan now has presented its draft budget, which contains a separate line item: 550 million tenge for the maintenance of city structures of Leninsk and Akay and Tyuratam settlements, which also are part of the city. If we get all this money, we will have the real ability to do a lot in terms of maintaining the city infrastructure.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Everything will be enumerated and approved.... As it stands now, however, almost entire Leninsk is sitting without money. Budget organizations are without financing since January; salaries are not paid. And on top of this, delays in paying salaries are becoming a habitual and permanent thing in both Russia's and Kazakhstan's agencies.

[Dmitriyenko] Absolutely correct. We are working on it now, and hope that this vitally important problem will be removed any time now.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] And something else. Both Russia and Kazakhstan are responsible for Leninsk's financing. Does it mean that Russia provides money for Leninsk, and Kazakhstan—for the Akay and Tyuratam settlements?

[Dmitriyenko] Not exactly. The agreement says that Kazakhstan participates in the maintenance of infrastructure and development of the social base of Leninsk, and maintains Akay and Tyuratam. Hence dual financing. But it is necessary for the money to come in a single flow. Therefore, it is desirable, as we discussed with Kazakhstan's Minister of Finance, Aleksandr Pavlov, for your government to route its money flow through Russia, from those $115 million Russia is supposed to pay for the lease of the space station. The 550 million tenge envisaged by Kazakhstan and converted into Russian rubles will go directly from Russia to Leninsk. This is the way we figure it.

As to difficulties, naturally, they exist and will remain. The lease agreement says that Leninsk is an administrative-territorial unit of Kazakhstan. This is unequivocal, and this is the way it should be. At the same time, it is necessary, and this is also written in the agreement, to preserve and protect the legal rights of Russian and Kazakhstani citizens.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Does that mean that two legal systems, two constitutions, the law of both Kazakhstan and Russia, should be in effect on the same territory?

[Dmitriyenko] And how will that work in real life? Of course, we can make arrangements with, for instance, law enforcement structures: If a crime is committed by a citizen of Kazakhstan, apply your state's law to him; and if it is a Russian citizen—deal with him, respectively, in accordance with our law. But what do you do if citizens of both countries are involved in the same case? Whose procuracy, whose court will have the jurisdiction? A lot of such questions come up, and will in the future.

The most important point, however, is the status of the city. On the one hand, Leninsk is the Republic of Kazakhstan's city, with everything this entails; on the other hand, it is leased to Russia, which forms its team and manages all city structures. How do we reconcile these two situations? Is it possible? It seems to be. But as soon as you tackle the city problems, especially those involving social security and issuance of pensions and salaries, you run into a dead end. And unless specialists, jurists, economists, and sociologists sit down at a "roundtable" right now, not in the capitals but right here, in the city, together with us, and arrive at a solution, difficulties will continue to mount. And I think that wherever there is a discrepancy in the laws of our states on particular aspects, we need to arrive at some third option, find a compromise. Let us write a statute of Leninsk, or rather, a constitution of the city of Leninsk. This will be a legal document governing our life.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] You were in Moscow and are planning to go to Almaty; you have met at different levels with top officials of both governments, visited many government departments, many departments of the president's administration. Were you resolving any particular problems, or was this simply an introduction of the new head of city administration?

[Dmitriyenko] In Moscow, the government commission on Baykonur from the Russian Federation side was convened at our initiative. All problems I have just enumerated were brought up at the commission, and at our initiative a letter was drafted to President Boris Yeltsin, which also outlines priority problems requiring resolution at the government level. The letter also contains a proposal to make Leninsk again a closed city, with all the attendant consequences. This is necessary, because Leninsk is the heart of the space launch station, and there should be strict order in it in every respect.

As to Almaty, I am only going there now; visits to high offices, meetings, trudging along the corridors of power—this is all still ahead of me. I hope to find understanding there too. It cannot be otherwise.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] You have outlined the difficulties with respect to city's municipal services. What about the residents? Because everything we were

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talking about—two authorities, military and civilian; two constitutions, Kazakhstani and Russian—inevitably affect the people too.

[Dmitriyenko] Actually, the people are what the new administration concentrated its first efforts on. I will tell you right away that I, as the head of city administration, do not intend to drastically change the "team" that existed before I came in. People work well and know what they are doing, so why have change for the sake of change? Of course, some change is indeed necessary. But in structure, not personnel. This is on the subject of the apparat.

Now about the city population as a whole. Since the first day of the new administration, we have been studying the quantitative and qualitative composition of Baykonur inhabitants. The problem is purely ours, Leninsk-specific: 2,000 empty apartments—and squatters. Almost 3,000 apartments, which is one-seventh of the city's housing stock, have been taken over by squatters; 6,500 persons live here without a residence permit. And this is happening in a restricted-access city.

We have decided to introduce temporary residence permits. Over this period of time, I think, the problem can be resolved: Those who want to live and work here legally will stay; those who do not will leave. For this purpose a special expert commission has been created.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] You have already mentioned two flags in the beginning of the conversation—Kazakhstan's and Russia's.

[Dmitriyenko] Yes, as you can see, they are both in my office, right behind my back. And as head of the administration, I will predicate my work on the equality of two states, two constitutions. Although I am a Russian citizen, I have great respect for Kazakhstan. It could not be otherwise. It is here, in Kazakhstan, at the Baykonur space launch station, that I have developed as a person, as a specialist; I have given half of my life to Baykonur. So I am a Leninsk old-timer. And since it so happened that I became the first head of the Russian authority in Leninsk, I will try to see that the city I love will live a full life, that all problems get resolved in a timely manner, and that this "little corner of Moscow" in the Kazakhstani land regains its old pretty and cozy look, its old image of a peaceful city.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Will you succeed?

[Dmitriyenko] Time will tell.

2. One Pain, One Hope—Interview With Yergazy Nurgaliyev

By the edict of President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, Yergazy Nurgaliyev has been appointed Republic of Kazakhstan's special representative at the Baykonur space launch station and the city of Leninsk.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Yergazy Meyrgaliyevich, your first steps in the new capacity?

[Nurgaliyev] I must say that my personal plans for the future were somewhat different. I highly appreciate the president's confidence in me, and realize the responsibility: You have to be not just a specialist and civil servant, but also to a certain extent a diplomat, learn the laws of both our republic and Russia. I absolutely cannot be a outside observer or duplicate to any extent the actions of city authorities.

I have to seriously think through all the functions. The status is only now being defined; the representation staff roster is being approved. The staff probably will include five to seven specialists; I think we definitely need a jurist and a specialist on liaison with military structures.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] Yergazy Meyrgaliyevich, a little about yourself, your life and work at the space launch station.

[Nurgaliyev] I have lived here for 18 years; my children were born here. First I was in the military, and then worked in the Main Construction Administration—also a military structure. Learned on the job in the Leninsk bodies of executive authority: as deputy chairman of the city executive committee, the city's chief architect, chairman of the city committee on the management of state property. In short, I know Baykonur and Leninsk and their sore points firsthand, and believe that I have a good grip on the situation.

Of course, these are not the best times in Leninsk. Like in a drop of water, all the difficulties and contradictions of the transition period that are characteristic of both Kazakhstan and Russia are concentrated here. And we, Baykonur old-timers, share common pain for the current state of the space harbor, and the common hope that these problems are temporary and that Russia and Kazakhstan can handle the task of raising the space launch station to the level needed not only by these two states and the entire CIS, but also by other countries of our world community.

Naturally, today Kazakhstan is unable to independently utilize Baykonur. Nevertheless, fate has placed this space launch station on our land, and we must, together with Russia and other countries, use most fully the huge potential we possess.

Our National Aerospace Agency (NAKA) does a lot in this respect. For instance, it contributed a lot into drafting the package of documents on the treaty and agreement on the joint utilization of the space launch station; the agency has excellent specialists and research staff. And I think that in the near future the NAKA will be able—jointly with respective Russian structures, of course—to conduct its Kazakhstani space program on the world level. But, I want to emphasize once again, jointly, through combined efforts of the two countries. Because without friendship, unity, and interaction, we cannot rebuild the space launch station.

My task is to facilitate this interaction between the two states—naturally, while strictly watching out for Kazakhstan's interests; to protect the rights of Kazakhstan

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citizens working and living here, at Baykonur. The most important aspect of my work since my first days here has been liaison with all Russian agencies represented in Baykonur. Together with the city administration, I have been working intensely for a month with Kazakhstan ministries and agencies, drafting those additional documents that go, as I already mentioned, in the same package with the lease agreement. There are a total of 28 of them, and in time all of them will be presented for ratification to the two parliaments: the Kazakhstani and Russian.

I should mention here that I have acquired considerable expertise working on the treaty and agreement during the initial development of these documents, the provisions of Baykonur's transfer to Russia on lease. Leninsk's first administration, headed by Vitaliy Brynkin, did a lot to shape the agreement the way it currently is. This is already Baykonur and Leninsk's history, and we have to remember this.

Now, together with Gennadiy Dmitriyenko, head of the new—this time Russian, not Kazakhstani—administration, we find the lines of interaction, define the spheres where my participation is necessary, and make joint decisions on the matters of city financing, since both Russia and Kazakhstan participate in it.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] The matters of financing, however, although they have been agreed on, are not yet resolved?

[Nurgaliyev] Kazakhstan's Ministry of Finance, in keeping with the agreement between the two states on Baykonur space launch station, put into the draft 1995 budget a line item that Kazakhstan is allocating 550 million tenge for social development of the city of Leninsk and Akay and Tyuratam settlements. This is approximately one-seventh of the amount allocated for these purposes by Baykonur's lessee—Russia. And since we are the state that possesses such a unique complex as Baykonur, we also need to make our contribution. Leninsk is a city in our republic, and more than half of its population are Kazakhstanis.

[SOVETY KAZAKHSTANA] When you speak of the Kazakhstani population of Leninsk, do you mean those Kazakhstanis who work directly in the space launch station's structures or everyone living in Leninsk?

[Nurgaliyev] There are quite a few people living in Leninsk now who do not have residence permits, have moved into vacant apartments without authorization. They have moved here mainly from the epicenter of the ecological disaster zone in the Aral Sea area—from Aralsk and Kazalinsk. Yes, we have serious difficulties in this respect. But first some statistics.

The city itself, and the Akay and Tyuratam settlements within its borders, have the population of 72,000. Of the adult population (since citizenship is only conferred on people fully of age), 17,000 are citizens of Russia, and more than 22,000—citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Hence, if we include children in this count, more than 50 percent of the Leninsk population are Kazakhstanis. The ethnic composition is as follows: 16,000 Russians, 21,000 Kazakhs, slightly less than 2,000 Ukrainians, and about as many members of other ethnic groups. Of the 31,000 employed, only 27,000 work in space-related organizations.

The rate of unemployment also is very high. Up to 17 percent of adult population are currently out of work. This is only according to the labor administration's data; in reality the figures are higher. The paradox is that most Russian structures, including military ones, have plenty of vacancies. Naturally, people without a residence permit are not hired. However, in my opinion, the city administration has found the right solution to this problem: All 6,500 persons without a residence permit will get temporary permits. This will give a chance to everyone living in Leninsk, shall we say, without legal grounds, to solve their employment problems and legitimize their stay in the restricted city.

The city labor department will inventory all available vacancies, organize short courses for training and retraining in professions needed by the city and the garrison, and will help the unemployed to find a place. Of course, it is unlikely that we will get highly skilled specialists as a result of this work: One can hardly find intellectuals or competent engineering and technical personnel among the unemployed. But there are also a tremendous number of people who are willing to take any job, get trained in blue-collar jobs. And what the administration currently proposes is the best way out of the existing situation.

As you can see, the city and the space launch station have plenty of problems. What is encouraging is that since the beginning of the year, both states have begun searching for solutions, so to say, as a team. The high-level meeting between the two presidents—Nursultan Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin—that recently took place in Moscow, and the summit of the heads of CIS members countries in Almaty; the questions raised there inspire hope that our countries will find a common road, will establish economic ties that currently are barely alive but will become firm in the future. And I think that the Eurasian Union, proposed by our President Nursultan Nazarbayev, is becoming a reality.

Which means that both the problems of Leninsk and those of Baykonur as a whole will now be resolved more promptly. I would like to see space exploration priorities, only recently so real, not lost, but on the contrary, considerably strengthened.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Departs For Kazakhstan Summit; Agenda Detailed

LD1404081695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0724 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek April 14 TASS—Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev has left for south Kazakhstan today to attend a one-day summit of heads of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

According to well-informed sources, one of the main topics on the agenda of the summit of heads of Central Asian states is expected to be the escalation of combat operations on the Tajik-Afghan border. The Kyrgyz leadership has taken a firm position on this problem—to resolve the conflict by peaceful means at the negotiating table. Kyrgyz border guards are taking part in the CIS peace keeping contingent guarding the southern borders of the CIS.

Bishkek officials do not want Kyrgyz border guards to be involved in combat operations on the territory of neighboring Tajikistan. Memories of clashes between the Kyrgyz and Tajiks in the Batken valley in 1989 over irrigation facilities, which led to bloodshed, are still fresh in the minds of the people of the Republic. In comparison with violence reported nowadays one or two people who died in the local conflict then might seem insignificant, but someone might at any time remind of the tragedy, bringing it to the fore. Therefore, no one can tell what the relations between the neighboring people will be like if someone decides to do so.

Apparently, participants in the Chimkent summit will not leave out the problem of the extension of the powers of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev until the year 2000. This problem was raised by some lawmakers of the new parliament of the Republic. Local political observers believe that Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov who have already made a similar choice would attempt to persuade Askar Akayev to hold a referendum.

It is difficult to say yet what steps the Kyrgyz president might take. But one might say with a greater degree of confidence that the Kyrgyz president will not agree to a referendum for the time being. A considerable number of lawmakers are against it. Speaker of the chamber of the Kyrgyz people's assembly Almambet Maturbraimov has made an unequivocal statement to this effect at a meeting with journalists on Thursday. "It is not the right time now to hold a referendum,"—the speaker pointed out.

Bishkek Fears More Drug Trafficking From Tajikistan

LD1304150195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1044 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, April 12 (Interfax)—Drug trafficking into Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan has been mounting, Aleksandr Zelichenko, deputy chairman of Kyrgyzstan's state commission for control over narcotics, declared to Interfax Wednesday [12 April].

According to him, about 500 kilograms of opium poppy-seed were confiscated from smugglers last year, and 90 kilograms over the last three months. Zelichenko reported that a few days ago, on the Osho-Khorog highway, linking Kyrgyzstan with Tajikistan, custom officers had confiscated as a result of one inspection alone the biggest ever batch of opium poppy-seed of 88 kilograms. In the meantime, over five years since 1989 to 1993 alone, no more than 20 kilograms of this drug were seized in Kyrgyzstan.

Zelichenko claims that republican law enforcement officers confiscate 8-10 percent of all the drugs sought to be smuggled through Kyrgyzstan. Interpol experts regard the Osh-Khorog highway as "the most prospective ways for developing international narcotics business", Zelichenko said, blaming that on poverty in Afghanistan and Badakhshan, Tajikistan, where people peddle drugs to earn their living.

Islamic Bank Representative in Bishkek To Discuss Energy

LD1304171095 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 0900 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Islamic Bank mission led by Dr. [name indistinct] has arrived in Bishkek. Talks on the decision of the Board of Directors of the bank to allocate $250,000 to study the sales market for Kyrgyz energy in Central Asia, Pakistan, and other regions were held at the Kyrgyzenergoholding [Kyrgyz Power Holding] state joint-stock company.

The further production of small transformers for rural areas by the Tempo [as heard] Turkish-Kyrgyz joint venture was the second important question [discussed] at the talks. The representatives of the joint venture made a request to the Islamic Bank to make available an $8 million credit. If this question is resolved favorably, the demand and requirements for small transformers might be met on the markets of both countries.

Tajikistan

Attacks Continue on Border Units in Gorno-Badakhshan

LD1304164695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1516 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, April 13 (Interfax)—Tajik opposition militants continue using mortars and small arms against the first post of the Khorog border unit in Gorno-Badakhshan, East Tajikistan.

The Chief of Staff of the Russian Border Force in Tajikistan Major General Vladimir Novikov told Interfax Thursday that Russian border guards backed by aircraft are retaliating. He said there have been no losses among border guards today.

Reports from the post speak of killed and wounded among the militants, but it has been impossible so far to determine their exact number.

Novikov stressed that the first post will not surrender its positions under any circumstances. Its arsenals have

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been replenished by ammunition and arms, reinforcements have arrived, the general said.

He said Tajik government troops were not involved in the clashes. Neither have there been talks with field commanders of opposition groups attacking Russian border guards in the region.

A military source in the Tajik capital told Interfax that 500 Tajik border guards were transferred from other parts of the country to guard the border with Afghanistan in Gorno-Badakhshan.

A mourning ceremony was held Thursday at an army unit in Dushanbe for eleven border guards killed at the beginning of the week by militants. Three of them from Russia and eight from Tajikistan defended the frontier post Dashti-Yazgulem belonging to the Khorog border unit.

Local residents constitute 90 percent of the personnel of the Russian border force in Tajikistan.

Border Post Near Khorog Under Grenade Attack

LD1304195095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1605 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe April 13 TASS—Another "hot spot" has been reported at the Pamir site of the Tajik-Afghan border. Frontier post Barchid near Khorog, administrative centre of Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan autonomy, came under fire from grenade-launchers at 16:30 local time on Thursday. Fighting continues. No data on casualties have been reported yet.

A source at the Russian border troops' command in Tajikistan told TASS that the attack had been performed by one of Pamir groups of militants. The situation at the first frontier post of the Khorog border unit also remains tense, as sporadic shelling continues.

Recent statements by the Pamir opposition leaders indicate either their "hypocrisy or inability to handle the situation", according to the source. The opposition leadership announced recently they would halt active combat actions until the end of talks between official Dushanbe and the opposition. These talks are scheduled to be held in Moscow on April 17.

Furthermore, radical Pamir groups do not make secret of the fact that they are waiting for reinforcements to come from Afghan settlement Bahorak. It is also known that a 250-men-strong reserve group of Tajik mujahids is approaching the settlement, the source stressed.

Fighting Spreads Around Gorno-Badakhshan

LD1304171895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DUSHANBE, April 13 (Interfax)—The area of fighting between Russian border guards and the Tajik opposition's militants in Gorno-Badakhshan (an autonomous region in Tajikistan) became larger today, the press center of the Group of Russian Border Guard Troops in Tajikistan command told Interfax.

A unit of the Tajik armed opposition led by Zainetdin attacked the Khorog Barchid border regiment (5 kilometers to the north of Khorog, the region's administrative center) today at 16:30. Precise information on casualties among border guards will be available later.

A grouping of another field commander Mullo Umar is now trying to create a corridor for militants penetrating from Afghanistan into Tajikistan on the same section of the border.

The Russian Federal Border Guard Service said that military actions were being escalated while some informal leaders of the Gorno-Badakhshan self-defense units were declaring that they were ready to hold talks on normalizing the situation.

The situation around the First border post of the Khorog border regiment remains tense. Border guards have been coming under fire from various kinds of armaments.

More on Clashes; 6 Border Guards Killed

LD1404055595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0523 GMT 14 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe, 14 Apr—Six servicemen of the Khorog border detachment, including one Russian soldier, were killed on the evening of 13 April in a clash, which lasted three hours, with a Pamir opposition group at the village of Parchid. The entire group numbering up to 50 men was destroyed, including its field commander Mullo Umar, ITAR-TASS was told today at the press center of the command of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan.

The armed militants ambushed a truck convoy of the Khorog border detachment as it proceeded from Dashti-Yazgulem to the administrative center of Gorno-Badakhshan, despite the fact that an agreement on unimpeded movement of the column had been reached earlier between the border troops and the opposition leaders, mediated by the UN representative in the Pamirs.

Opposition Says Moscow Raising Tensions

LD1404112595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1925 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Apr—Pamir opposition leaders believe that the immediate withdrawal of government forces from the territory of the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region of Tajikistan and the noninterference of Russian border troops in its internal affairs should become a main condition for restoring peace and stability in the region, Salim Sarmat, an

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executive representative of the military and political council of Badakhshan, told ITAR-TASS today.

According to Sarmat, the explosive situation in the Pamirs has been provoked by the recent "unprecedented augmentation" of Russian border posts with new men, primarily at the expense of the Tajik Government forces, by creating conditions for them to advance on the territory of Badakhshan, although this contradicts the inter-Tajik Tehran accords on a cease-fire and "the repeated promises of the Tajik authorities not to bring central troops into the Pamirs."

The Badakhshan opposition representative also accused Russian border troops of exceeding their mandate and of hostilities against Pamirs' self-defense detachments some 8-10 km from the border. This, in his opinion, is interference in the internal affairs of the region. Armed clashes have left casualties on both sides, Sarmat stressed, including civilian residents of Rushan, Valsk, and Khalay- Kum Districts. Delivery of food aid from the Aga-Khan Fund to "the starving people of the Pamirs" has become practically impossible due to the hostilities.

The military and political council of Badakhshan is not opposed to the presence of a Russian border troop contingent in the Pamirs and is not hostile toward it. The council simply insists that the contingent should observe its mandate and should not interfere in the autonomy's internal affairs, Sarmat added. Furthermore, the opposition has advised the Russian border troops command that it is ready to bring an end to all hostilities in the Pamir section of the Tajik-Afghan border before the fourth round of the inter-Tajik talks yield results and that the opposition stands for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the Badakhshan opposition representative stressed.

Sarmat said that the Pamirs' opposition council set out its assessment of the tragic events in the Pamirs in a statement addressed to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali today.

Turkmenistan

Niyazov Meets With Indonesia's Suharto

LD1204193095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1527 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ashgabat, April 12 (INTERFAX)—Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov and his Indonesian counterpart Suharto discussed bilateral cooperation in Ashgabat on Tuesday [11 April].

Turkmen Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Boris Shikhmuradov told Interfax that "Suharto pledged to support the Turkmen president's initiative on granting Turkmenistan the status of a neutral country," which will allow it to become a center of international conferences, like Switzerland and Austria.

In the evening April 12, Suharto will fly out to Tashkent (Uzbekistan), where he will change over to his personal plane and leave for Indonesia.

Cooperation Declaration Signed

LD1204222095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1947 GMT 12 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Kurbanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ashgabat April 12 TASs—President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan and visiting Indonesian President Suharto on Wednesday [12 April] signed a joint declaration on principles of bilateral relations and cooperation between the two countries. These pinciples are sovereign equality, respect of territorial integrity and political independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of any state and peace settlement of any disputes, the document stressed.

During their talks, the two presidents pointed to the increasing role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the worldwide struggle for peace and disarmament, as well as to Turkmenistan's commitment to the policy of positive neutrality.

Suharto, who is chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, hailed Turkmenistan's bid for a full membership in this organization.

With a view to create conditions for large-scale and close cooperation, the two sides agreed to prepare an intergovernmental agreement to avoid dual taxation.

Within the framework of the visit, meetings were held between representatives of the Turkmen and Indonesian business communities. As a result, a contract was concluded for supplies of 30,000 tonnes of Turkmen cotton this year. Other projects for cooperation include a joint venture to make sleepers, reconstruction of the cement-producing factory in the town of Byuzmeiin.

On winding up his tour of the Central Asian republics, the Indonesian president left for Dubai on Wednesday night.

Accords Signed With Pakistan on Building Gas Pipeline

AU1304145695 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 12 Apr 95 p 6

[Report by HOLOS UKRAYINY correspondent Murab Sanidov from Ashgabat: "There Are Enough Energy Sources. For Pakistan Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Turkmenistan has recently been reminding increasingly often about its own natural resources and proposing that foreign partners invest in joint ventures and explore gas and oil deposits.

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After insistent proposals to well-known overseas companies to run things together, Turkmen leaders decided that it wouldn't be bad to have a closer look at their neighbors.

The recent visit by Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov to the capital of Pakistan was one such successful attempt. The main result of the negotiations was the signing of accords on building a gas pipeline, along which 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year will be supplied from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. It is pointed out in the accord, signed by the heads of the two states in Islamabad, that the 1,000 kilometer-long gas pipeline will run from the Sovetabat deposit to the Pakistani town of Sui [name as transliterated]. The tentative technological and economic substantiation of the project will be prepared by the Turkmen ministry and the Argentine company "Bridas," which has a three-year long experience in cooperation with the Turkmenistan oil and gas complex.

However, some difficulties will also emerge: The gas pipeline will run across Afghanistan, which is at war. It was therefore decided to hold, in April, a tripartite meeting for settling the safety questions.

According to Amangeldy Esenov, Tukrmenistan's oil and gas minister, the building of an oil pipeline may yet be another trend in the mutually advantageous Turkmenistan-Pakistan cooperation. It is possible that it will start at the oil refinery combine in the Turkmen town of Seidi [name as transliterated].

Uzbekistan

Karimov, Germany's Herzog Hold Talks

LD1304190695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1624 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tashkent, April 13 (INTERFAX)—The presidents of Uzbekistan and Germany Islam Karimov and Roman Herzog discussed in Tashkent Thursday [13 April] the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Sources close to the Central Asian leader told Interfax, the sides arrived at the conclusion that stability in Tajikistan would have a positive effect on Eurasia in general, not just Central Asian countries.

On Tuesday the two presidents signed a number of bilateral documents: An agreement on German military cemeteries in Uzbekistan, a joint statement on the principles of relations and an agreement on free travel between the two countries.

On Wednesday Herzog accompanied by Karimov visited the medieval towns of Samarkand and Bukhara. At the refrigerator plant in Samarkand the two presidents decided that a joint facility for the production of high-quality household appliances could be developed on its basis.

On Thursday Herzog visited the Uzbek parliament where he met chairmen of committees representing different parties and movements.

On Thursday evening the German president and his escort left for home.

Herzog on Future Cooperation

LD1104102295 Tashkent NARODNOYE SLOVO in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 1

[Speech by German Federal President Roman Herzog at the reception held by President Islam Karimov; date not given: "Our Cooperation Has a Bright Future"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dear Mr. President, Mrs. Karimova, Esteemed ladies and gentlemen!

My wife and I would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to you, Mr. President, for your very warm words of greeting.

Personally, I am happy to continue our conversation that began in the winter of Davos and, at the same time, reciprocate the visit which you, Mr. President, paid to the Federal Republic of Germany in the beginning of 1993.

The Republic of Uzbekistan is one of the most important Central Asian states not only in terms of territory or population, but also because of its cultural legacy, economic potential, and political significance. So, it is no mere coincidence that my first trip on an official visit as head of the German state, just a few months after assuming office, has brought me here.

The most important goal that Uzbekistan, as well as other former states of the Soviet Union after it collapsed, had to face was to identify its own place in the world and sort out relations with its neighbors, create the structures of its own statehood, set the process of transformation going towards the market economy, and develop new forms of cooperation. This is a difficult and painful process, which we are familiar with from our own experience. That is why you can count not only on our understanding, but also on our readiness to give you support within the bounds of existing possibilities.

The Soviet empire has left a difficult heritage for Uzbekistan, too. You, Mr. President, are constantly and quite actively speaking about preserving economic integrity under conditions of political diversity. Your voice is particularly distinct among the choir of other CIS states and people heed this voice. [passage omitted]

Both of our countries are discovering themselves as interesting and long-term partners in the sphere of the economy. A number of German firms are already represented in Uzbekistan through projects and joint ventures and others are on their way, too. The fact that numerous representatives of the German economy arrived here as a part of the delegation accompanying me is concrete evidence of our interest in expanding economic ties.

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As for the political level, it is necessary to create suitable general conditions. We can also help with our advice in this matter too. As before, we are quite ready for that. The general conditions include not only technical aspects such as protecting investments and avoiding dual taxation, but also political stability and a convincing course towards democratization.

Uzbekistan adopted the principal decision on opening the doors to democracy, and with the aim of creating a society based on pluralism and on the principals of a law-governed state. We are watching with great sympathy as you move along this path, still cautiously, and wish you all courage and consistency. The political and economic transformation of the state is a difficult and painful operation in any case, but in order to achieve a goal such as the establishment of a society based on democracy and pluralism no efforts must be spared.

Internal stability in a multi-ethnic state also means that members of many nationalities are living in a common house as citizens with equal rights. We are glad to see that Uzbekistan is advancing along this path towards achieving harmonious relations with different nationalities, and guided by the spirit of Alisher Navoi, the great humanist of the 15th century, whose interests reached far beyond the limits of one single region or people and who used to write both in Uzbek and Tajik. [passage omitted]

Herzog Winds Up Visit

LD1304140395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1251 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vilor Niyazmatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tashkent April 13 TASS—Germany's Federal President Roman Herzog and a group of 30 accompanying businessmen wound up their visit to Uzbekistan on Thursday [13 April].

On Wednesday, Herzog and Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov visited a refrigerator manufacturing factory in Samarkand where they attended the ceremony of signing an agreement between the facility management and a German firm on creating a joint venture.

At a reception in honour of the high-ranking guest, Karimov said economic relations between the two countries were developing successfully, and this year's Uzbek-German trade turnover was expected to double against last year's 500 million Deutschmarks.

In the course of the visit, the federal president also went to the Tashkent Lutheran Church, and met members of the German community in Uzbekistan.

President Discusses Tajikistan With UN Envoy

LD1404084795 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 14 Apr 95 p1

[FBIS Translated Text] President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan received Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, special UN envoy in Tajikistan, on 13 April.

During the meeting, matters relating to securing peace and stability in the Central Asian region and a peaceful settlement to the situation in Tajikistan were discussed. During the conversation, it was especially stressed that the world community, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in particular, can make a great contribution to the process of securing peace in the region.

Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov took part in the reception. Khalid Malik, permanent UN representative in Uzbekistan, was present.

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Armenia

Uzbekistan Cuts Off Gas Pipeline

LD1304145795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1044 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, April 13 (INTERFAX)—The press service of the Armenian government reported to Interfax that in the evening of April 12 Uzbekistan shut the gas pipeline along which gas is supplied to Transcaucasia.

According to the press service, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are unable to solve the tariff issue for fuel transit.

On Wednesday evening Armenian Prime Minister Grant Bagratyan addressed Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin over the telephone with a request to grant Russian gas to Armenia until Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan solve financial issues.

Armenia has been experiencing a sharp energy crisis for several years already. It is caused in part by blockade of the main gas pipeline laid through the Azerbaijani territory. The second pipeline laid though the Georgian territory delivers only a minor amount of gas to Armenia. The republic's population does not receive gas for the third year already and electric power is supplied only two hours a day.

Gaydar Backs Armenia's Economic Reform

954F2052A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA in Russian 7 Apr 95 p 1

[ARMENPRESS report of a television interview with Yegor Gaydar by an unidentified interviewer; in Yerevan; date not given: "'An Open Economy Is for You the Sole Solution': The Former Russian Prime Minister Gives the Reforms in Armenia High Marks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Choice party and head of this party's faction in the State Duma and former prime minister of Russia, who is in Yerevan at the invitation of the board of the Armenian National Movement, granted Armenian Television an interview, which we reproduce in full.**

[Correspondent] I would like to ask you as an economist, politician, deputy of the State Duma, and former prime minister of Russia several questions concerning your stay in Armenia and to learn your assessment of the situation in Armenia.

[Gaydar] I will begin with the situation in Russia. The economic situation at this time is complicated, but, in my view, affords serious opportunities for stabilization in 1995. At the end of 1994 the government, based on the experience of its own trial and error, finally convinced itself that we were right, that the path is narrow, and that, if you want to be elected and not be tossed onto the sidelines of history, you have, for all that, to go this route. And having convinced itself, it has been able, even under very complex situations, which became more complicated following the start of the Chechen campaign, to keep the situation under control and maintain the rate of growth, and it is now obvious that the rate of inflation will head down quite rapidly also. It has already gone down: In March, inflation was only half of what it was in January, and in a year it will be appreciably and incomparably lower than in May and July. Generally, it is hoped that inflation will as of the latter half of the year be very low, and it is, accordingly, hoped that the exchange rate will be predictable, and there is, accordingly, hope of the start of industrial growth in the latter half of the year. Individual signs of it, a growth in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and chemical industry, say, have begun to emerge even now; the situation in the timber sector is stabilizing, and growth is observed in individual branches of mechanical engineering; true, serious crisis processes in light and food industry continue, but there is hope that the latter half of 1995 will be a period of the start of stabilization. The political situation, unfortunately, is more worrying. The long, drawn-out period of reforms and their inconsistency and indecisiveness, whence the long period of high inflation and the growth of social stratification, which always goes hand in hand with inflation, whence the prolonged period of decline in the volume of production—this is a splendid nutrient base for populist manipulations. It is with us precisely the forces that formerly forced the resignation of our government (this was a coalition of communists, agrarians, and radical nationalists) and were able thereby to hold up the reforms that are today attempting to derive political dividends from the fact that the reforms have slowed down and progress toward the market has not been sufficiently decisive and swift.

[Correspondent] The situation is influencing the economy?

[Gaydar] It is not as yet, fortunately, influencing it directly; we now have a prudent system of checks and balances, and populist decisions, which sometimes get through in parliament, and irresponsible decisions, which cannot be embodied, they do not carry, as a rule, because the president vetoes them. We, in response, also support the veto, which they do not override. Thus, there are no serious threats in the current plane. The 1995 budget has been adopted. It is a tight budget, but, generally, it affords a base we can work on. I see no direct threats here. I see another threat. If a coalition of the communists and their allies breaks through to power at the next parliamentary and presidential elections, this could, of course, be very dangerous. Because our communists are not East European, mild, all social democratized, pink communists. Our communists are not pink; they are to a far greater degree brown, and they are for this reason far more dangerous. This risk of the accession to power in Russia legally, on the basis of elections, of forces that by no means consider themselves bound by, say, respect for democratic standards could represent the most serious political risk for Russia.

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[Correspondent] What is the likelihood of victory of the democratic forces?

[Gaydar] It exists, I believe. First, although there indeed are in Russia, of course, many people who are not disposed to submit to the arguments of common sense; there are, for all that, prudent people also.... There are, for all that, more of the prudent people, in my opinion.... There are malcontents also. They have reason to be unhappy. Economic policy truly was for a long time ineffective. The authorities are not always effective; at times they have been wholly ineffective in combating corruption. And this always gives rise to a natural dissatisfaction. But very many people understand how dangerous an attempted jump back is.... Since it could lead to nothing stable. Masses of people, who are more or less fairly castigating the present authorities, to the question as to whether they are sure, in fact, that they want to go back, want to lose their property, their job, their rights—to go abroad, say, without having sought a certificate in the party committee saying that they are morally stable, whether they want the ruble to be wooden once again, just empty paper, whether they want to stand in lines once again, whether they want to go from Ryazan to Moscow for sausage every week on the sausage train, would find it hard to answer in the affirmative. I am convinced, therefore, that a victory of extremists at the next elections is a real, but by no means inevitable, threat.

[Correspondent] If you have had time to familiarize yourself with the political forces in Armenia, how would you evaluate them?

[Gaydar] Well, I have had time to get to know them to some extent, of course. We have good relations with the Armenian National Movement. We regard the Armenian National Movement as our fellow thinkers who share the center-right values that are characteristic of electivity. Generally, it has to be said honestly that I am well aware how inconceivable in its onerousness is the task that has befallen the present government. I am, on the whole, familiar with the situation in the CIS at first hand. I have studied this directly, and I know that there is no state in the Commonwealth that is encountering tougher tasks than Armenia. And the fact that under these conditions it has still been possible to make progress on the path of reforms, that it has been possible to accomplish a whole number of most important long-term tasks, that it has been possible to stabilize the national currency, securing its steadiness and convertibility, that it has been possible on this basis to sharply curb inflation and thereby create a base for economic growth, this, I believe, is a very serious achievement. I would emphasize once again, in the framework of reality, that I understand full well how hard life is in Armenia, how many problems there are. Armenia will not be the United States for a long time yet, and it is pointless competing with it, but looking at your neighbors, it can be seen to what extent serious results have been achieved here, even granted all the difficulties. Georgia, say, your neighbor, is far wealthier and should, it might have been thought, be having a far better life. We cannot, of course, interfere in the internal political affairs of Armenia, nor will we ever do so but, nonetheless, as political friends and relations, of course, we hope that reasonable, in my view, responsible forces in Armenia win the next elections.

[Correspondent] How do you evaluate the reform policy in Armenia?

[Gaydar] Positively, on the whole. I believe that on the territory of the CIS, with the exception of the Baltic states, Armenia has been the most decisive and consistent in its reforms. In my view, the agrarian reform was a most important step, and the result is in evidence. I understand how difficult privatization is under the present conditions. But, nonetheless, I believe that the approaches here are sound and rational. The policy of economic openness, even your not being ready to agree to a customs union with Russia, I consider a correct decision under your present conditions. Were there, say, a common border with Russia and if only, at least, the railroad, via Abkhazia, was operating, this problem could be resolved differently. An open economy is for Armenia today the sole solution. I have long been well acquainted with Grant Bagratyan, prime minister of Armenia, and I have profound respect for him as a competent and very purposeful individual and thinking politician capable of operating under difficult conditions.

[Correspondent] What do you think, how long will it take the economy to really stand on its own two feet?

[Gaydar] This is what I think: If, and this is possible, there is no change in the political situation, and the war in Karabakh, God forbid, does not resume, let us say, the chances of 1995 being a year of financial stability and economic growth are very high. And that Armenia's economy will as of 1996 enter a period of steady growth, I have simply not the least doubts about this. It should be understood that Armenia will for a long time be a poor country, like Japan, which was a poor country for a long time, incidentally. But there is no doubt that it could become a country with very dynamic development in the coming years. The main thing is that the war not cancel out this opportunity. And were the position of your neighbors to stabilize further, if only a little, were the transport situation in Abkhazia to be more dependable, and were Turkey's border open for trade, the road to Armenia's steady economic growth would then be open.

[Correspondent] Is there a similarity in the policy of reforms of your government and of our prime minister?

[Gaydar] Yes, of course. And to the highest extent. Much of what has been done by your government has been most closely connected with the policy, programs, and designs of our government. We are fellow thinkers on matters of principle, but it has to be understood that we have different conditions. There is in Russia one situation, in Armenia, quite another; nonetheless, our experience shows, however strange, that some common prudent decisions produce predictable results.

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[Correspondent] How do you evaluate the "policy-economy" correlation in Armenia?

[Gaydar] I hope, to be honest, that policy and political problems will not be so drastic and serious in Armenia as in Russia. It seems to me that Armenia will hold to the path of this kind of dependable political support for the reform policy. You will recall that in 1992, when the opposition wanted a change of our government, there was a new prime minister, Chernomyrdin, and he embarked on a price freeze and so forth. Today, after two and a half years of fluctuation and fuss, Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin is speaking like a disguised Gaydar, in makeup, of the 1992 model. And it is not a question of his having gone to Chicago and of his having passed a test there or having purchased pink pants, but of his having on the basis of his own experience of trial and error arrived at what was to us absolutely clear even earlier. I very much hope, therefore, that the coming elections will provide for this reform policy sufficiently dependable support in parliament. This, incidentally, is an element of political predictability and means that there will be no redistribution of property, which will be the basis for new private investments. And Armenia could be a serious "piece," let us say, in terms of the extent of the per capita foreign investments of East Europe. You know, incidentally, that the second elections following the start of the reforms have been won in East Europe as a whole by the former communists, as a rule. There have been virtually no exceptions thus far. I believe that the next elections in Armenia will be the exception. It seems to me that there is in Armenia a real base for a break with this trend.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev Receives OSCE Minsk Group Delegation

NC1304191095 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev today received (Tavlitse), cochairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and (Nideg), cochairman of the Minsk Group and ambassador on special missions.

[Begin recording] [Nermine Elikhanbeyli] The Finnish diplomats will henceforth carry out the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group. In this connection, Heydar Aliyev said that while the process is complicated it is important for the entire region. The Finnish diplomats who have assumed such a responsible task will play an important role in establishing peace.

(Feike Tavlitse), co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh, submitted a letter and a gift to Aliyev from the Finnish president, who met Aliyev during the Budapest summit.

Recalling his meeting with the Finnish president in Budapest, the Azerbaijani president noted that Finland is experienced in resolving international conflicts. He added that he hopes the Finnish diplomats will actively participate in regulating the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and will try to establish a firm peace in the region. [end recording]

Czech Republic To Send Armed Unit to Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1304165995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1159 GMT 13 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Shamshin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague, 13 Apr—The Czech Army Command is planning to send a company of 190 soldiers and officers to Nagorno-Karabakh. It became known here today that the Czech military unit will start operating in this "troubled spot" of the CIS as a part of international peacekeeping forces, which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is planning to send there in the near future.

There is already one Czech officer in the OSCE joint headquarters for planning the peace keeping operation in Caucasus. The request by the OSCE's leadership to send Czech soldiers to the area of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict has been described by Prague as a high recognition "of the quality of their military training and impartial attitude to the participants of the military conflict."

The issue of financing the training and sending Czechs to Nagorno-Karabakh has not yet been solved. According to the republican Ministry of Defense, it will cost about $9.5 million.

Aliyev, Turkey's Ciller Comment on Oil Deal

LD1304193695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Azerbaijan views Turkey not only as an economic but as its political partner, President Geydar Aliyev declared at the ceremony of signing of an agreement on the transfer of 5 of its 20-percent share in the consortium, which is to develop oil fields on the Caspian Sea, to the Turkish oil company Turkish Petroleum.

Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller who has specially come on a one-day working visit to Baku, was present at the ceremony of signing. IF Note: President of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) and leader of Turkish Petroleum signed the agreement. The ceremony of signing took place in the Palace Gulistan, Baku's suburbs, where an agreement on forming consortium of western companies was signed earlier. Turkey managed to increase its share from 1.75 to 6.75 percent after a serious pressure which American oil companies

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and the US government rendered on Azerbaijan as they did not want to transfer 5 percent of the consortium's shares to Iran.

The American Amoco (17%), Unocal (11%), McDermott (2.45%), Pennzoil (9.8%), Ramco (2%), the British Norwegian alliance British Petroleum/Statoil (17%/8.5%), and the Russian join stock company LUKoil (10%) make up the consortium along with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

"We permanently feel Turkey's support in all spheres which are of vital importance for Azerbaijan," Aliyev underlined saying that the signed agreement is very important for his country.

In response Tansu Ciller underlined that Ankara does not intend to stop at this stage and hopes that "our cooperation with Azerbaijan, with participation of Kazakhstan and other neighboring countries, will go on in the frameworks of construction of an export oil pipeline." IF Note: With the support of the United States and several western companies Turkey has proposed its variant of the pipeline's construction to export Azerbaijani and, possibly, Kazakh oil in contrast to the system of the Caspian pipeline consortium supported by Russia.

At the same time Iran made it clear that it can revise its consent to transport oil extracted on the Caspian oil fields if its oil company is not allowed to participate in projects on Azerbaijan's shelf.

Ciller spoke in favor of developing a joint position regarding the route of the export pipeline from the Caspian fields to the Western Europe through the Turkish terminal on the Mediterranean Sea. She expressed hope that Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan would find a common opinion on this issue.

Speaker of Azerbaijan's parliament Rasul Guliyev reported to Interfax that the route of the export pipeline was discussed at the meeting between Azerbaijan's leadership and the Turkish Prime Minister Wednesday. In his words, the parties considered different variants but failed to find any final decision.

Guliyev added that the officials discussed the issue on settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict along with the problems of economic cooperation between two countries.

After the signing Aliyev declared that for Azerbaijan this conflict remains one of the most important and simultaneously difficult problems. In his words, Baku firmly intends to adhere to the ceasefire regime between the warring parties (a ceasefire agreement was signed 11 months ago in Moscow under international mediation) and strives to achieve a comprehensive political agreement to finally settle the conflict. Aliyev welcomed Turkey's efforts aimed at settling this conflict.

Ciller reassured that as before, Ankara intends to use its all opportunities in the frameworks of international organizations, and primarily, in the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to stop the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Expressing Turkey's point of view, Ciller underlined that Ankara believes that Armenia should release all occupied lands and Azerbaijani refugees should return home.

Foreign Minister on Iranian Reaction to Oil Deal

NC1304144195 Baku AZERTAC in English 1446 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, April 13—Yesterday the Azerbaijani minister of foreign affairs Gasan Gasanov expressed his regret for the Iranian reaction in connection with cession [transfer] of ten percentage part of the Azerbaijani investments to the American firm 'Exxon' and the Turkish firm 'Turkish Petroleum'. During a conversation with the correspondents Gasan Gasanov noted that he knew about the statement of his Iranian colleague 'Ali Akbar Velayati through the foreign press and so he didnt want to do hasty conclusions. According to 'Ali Akbar Velayati, it will be impossible to realize the oil contract, having signed between Azerbaijan and International Consortium, till understanding on status of the Caspian Sea is achieved.

At the same time Gasan Gasanov doesnt see obstacles in Azerbaijani-Iranian cooperation in the sphere of oil and gas extraction. He also considers that the last events around the 'century contract' will not affect the two-sided relations. "Azerbaijan will do all that possible to rule out aggravation of relations with Iran".

Parliament Speaker: Iran's Accusations 'Incomprehensible'

LD1304163995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1415 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, April 13 (PIA-INTERFAX)—Parliament Speaker Rasul Guliyev has described as totally incomprehensible Tehran's accusations of Azerbaijan of ceding a 10 percent share in the international oil consortium to American Exxon and Turkish TRAO companies.

Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. 'Ali Akbar Velayati in an interview with IRNA news agency published in Baku on Thursday said the annulment of the deal with Iran was in breach of earlier commitments and would not be to the benefit of Baku.

For his part, Guliyev in an interview with INTERFAX's PETROLEUM INFORMATION AGENCY said that Azerbaijan was willing to cede a 5 percent stake to Iran but other members of the consortium blocked this. He said that under the contract, acceptance of new members is subject to consortium approval.

The speaker described Velayati's statement as misguided given that Iran has been offered to participate in other oil projects in Azerbaijan which are more lucrative than its 5 percent stake in the consortium.

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Guliyev is optimistic about the prospects of trade and economic relations Iran, the country's main trading partner.

For his part, Azeri Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov described Velayati's statement as overreaction.

Foreign Minister on Talks With Russian Official

NC1304153195 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1250 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking to a KHABAR SERVICE correspondent on the result of the visit paid to our republic by Dmitriy Ryurikov, foreign policy adviser of the Russian president, and Anatoliy Zaytsev, head of a department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov noted that the development of all-round cooperation between the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan is essential. The resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the reopening of the communications and transportations lines, and matters to be discussed during the upcoming talks between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia were broached during the talks.

Commenting on the statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry ambassador for special missions, Vladimir Kazimirov, that the sides are not ready for an independent dialogue on resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Hasan Hasanov said that such views serve to freeze the talks, whereas the mediators should ensure the speeding up of the peace talks.

Georgia

French Envoy, European Officials Visiting Batumi

LD1304153095 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0700 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bernard Fassier, French ambassador to Georgia, European Commission chairman (Patrick Chalignol), and (Mark Gral), chief coordinator of the European Union's Food Program, are on a working visit in Batumi.

The European Union has worked out a wide-scale program of assistance for all three Transcaucasian republics, as well as for two Central Asian republics. The program breaks down to three stages. Currently, the second stage is being implemented. According to the second stage of the assistance program, humanitarian aid worth $660 million will arrive in the above republics, in particular, 165,000 tonnes of grain, 150,000 tonnes of flour, 10,000 tonnes of rye, 50,000 tonnes of butter, and 10,000 tonnes of vegetable oil. The revenue received from the selling of these products will be put in a special account and utilized for resolving the people's social problems. Georgia's profit is $30 million.

Deputy Premier on Eurasian Corridor, Port Reconstruction

LD1204153895 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1200 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Zurab Kervalishvili today held a working session which discussed financing of the Eurasian corridor. The session also discussed the issue of speeding up the reconstruction of the sea port of Poti. It was noted that the Institute of Agriculture had prepared a project for building 15 terminals for grain processing. The project has already been passed and preparatory work is under way. The decision has been made at the meeting to prepare the final version of the reconstruction project of the Poti sea port and present it to the Cabinet of Ministers for adoption.

Article Criticizes Military 'Deal' With Russia

AU1304150095 Tbilisi TAVISUPALI SAKARTVELO in Georgian 31 Mar-6 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Ana Chavchavadze: "Russian-Georgian Military Deal—Forward Toward the Soviet Union!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 March of this year, the leadership of the Georgian and Russian military departments—Pavel Grachev and Vardiko Nadibaidze—signed a 25-year draft treaty "on Russian Federation Military Bases on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia." In this way, the process of Georgia's amalgamation within Russia's military-strategic space has entered its decisive phase.

The treaty is composed of an introductory part, 41 articles, and two annexes and contains the particular view of the Georgian side where the treaty's "main trump card" is played, namely the prospects for the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity, which, according to officials, will become reality thanks to this treaty.

Bases In Exchange for Territory

The note regarding the rules governing the initialing of the treaty by V. Nadibaidze states:

"The Georgian side considers it possible for the head of state to sign the enclosed treaty and for it to be ratified following the restoration of its jurisdiction on the whole territory of Georgia (taking into account that the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are hindering the implementation of the terms of the treaty) and the determination of the obligations connected with the organizational development of the Republic of Georgia Armed Forces by the Russian Federation.

"Proceeding from the mutual understanding reached during the course of the negotiations, the Georgian side raises the question of the destruction of those weapons and that military hardware that do not belong to the Republic of Georgia Armed Forces but are located on Georgian territory."

It is clear that this note has been added to the document precisely to stress the point that it will be signed only after Abkhazia and Samachablo [South Ossetia] have been returned. The comments made by Shevardnadze

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would seem to give rise to the same hopes. However, closer observation shows us that he views the matter in a different way:

"This document will help us to settle the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems."

Does this mean that the initial action will be the return of the territories that have been seized from Georgia or, on the contrary, the signing of the treaty and then the return of Samachablo and Abkhazia?!

In the Sunday program "Taim Auti" [Time Out], Shevardnadze totally confused already bewildered viewers. In the first place, he said that one of the principal merits of the treaty was that it would strengthen the border between Russia and Georgia: "We will no longer be threatened with danger from there." Clearly, he had in mind not the Russians whom he himself invited in along with their weaponry, but the confederates [members of the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples—CCMP] who are called Chechens. The following question naturally arises: Can such a "great politician" be so naive to think that the Russians have not been able up to now to curb [CCMP Chairman] Shanibov's campaign or that this treaty will prevent them from organizing another invasion if necessary? After all, did the agreement of 3 September 1992 or the capitulatory deal made on 27 July 1993 save Gagra and Sukhumi respectively?

In any case, how many times have Shevardnadze and Russia in the person of Shevardnadze already promised us a settlement of the territorial problem at the price of conceding Georgia's state independence?

"Sovereignization" of the Bases

Shevardnadze's second "global" prediction has been totally astounding: "Everything is changing so much in the world and the process of integration in Europe is proceeding so quickly that it is possible that Russia will soon find itself integrated into Europe and a member of NATO. In that case, this 25-year treaty will become completely invalid, but we should all the same insure ourselves...."

To what extent this prediction is credible is clearly shown by Russia's growing military aggression, to which recent events in Azerbaijan testify; likewise, the treaty on bases signed between Russia and Armenia and the adjoining document that contains a whole series of articles in which Russia's priority direction is openly stated—the restoration of the military-strategic position that existed at the time of the USSR.

Even if this were not so, the treaty has determined a very long period of insurance—25 years—and it notes that this period "will be prolonged automatically for a further five years unless one side informs the other in writing about its decision to suspend the treaty two years before its expiration date."

According to the treaty (Article 2), the bases will be located in four cities (Batumi, Akhalkalaki, Vaziani, and Gudauta), while their "command and military units and subunits directly subordinate to it along with the supply and service installations will be located in Tbilisi."

It is worth noting the geopolitical location and significance of these bases:

1. Batumi or Achara, which has anyway slipped away from Georgian jurisdiction by peaceful and wholly legal means. It is worrying that this process has been crowned by its status as a free trade zone, which Shevardnadze welcomed during his recent visit to Achara. It becomes clear, following the initialing of the treaty on the bases, for whom this will be a free trade zone.

2. Akhalkalaki, the center of a region that, to all intents and purposes, is likewise outside Tbilisi's control and in which, according to various unofficial data, such local administrative structures are being formed that, if necessary, will strongly oppose any attempt by the center to implement its power. Allowing this process to take its own course means we will be faced with the prospect of yet another state formation that will be backed by a fairly powerful friend, one that also has Russian bases on its territory.

On the other hand, the locations of both bases—Batumi and Akhalkalaki—lie close to the border with Turkey and it is clear that Russia's interests in this case are based on the insidious principle of "strengthening southern borders." To what extent does the creation of two Russian military bases directly on the border with Turkey, a NATO-member country, coincide with Georgia's own interests and does this treaty on the whole accord with the much-publicized plan to run an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia or the recent events in Azerbaijan and the signing of a similar treaty by Armenia against the background of a fairly categorical refusal on the part of Baku? Doesn't all this look like a conspiracy on the part of Russia, Georgia, and Armenia in order to wreck the oil pipeline project?

Shevardnadze believes that, on the contrary, the Russian bases will be a guarantee of stability for Western business circles. It is interesting what the latter think about this?

3. Gudauta, the main military-strategic support of both the Russians and the separatists in Abkhazia. The two-year war clearly showed us how effective the coordinated actions of these two forces could be given their control of the military airport and access to the sea. It is doubtful whether Guduata will become a center of cooperation between Georgian and Russian troops in the future. On the contrary, even in the event that the conditions in the treaty are completely fulfilled, this base will become the sword of Damocles for future generations.

As such, proceeding from the specific nature of the three regions, these bases could easily become a guarantee of the "sovereignization" of precisely these administrative

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units and not Georgia. However, in order to regulate this process, the Russians should also have the center under their supervision.

4-5. Vaziani and Tbilisi essentially form an indivisible link in the control of the central part of eastern Georgia and the capital. It is obvious that, along with Vaziani military airport, the military units and subunits directly subordinate to the bases' command will form a fifth military base in Tbilisi.

At the same time, Article 23 provides us with very interesting information; in particular, it is pointed, out on the one hand, that military servicemen carry and use authorized weapons on the territory of the bases, but, on the other hand, it states that "authorized weapons may be carried outside the territory of the bases only with the aim of fulfilling those tasks pertaining to military service that are connected with ensuring the regime of secrecy...."

It is not known what type of actions or installations are included in the regime of secrecy. It is also unknown to what extent their content corresponds to Georgia's international obligations and for what purposes Georgia may be used. Until answers are provided to these questions, it is superfluous to speak of Georgia's security.

"Security" in Europe at Georgia's Expense

A number of articles in the treaty (for example, Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 17) that call for separate agreement on one question or another give cause for alarm. On the one hand, it is indeed impossible to determine in this document such details as the amount of military equipment to be used during military training, the route to be used for its displacement, and so forth. However, it is impermissible that there should be separate agreements on those questions that disregard the fundamental principles of the treaty itself. For example, Article 9 forbids the presence of those Russian military formations on the territory of Georgia that are not stationed at the bases, but it allows exceptions in those cases when separate agreements have been reached. At the same time, it is not determined at what administrative level such agreements are to be reached and who is to control that the introduction of the new formations does not result in the violation of the provisions of the treaty, international obligations, and so forth.

In the same way, Article 16 states that the command of the Russian bases is to create forbidden and security zones in coordination with the commander in chief of the Georgian Armed Forces; in other words, such an important question is decided, to all intents and purposes, in agreement with one person. Taking into account who the current commander in chief is [Shevardnadze], it cannot be excluded that even Svetitskhoveli [ancient religious complex situated just outside Tbilisi] will be made a forbidden zone and used as a polygon.

Article 34 also envisions the determination of questions of jurisdiction and mutual assistance on the basis of separate agreements. If such fundamental questions are to be resolved according to a special procedure, then what is the point of this treaty?!

The two annexes mentioned earlier are the most significant in this respect:

Annex 1—on changing the maximum levels of weapons existing on the territory of Georgia in accordance with the treaties on the restriction of conventional weapons in Europe. This annex states that, according to the quotas determined for Georgia by international treaties, the weaponry of the Russian Federation Armed Forces will increase at the expense of a decrease in Georgia's weaponry (amounts provided). Although the Georgian side views as a victory for itself that both the annex and the treaty (Article 6) contain a provision on changing the maximum levels of weapons according to separate agreements, is it really so vitally important how many tanks are at the disposal of the metropolis and the colony respectively? This document reveals the true essence of this military alliance—Russia's use of Georgia to mask its own imperialist aims.

Who Is the Boss?!

Annex 2 gives the composition of the military formations and structures on the territory of Georgia or, in other words, lists those military and other installations that are to be transferred or, more precisely, returned to Russia's military force. It is sufficient to mention just the former Officers' House on Rustaveli Prospekt in Tbilisi to convey what is meant. This list contains 91 installations and their addresses, of which there are 26 in Batumi, six in Vaziani, eight in Akhalkalaki, one (?!) in Gudauta, and 50 in Tbilisi. Airports, motorized rifle and surface-to-air missile regiments, training centers, communication centers, military warehouses, and so forth, as well as administrative buildings, residential and rest homes (in Makhinjauri), summer cottages (for example, in Kojori), car parks and repair shops, medical establishments, sports clubs, dry cleaners, commercial facilities, hotels, and so forth are all listed as installations designated for military purposes.

Both annexes have been signed by the defense ministers who are related to one another as godfather and godson.

On the Rights of Russian Servicemen

Particular emphasis is given in the introductory part of the treaty to the fact that the signatories unconditionally recognize each other's sovereignty, which is blatant cynicism as the present document itself proves that Georgia's state sovereignty and statehood in general is being completely ignored.

It is sufficient to discuss those articles in which the rights of Russian servicemen and their families are equated with the rights of Georgian citizens. Take, for example,

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Article 11: "Those persons belonging to the staff of the Russian military bases and also those on the staff of these bases who have been released from active military service or have retired, together with their families, in accordance with Georgian legislation, are entitled to the same rights as Georgian citizens regarding the acquisition of goods for their personal consumption and the use of necessary services."

It is clear that tourists are not forbidden to acquire goods in Georgia and, therefore, it may seem incomprehensible to us why it was necessary to point out that they are entitled to the same rights as Georgian citizens. However, upon closer observation, it becomes clear that the use of necessary services can embrace a very broad spectrum and open up big prospects for retired or discharged Russian servicemen who probably have no intention of returning to their motherland!

Article 32 signifies wholly unjust privileges for Russian military servicemen when travelling outside Georgia's borders and when on business or leave; in particular, in these cases, they do not pay customs duty and other types of taxation as stipulated in Georgian legislation.

The treaty contains many more negative aspects; many problems may be masked and, therefore, it requires a more competent observer. Furthermore, in order to ascertain more clearly what this document really has in store for us, it should be analyzed in the context of other military agreements concluded within the framework of the "big treaty" and in relation to international norms.

Abashidze Scores Security Service Chief

954F2055A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Apr 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Igor Rotar: "Mafiosi Are Preparing for a March on Batumi. Aslan Abashidze, Chairman of the Autonomy's Supreme Council, Is Convinced of This"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Batumi-Trabzon-Moscow—"There is now no industry left in Georgia that has not been looted and is not under the control of certain groupings. For these people with automatic weapons, Ajaria is like the smell of blood to a shark," Aslan Abashidze, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ajaria, says. After cloudy, cold Moscow, Batumi, which is awash in verdure and as hot as in summer, seems a paradise, almost. I find it hard to believe that war also threatens this last peaceful corner of the lacerated Transcaucasus republic mired in fratricidal strife. Since the Ajari leader declared that Igor Georgadze, chief of Georgia's Security Service, was preparing an attempt on his life, the republic has been living in a state of anxious expectation. Armed young people in civilian clothes are encountered at practically every corner in the city center: The Ajaris have made preparations for any unpleasant surprises. Two properties are being guarded in earnest: Abashidze's residence and the home of Vladimir Gladyshev, commander of the 12th Russian Military Base, who is out of favor and whose removal is also explained in Ajaria by the intrigues of the "evil genius" Georgadze. The "heroes" of the conflict with Tbilisi themselves are displaying an enviable caution and prefer for the time being not to make any drastic movements. "The general will receive you today at 11 in the evening," I was told by two automatic weapon-armed Ajaris on duty outside the building in which Gladyshev's apartment is located. Under the cover of night, I once again stood outside that same entrance. "The general has had second thoughts, come tomorrow morning," the guard said. But the next day Gladyshev unexpectedly took seriously "ill" and 24 hours later flew to Moscow. "The commander has simply been hounded, and although he wanted to, he was afraid to meet you," a leader of Ajaria explained to me in confidence the oddities of the general's behavior.

At first sight, life in today's Ajaria differs little from the situation in other regions of Georgia. Pay (several millions of Georgian coupons) is sufficient for several loaves of bread. In the evenings the cities and villages of Ajaria are enveloped in darkness—there is a catastrophic shortage of electric power in the republic, water supply is inoperative, virtually, and homes are not being heated. It is impossible to get through to another city by conventional telephone, and the sole dependable communications with the outside world are via satellite—$2 per minute of conversation. But all these problems pale in comparison with Ajaria's indisputable advantage: It is the sole place in Georgia where a person feels practically completely safe. As in distant Japan, police stations in Batumi are located at a distance of a human cry from one another. You can walk around the city the whole night and feel totally safe. "There is no apartment in Tbilisi that has not been burgled three or four times. People are afraid to go out at night. But no one threatens you here. You can do business and not tremble with fear lest armed people appear here and demand their share," a former resident of the capital, who moved to Batumi in search of a quiet life, told me.

The precise operation of the police is far from the sole Ajari trump card, for that matter. Just 12 km separate Batumi from the Turkish-Georgian border. With the start of perestroyka, a powerful stream of shuttle travelers from the entire Transcaucasus and the south of Russia stretched into the neighboring Muslim republic through the entry point opened in the Ajari village of Sarpi. Prior to the opening of the border, incidentally, the eastern areas of Turkey had been the poorest, most economically backward part of the country. It was natives from there who constituted the bulk of the Gastarbeiter in Germany. The shuttle boom has literally transformed Eastern Anatolia. Hundreds of thousands of local inhabitants have found work, and construction is actively under way: The "shuttlers" needed new hotels and stores. There are today signs in Russian in practically all stores of the cities of Eastern Turkey. The most prevalent inscriptions read: "Russian spoken here" and "Copper, nonferrous metals, gold. We buy everything." All tradesmen—from big businessmen to small-time

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street vendors—have begun to speak Russian. It would hardly be any exaggeration to maintain that practically all business in Eastern Turkey is today linked with the former Soviet Union. And Batumi remains today the sole crossing point into Turkey for the Transcaucasus republics. Naturally, Ajaria's unique geographical location is to this republic of enormous economic benefit. New opportunities for Ajaria are promised also by the major oil and gas reserves that were discovered here recently. And, finally, Ajaria's future has been changed fundamentally by the signing of Baku's "contract of the century": One of the most likely routes of the shipment of Azerbaijani oil is via Ajaria and Turkey.

Speaker Aslan Abashidze was in conversation with me a model of restraint. Having repeated the "stale" sensation concerning Georgadze's intrigues, he preferred to speak in hints, without mentioning specific political figures. But the scenario of the possible development of events that he drew lost none of its sinister logic because of this. The conditions for a new war have, in fact, already been created, apparently: "Gladyshev declared repeatedly that he would not permit gangster formations to penetrate Ajaria. This was his mistake! Very many people who wanted to come here with the aim of plunder considered him the main obstacle in their way!" In the Ajari leader's opinion, gangster formations have already divvied up the entire territory of Georgia, other than his patrimony, and are now dreaming of a new tasty morsel. "No one may enter a private or state structure here in Ajaria and dictate his will. There is here a border and a port, that is, an opportunity for transport. This is what they are after! ... The majority of specialists believe that the most convenient pipeline route runs via Ajaria. There is already an oil refinery and terminal here. There are, of course, forces that would like to place all this under their personal control! ... People who have now grown stronger have an insufficient field of activity. Without Ajaria, this is an incomplete deck!" Abashidze believes.

So Ajaria was never so close to war as today. But the present crisis can hardly be explained by some people's thirst for new profit. It cannot be ruled out that the main culprits of Abashidze's "headache" are located thousands of kilometers from Tbilisi. Igor Georgadze, who is unloved in Ajaria, makes no secret of his pro-Moscow orientation. An excessively independent Abashidze could be an awkward figure for Moscow if it is decided, after all, to pump "black gold" across the territory of this Muslim autonomy of Georgia, and it is perfectly likely that certain forces in the Kremlin are attempting by others' hands to increase their influence in this region.

At the same time, on the other hand, the destabilization of the situation in Ajaria is affecting the interests of another regional superpower, and Ankara is doing everything possible to prevent the formation of a new "ring of fire" on its eastern borders.

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Estonia

Meri on Reason for Not Attending Moscow Ceremony

LD1304180595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1650 GMT 13 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Lennart Meri in a message to the Russian leader said he would be unable to attend May 9 celebrations in Moscow because the Second World War ended for Estonia on August 31, 1994 following the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from its soil but not on May 9, 1945.

He said his country hoped that Russia would unequivocally and in a convenient form distance itself from the Stalin policy of aggression with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland falling first victims.

At the same time, Meri stressed seeking normal and fruitful relations with Moscow saying that friendly cooperation places the need for drawing the line under past injustices.

Coast Guard To Turn Away Latvian Ships Without Permits

WS1304142795 Tallinn BNS in English 1000 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 13, BNS—Estonian coastguardsmen will not allow a single Latvian vessel not carrying a permit to enter Estonian territorial waters, Jaan Kapp, head of the Border Guard Department maritime division, told BNS.

A small coast guard boat currently patrolling the disputed Gulf of Riga is to be replaced Thursday by a bigger vessel equipped with two 23 mm cannons.

Kapp told BNS preventing Latvian fishing vessels' "terrorist activity" toward Estonian border guard was one of the tasks of the coast guard. Sending a big ship into the Gulf of Riga "doesn't mean a declaration of war on Latvia; this is a sort of peacekeeping mission in the 'grey zone' (the disputed waters)," he said.

Kapp said the coast guard based its activity on an agreement signed by the Estonian and Latvian prime ministers in March under which Latvian vessels are to avoid fishing in the "grey zone" until a further agreement is reached. The agreement places the task of guarding the zone, which is also Estonia's economic zone, on the Estonian border guard.

Estonian coastguardsmen have in the last few months repeatedly had problems with Latvian trawlers, Kapp said. Seven ships recently blocked the patrol boat and about six weeks ago a Latvian warship entered Estonian waters together with the trawlers.

The Estonian-Latvian talks on the sea border and economic zones in Riga on Tuesday came to a dead end and Latvia threatened to take the matter to the International Court of Justice in the Hague.

Latvia

Ulmanis Talks About NATO With U.S. Congressmen

LD1304155395 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It is important that Latvia is admitted to NATO possibly sooner, because there is no certainty about the CIS having abandoned the intention to draw the Baltic states onto its orbit, President Guntis Ulmanis said at a meeting today with U.S. congressmen, (Doug Dereuter) and Gerald Solomon. Russia has stated that it would not stay indifferent to the enlargement of NATO and, as Ulmanis said, this indifference might be fateful for the Baltic states. [passage omitted]

Saeima Factions Oppose Ulmanis Moscow Trip

954F2035A Riga DIYENA in Russian 17 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Nelliya Lochmele: "The Majority of Saeima Factions Advise Ulmanis Not To Go to Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The majority of political forces represented in the Saeima hold the opinion that the country's president should not go to the festivities in Moscow on 8 and 10 May in connection with the 50th anniversary of the capitulation of Hitler's Germany and that it would be better to celebrate the historical event in London. Only deputies of *Ravnopravia* [Equal Rights] hold the opposite opinion. The People's Accord Party think that the president should visit both Moscow and London, and the faction of the Democratic Party suggest celebrating the anniversary of the end of the war and the beginning of the occupation at a scholarly conference here in Latvia—and then Guntis Ulmanis will not have to go anywhere.

The secretary of the board of *Latvijas cels* [Latvian Way], Indulis Berzinysh, said that *Latvijas cels* had not discussed how the country's president should celebrate the end of World War II, since the party does not want to try to tell Ulmanis what to do. *Latvijas cels* thinks that the president should consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and question adopt a decision regarding this in keeping with Latvia's foreign political concept. Minister of Foreign Affairs Valdis Birkavs said that the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the president of the country coincide, and they are working continuously on the development of a unified position. The adoption of a decision will depend on three factors—the unanimous opinion of the Baltic countries, the position of the European countries, and the actual procedure for the

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festivities. "If this event is to serve for the future, it is quite possible that the leaders of many countries will participate in it. If it is merely a remembrance of the past and a demonstration of military might, then they will not," said V. Birkavs.

Representatives of the National Bloc—DNNL [Latvian National Independence Movement], *Telzemei un Brivibai* [For Fatherland and Freedom], the Peasant Union of Latvia, and the Union of Christian Democrats—think that G. Ulmanis should go to London and not to Moscow, since Russia has not expressed a clear attitude toward the occupation of Latvia, and the victory the Russians will be celebrating is not the one that will be celebrated by the West and Latvia. The Chairman of the KhDS, Andris Grots, said that the only reason Ulmanis might go to Moscow anyway would be to join the other presidents of Baltic countries to make a public statement about the occupation.

The People's Accord Party thinks that the country's president should go to both London and Moscow, since these celebrations provide a good opportunity to remind Russia that 9 May marked the end of the power of just one monster, Hitler, and that Stalin's regime endured. It should be affirmed to the countries of the Council of Europe in London that Latvia belongs to their group, and they should be reminded of its fate.

The leader of the Political Association of National Economy Workers, Edvin Kide, expressed the personal opinion that Ulmanis should not go to Moscow, since Russia has not admitted its participation in the occupation of Latvia or the criminal essence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Ravnopraviya thinks that the president of Latvia absolutely must go to Moscow, since no other state has done as much to fight fascism as Russia. "The USSR fought against fascism, and Latvia as a former republic of the USSR must attend these festivities. History cannot be changed," said the leader of the *Ravnopraviya* faction, Filipp Stroganov.

The Democratic Party faction in the Saeima suggests discussing the end of the war, remembering the victims, and reminding people of the beginning of the long occupation of Latvia at a scholarly conference in Latvia, where the country's president could deliver a speech, and then he would not have to go either to Moscow or to London.

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